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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis investigates the relationship between ethics and aesthetics by analysing 
several artworks produced over the last fifty years. It argues that ethics and aesthetics 
relate to one another in historically specific ways, and that artworks represent a 
privileged point of access for seeing how this relationship forms and changes. I show 
that within this period it is possible to discern the rise and fall of a paradigmatic bond 
between ethics and aesthetics articulated around the concept of transgression. The 
paradigm of transgression has, I argue, suffered a historical decline in a range of 
contexts. The theoretical resources used to navigate through this decline are drawn from 
the work of Jacques Lacan and Félix Guattari, among others. Lacan’s work in particular 
is marked by a shift away from transgression that parallels the move within art. After 
focusing on figures such as Sade and Antigone in the early 1960s, a decade later Lacan 
turns to the work of James Joyce in order to reformulate the psychoanalytic concept of 
the symptom as ‘sinthome’. This concept shifts the ethical accent away from 
transgression towards creativity, and can be pushed in new directions by drawing on the 
work of Guattari. More than just a curious symmetry, the shift away from transgression 
in both art and theory occurs in response to a larger set of social changes in the function 
of language and prohibition. I conclude that the historical decline of such Symbolic 
forms makes a new relationship between ethics and aesthetics possible. The marriage 
between the two, I argue, can be brokered through their mutual participation in the 
production of subjectivity. The argument culminates by suggesting directions, in the 
form of the concepts of ‘repair’ and ‘fabulation’, along which this new ethico-aesthetic 
paradigm might develop.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Scatological shock-merchants, untrained social workers, conflict-zone tourists: from a 
certain standpoint the relationship between contemporary art and ethics involves a string 
of such negative conjunctions. At their centre stands the figure of the artist, whose 
personality and intentions often serve as an ethical measure of the work. This thesis 
operates on the basis of a slightly different premise: that the artwork itself has an ethical 
content, and looking at this content more closely can tell us about wider processes of 
social change.1 More than simply condensations of an artist’s own moral or ethical 
disposition, artworks fundamentally channel, express, and help shape the attitudes at 
play in their milieu. 
This thesis also operates on the basis that there is no fixed relationship between 
ethics and aesthetics; each artwork negotiates the relationship between the two in its 
own way. The number of different forms this relationship takes in contemporary art 
highlights the fundamentally unstable nature of the concepts themselves. Trying to 
make sense of the interrelations between ethics and aesthetics can sometimes feel like 
walking the fault-line between two tectonic plates; the sensation of movement under 
foot is ever-present. Nevertheless, the historical variability of the relationship between 
ethics and aesthetics periodically stabilises, and patterns of interaction emerge. These 
periods of stabilisation are what I call ethico-aesthetic paradigms.2  
The intention in part 1 is to show that an ethico-aesthetic paradigm can be 
articulated around the concept of ‘transgression’. Perhaps for many readers this would 
not come as much of a surprise. The word ethics rarely enters the discourse around 
contemporary art in a ‘positive’ way, and contemporary artworks are rarely held up as 
symbols of virtue. Across the cover of a recent reader on art and ethics the word 
‘scandalous’ is emblazoned in large letters, the book itself containing a catalogue of 
moral infringements.3 Despite the existence of such texts, very few authors have 
attempted to make sense of transgression in a sustained critical fashion. And very few 
have attempted to make sense of its patterns of historical emergence.  
																																																								
1  This focus on the ethical content of artworks does not in itself constitute a radically new approach to 
the subject, as demonstrated by the existence of books such as The Life and Death of Images: Ethics and 
Aesthetics, ed. by Diarmuid Costello and Dominic Willsdon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
2   The term ‘ethico-aesthetic paradigm’ has been borrowed from Félix Guattari, and forms the subtitle of 
his book Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm (Sydney: Power Publications, 1995).  
3   Scandalous: A Reader on Art and Ethics, ed. by Nina Möntmann (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2013). 
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Accounting for these patterns comprises the first of three ambitions in this 
thesis. The second ambition is to account for the fact that the ethico-aesthetic paradigm 
of transgression has, in a range of contexts, suffered a decline. It is my belief that this 
decline can be attributed less to the desensitisation of art audiences, as some might 
expect, and more to a set of wider socio-cultural changes. By definition, transgression 
cannot exist in isolation from the prohibitions it interacts with. The fact that 
transgression is dependent upon a specific set of socio-cultural norms means that 
looking at such norms is necessary in order to account for the decline of transgression 
itself. Perhaps the biggest claim this thesis makes, then, is that prohibition and its 
variants (boundaries, norms, rules, etc.) have themselves changed in function under late 
capitalism. Taking up and developing the theoretical resources of psychoanalysis, I 
argue that this can be adequately conceptualised as a decline in what Lacan called the 
Symbolic order; that is, the tissue of linguistic and social relations that condition 
subjectivity.4  
Lacan’s work runs like a red thread through this thesis, but it is not the primary 
object of investigation. The relevance of his work to the subject of transgression 
becomes clear when one turns to his well-known seminar on the Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis.5 Together with its companion essay ‘Kant with Sade’, this seminar 
provides a rich set of resources for thinking through the multi-faceted nature of 
transgression.6 As well as drawing on his ‘classical’ articulation of ethics in part 1, in 
the second half of this thesis I will follow Lacan’s work forward in time. Throughout 
his life Lacan continued to return to the subject of ethics, constantly revising and 
reformulating his ideas. If transgressive figures such as Sade and Antigone served as 
key reference points in the early 1960s, in the mid ‘70s Lacan turns to the work of 
James Joyce in order to reformulate the psychoanalytic concept of the symptom as 
‘sinthome’. Although it is not framed as a concept that has anything to do with ethics, I 
aim to show that Lacan’s late work justifies speaking of an ‘ethics of the sinthome’.  
The process of reformulation that generates this concept, among many others, is 
always informed both at the micro level by changes in psychoanalytic treatment and the 
macro level by larger socio-cultural shifts. As well as constituting an interpretative grid 																																																								
4  Where the words 'Symbolic', 'Imaginary' and 'Real' are used in this thesis to designate the three 
Lacanian orders of experience, they have been capitalised, unless they appear in quotations where the 
author has chosen not to do so.   
5  Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. 1959-1960, 
ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller (London: Tavistock / Routledge, 1992). 
6  Jacques Lacan, 'Kant with Sade', in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English (London: Norton, 
2006), pp. 645-668. 
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based on clinical symptoms, it was Lacan’s position that psychoanalysis is itself a 
symptom that responds to changes in the social bond.7 Rather than treating Lacanian 
theory as the locus of timeless concepts that can be applied to artworks, the approach 
will involve looking at how both art and psychoanalysis change over time. On the 
subject of ethics specifically, Lacan’s work is characterised by a movement away from 
transgression towards a pragmatic ethics of creativity. I intend to show that this final 
theoretical adventure can be advanced by drawing on the work of Lacan’s one-time 
student Félix Guattari, which represents both an extension and radical critique of some 
key Lacanian ideas. As will be discussed in more detail below, the potential dividends 
of taking up and developing Lacan’s work in dialogue with Guattari can be found in its 
capacity to modulate a new ethico-aesthetic paradigm emerging today. This is the third 
and final ambition of this thesis: not only to analyse the ethico-aesthetic paradigm of 
transgression, nor to explain its historical decline, but to trace the contours of a new 
ethico-aesthetic paradigm ‘after’ transgression. If the paradigm of transgression is 
articulated around various kinds of ‘boundary play’ – a series of interactions with 
existing lines that demarcate the morally good from its inverse – I intend to show that 
the post-transgressive paradigm is more concerned with the incubation and deployment 
of ‘lines of flight’; creative mutations that enliven their social milieu and bring about 
changes in the production of subjectivity.8   
From transgression to the production of subjectivity, from Antigone and Sade to 
Joyce, this thesis aims to capture a certain movement in art and theory that has taken 
place over roughly the last 50 years.9 If the first half operates in a primarily diagnostic 																																																								
7   The claim that psychoanalysis is itself a symptom is made in Jacques Lacan, ‘Conferences and 
Conversations at North American Universities’, Scilicet, 6/7 (1975) 7-31 (p. 14).  
8   On the concept of the ‘line of flight’ see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 
(London: Continuum, 1987). 
9   As Peter Osborne has recently argued, any attempt to establish the parameters of a period coinciding 
with ‘contemporary art’ purely on the basis of historical chronology is immediately beset by a number of 
problems, not least the difficulty in establishing a start date for such a period (is it 1946, when the 
Institute of Contemporary Arts in London was set up, 1989 after the fall of the Berlin wall, or somewhere 
in between – a response to the radical social, political and cultural upheavals of the 1960s?). Although all 
of the artworks discussed in this thesis have been produced in the period after the Second World War, 
their status as works of contemporary art does not rely on the dates or places in which they were 
produced. Rather than simply a periodising or spatialising category, for Osborne the contemporary is 
constituted both by ‘the coming together or different times’ and by ‘the relations between the social 
spaces in which these times are embedded and articulated’ (p. 23). On a temporal axis, contemporary art 
embodies a specific kind of futurity — one that differs from modernity’s insofar as it has less political 
purchase on the future, ‘contracting’ its anticipatory structure. Nevertheless, the fact that works of 
contemporary art are still being made means that any definition will necessarily be anticipatory to a 
certain degree. For Osborne one of the necessary features of contemporary artworks is that they demand 
to be thought out, and this act of thinking is co-constitutive of the definition of contemporary art itself, 
which exists as an ‘operative fiction’. My own use of the term ‘contemporary art’ follows such an 
approach (albeit in a productively loose way), both insofar as it seeks to think through the consequences 
of certain artworks, and insofar as doing so makes use of an operative fiction and ‘fills it out’ with 
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mode, attending to the specific conditions of an artwork’s emergence, then part 2 shifts 
into more speculative territory. It seeks to demonstrate that at the same time that art 
reflects history’s lines of force, it also has the capacity to deploy lines of its own. This 
shift from a reactive to an active mode – in a reconstructed Nietzschean sense of the 
words - is part of the overall shift this thesis seeks to identify and advance.10 However 
creative its representatives may be, artistic strategies associated with transgression, I 
intend to show, are always trapped by the targets of their critique.   
 
* * * 
 
Before these three ambitions can be progressively realised, a number of terms need 
clarifying. Ethics and aesthetics may denote historically variable formations, but in this 
thesis they nevertheless operate within certain boundaries circumscribed on the basis of 
particular theoretical traditions. Two other terms that appear repeatedly in the 
arguments that follow – ‘transgression’ and ‘sinthome’ – serve as major concepts that 
structure the first and second halves of the thesis. As such it is worth giving them an 
initial characterisation. Clarifying these four terms will also provide the opportunity for 
a number of key arguments to be laid out in embryonic form, while at the same time 
giving an account of how I intend them to grow over the chapters that follow.  
 
Ethics beyond Morality  
 
During his yearlong seminar on the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan made a passing 
reference to the 1960 film Never On Sunday, directed by Jules Dassin. Drawing 
attention to a scene of the film shot in a Greek restaurant, in which a character starts 
smashing glasses on the floor, Lacan points out that every time a glass is shattered the 																																																																																																																																																																		
empirical material. (p. 26) Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art 
(London: Verso, 2013). 
10  Nietzsche develops the distinction between passive and active modes in On the Genealogy of Morality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Writings from the Late Notebooks (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003)  where it denotes a qualitative difference that relates to forces. In these 
texts the relationship implies a hierarchy insofar as active forces are described as form-giving, whereas 
reactive forces are form-receiving. Deleuze’s influential study Nietzsche and Philosophy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006) frames the distinction as an ontological relation that differs from 
dialectics. For Deleuze active forces affirm an originary difference that reactive forces seek to neutralise 
or repress. Even though Nietzsche links reactive forces with law and justice in the Genealogy, it could be 
said that transgression is fundamentally reactive insofar as it partially receives its form from the 
boundaries it crosses. The shift to an active mode in part 2 of this thesis implies less the promotion of 
dominating, possessive characteristics of ‘the active will’ described in Nietzsche, Genealogy, pp. 52-5, 
than an attempt to escape such formal conditioning by affirming difference.  
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cash register in the restaurant vibrates frenetically, tallying up the cost it would take to 
replace the broken items.11 When the glass smashing stops and a fight breaks out, the 
cashier continues, and a ring of the till accompanies every punch thrown.  
Whilst anecdotal, this reference nevertheless provides a good characterisation of 
a certain strand of ethical thought. The scene’s significance hinges on the centrality of 
counting. More than just a neutral tallying of accounts, each entry in the cash register 
amounts to an act of moral measurement, and this act of measurement is imbued with 
the force of a judgment.      
Judgments are wielded in a similar way in a variety of contexts today. The rise 
of ethics committees, bioethics, business ethics, and doomed political appeals for an 
‘ethical capitalism’ could all be seen to operate like the cash register in the film, 
subjecting actions to measurement in the hope that further transgressions will be 
deterred. In many of its contemporary instantiations ethics is reduced to little more than 
a machine for making decisions. Actions are abstracted from a web of relations brought 
before a set of pre-established rules or criteria. The criteria themselves, like the cash 
register in the film, often remain unchanged by the process.   
For Alain Badiou the contemporary configuration of such mechanisms 
constitutes nothing less than an ‘ethical ideology’.12 While Badiou positions philosophy 
as an antidote to such ideology, in fact the structures that underpin many contemporary 
manifestations of ethics are not entirely absent from the history of philosophy itself.13 
Todd May provides a summary of a major shift in ethical thought when he claims that 
by the late 18th century the Socratic question ‘how should one live?’ is all but replaced 
by the question ‘how should one act?’ — the latter finding full expression in the 
enlightenment philosophies of Kant and Bentham.14 While the first question attends to 
the full scope of a life’s processual unfolding (a process inextricably entangled in the 
unfolding of other lives and the objects they come into contact with), the second 
question isolates individual acts or attitudes and feeds them into the machinery of moral 
judgment. Actions take place in neat parcels of time and space. The subject is alienated 
from their actions and the full scope of the environment in which they occur. If one 																																																								
11  Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, p. 317 (July 6 1960). 
12  Alain Badiou, Ethics: an Essay on the Understanding of Evil (London: Verso, 2002), p. 1. 
13  Ibid., p. 40.  
14  Todd May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 4. 
The first question appears in a modified form in Plato, Republic (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004), p. 32. As 
Nathan Jun points out, the second question in fact pre-dates Kantian or Utilitarian ethics considerably, 
appearing in the medieval moral casuistry of Christian thinkers such as Raymond of Pennafort, 
Bartholemew of San Concordio and Sylvester Prierias. Nathan Jun, ‘Deleuze, Values and Normativity’, 
in Deleuze and Ethics, ed. by Nathan Jun and Daniel W. Smith (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2011), pp. 89-107 (p. 91).  
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follows the etymological root of ethics back to ethos, which before Aristotle used it to 
describe moral character or virtue was used to refer to the home or habitat, then it 
becomes clear that any philosophy that wrenches specific actions from their ethos 
cannot, if one hews closely to the roots of the word, be an ethical philosophy.15  
One of the strategies a number of thinkers have adopted to ‘purify’ ethics is to 
relegate such mechanistic approaches to the domain of morality. If ethics remains tied 
to the question ‘how should one live?’, then morality becomes a particular offshoot of 
the ethical associated with the question ‘how should one act?’. Hegel, Deleuze, and 
Williams each in their own way try to separate ethics from morality.16  Deleuze 
charaterises morality as a rule-based system of judgment, which ‘always refers 
existence to transcendent values’.17 This act of referral enables the subject to cede 
responsibility to a higher authority, and reflection is reduced to a question of how to 
apply a rule correctly. By contrast, for Deleuze ethics involves a degree of flexibility, 
and as such requires deliberation, if not the construction of a new rule or solution to a 
problem. To add a further point of distinction, it could be said that ethics differs from 
morality on the basis that the former is historically linked to a tradition of thinking 
positively about the cultivation of specific virtues.18 By contrast, morality could be seen 
as an essentially corrective science that seeks to tame unruly matter. Under this division 
the good of morality is defined by little more than the prevention of evil.19  
In this thesis, I hope to demonstrate that if ethics has any meaning at all, it must 
be situated where such mechanistic moral judgment breaks down. Thinking about ethics 
in such a way does not automatically entail a return to ancient philosophy. Instead of 
bypassing ‘modern’ morality and advocating a return to the classical question of ethics, 																																																								
15  The word ‘ethos’ is used to refer to home or habitat in Homer, The Iliad (London: Penguin, 2003), 
book 6, line 511; and Homer, The Odyssey  (London, Penguin, 2003), Book 14, line 411. 
16 In The Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel links ethical life, or ethical substance [Sittlichkeit] to 
immediate action, decisiveness, character and so on, while Morality [Moralität] is related to reflexive 
action, action referred to a transcendent value beyond the domain of entities. Ethical life for Hegel is also 
embedded, and operates on the basis of virtues, rather than prohibitions. Central to the organisation of 
these virtues is the idea of a shared way of life, a community, and individual agents within that 
community that fulfill particular duties that may or may not hold true for other communities. Morality on 
the other hand is something universal, not rooted in any particular community, and categorical (Hegel 
often uses the term in a way synonymous with Kantian morality). The moral position ‘knows duty to be 
the absolute essence’ and demands all agents, irrespective of differences in culture, community etc., to 
adhere to its tenets. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 
365. In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Bernard Williams claims, in a similar vein to Todd May, that 
morality constitutes ‘a particular development of the ethical’ linked to ‘processes of modernization’, the 
reformation, and a rationalistic world-view more generally. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy (London: Fontana Press, 1993), p. 8. 
17  Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), p. 23. 
18  The key thinker here is Aristotle, whose ideas around ‘flourishing’ (eudaimonia) form the cornerstone 
of his ethics. See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
19  Badiou argues that the doctrine of human rights conceives of ethics as ‘an a priori ability to discern 
evil’. Badiou, Ethics, p. 8. 
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‘how should one live’, it might be possible to reformulate the question itself. To the two 
questions above, May adds a third, which he links to a handful of 20th century thinkers 
including Sartre, Deleuze, Foucault and Derrida: not ‘how should I live?’, nor ‘how 
should I act?’, but ‘how might one live?’ The simple modal verb introduces the crucial 
ingredient of creativity into ethics that forestalls any attempt to temper it into a system 
of measurement.   
An important point of origin for this creative approach to ethics is the work of 
Spinoza. The oft-repeated refrain that ‘no one has yet determined what the body can 
do’20 does not only imply an act of temporal postponement, but also a self-differing 
movement that opens up a crack for ethics to crawl into; a crack that separates a body 
from the understanding it has of itself - or in other words, an unconscious. The two 
thinkers that play a decisive role in this thesis, Jacques Lacan and Félix Guattari, each in 
their own way occupy this crack and preserve the creative approach to ethics Spinoza’s 
work inspires. Although only a handful of scattered references to the latter can be found 
in Lacan’s work, details in Élisabeth Roudinesco’s biography show just how much 
influence the philosopher exerted on the young Lacan.21 When he comes to delivering 
his seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan, like Spinoza, would place desire at 
the heart of his reflections on ethics, not as something that needs to be trained like a 
wayward dog, but as the driving force of self-actualisation.22 Both thinkers emphasise 
the necessity of extricating oneself from conditions that would prevent such processes 
of self-actualisation from taking place, conditions that make the subject into a passive 
automaton of social norms, rather than the cause of their own actions. In part 2 of this 
thesis I argue that the accent in Lacan’s work shifts even more onto this idea of self-
authorship, especially in Seminar XXIII, where James Joyce takes centre stage as the 
conceptual persona who in effect ‘authors’ himself through an act of extra-literary 
composition. 
  In Guattari’s work creativity also plays a crucial role. This is no more so than in 
his elaborations of what he alternately calls ‘the new aesthetic paradigm’ and the 
‘ethico-aesthetic paradigm’. Here ethical choice no longer emanates from a 
‘transcendent enunciation, a code of law or a unique and all powerful god’, but instead 																																																								
20  Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics (London: Penguin, 1996), p. 71. 
21  See Élisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997). The influence is 
sufficiently recognised by authors such as Shoshana Felman that she can claim that ‘the whole of Lacan 
can be understood as putting Spinoza and Freud together’. Shoshana Felman, ‘Between Spinoza and 
Lacan and Us’, in The Claims of Literature: A Shoshana Felman Reader, ed. by Emily Sun, Eyal Peretz 
and Ulrich Baer (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), pp. 448-474 (p. 461). 
22  Spinoza’s concept of conatus can be seen as a precursor to psychoanalytic conceptions of desire. 
Conatus will be taken up again in chapter 5.  
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flows from creativity itself, which necessitates an attitude of ‘responsibility of the 
created instance with regard to the thing created, inflexions of the state of things, 
bifurcation beyond pre-established schemas’.23 In making a claim for such a creative 
approach to ethics, it might be objected that ethics has once again been severed from its 
etymological roots in ethos. Contrary to appearances, by placing the question ‘how 
might one live?’ at the centre of ethics, an ethos is retained, but not as a natural order in 
which a subject finds their place, as it did in ancient Greece. An ethos can instead be 
seen as a dynamic social body capable of being injected with fresh possibilities. When 
placed against a larger backdrop dominated by what Guattari calls the ‘steam roller 
subjectivity’ created by capitalism, posing the question ‘how might one live?’ takes on a 
distinctly political valence.24  
 
Aesthetics beyond Beauty 
 
The concept of a ‘new aesthetic paradigm’ elaborated in Guattari’s final book highlights 
an idea of aesthetics that differs from some other understandings of the word. Tracing 
some of these points of difference will be useful in throwing his, and my own approach 
to aesthetics into sharper relief.  
In the sense I use it here, aesthetics is not grounded in a study of beauty. Even in 
its radically stripped down Kantian form, the concept of beauty is ill-equipped to 
account for many of the artworks discussed in this thesis, particularly those in part 1 
that could be labeled ‘transgressive’. As Kieran Cashell convincingly argues, artworks 
that deliberately solicit such emotions as disgust, anger, or outrage not only flagrantly 
contradict the key Kantian precondition to aesthetic judgment: disinterestedness, but are 
often directed precisely against this mode of appreciating art, encouraging the viewer to 
respond in what Kant would call a ‘pathological’ way.25 As well as the aesthetic ideal of 
beauty, in this thesis I also take care to avoid reinforcing other values that might be said 
to underwrite aesthetic judgment, such as the good, the sublime, or the truthful.  
Needless to say Kant’s aesthetic philosophy is not limited to reflections on the 
preconditions for apprehending beauty. In the third critique aesthetics is elevated to the 																																																								
23  Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 107. 
24  Ibid., p. 91. 
25  Kieran Cashell, Aftershock: The Ethics of Contemporary Transgressive Art (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2009), p. 7. The notion of disinterestedness does however percolate through Guattari’s account of 
aesthetics, resulting from an artwork’s ‘detachment’ from the ‘field of dominant significations’. Guattari, 
Chaosmosis, p. 13. This notion of detachment will be discussed in greater detail in the paragraphs that 
follow, as well as in chapter 4.   
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status of a faculty that deals with sensory cognition rather than simply an attribute of 
particular objects.26 This means that aesthetics is not the preserve of art alone, but rather 
a fundamental faculty of human experience. In its new role, the aesthetic becomes a 
mode of perception that exceeds the cognitive or conceptual tendencies of the 
understanding. While cognition’s quest for generalising laws and schemas tends to stifle 
the sensual particulars of experience, aesthetics attends to these particulars. It is the 
name for the activity that describes how reality is itself formed through sensory 
experiences, while at the same time preserving their character as resistant to 
conceptualisation.  
In Kant’s hands, aesthetics is also what allows a subject to deal with new 
situations that exceeds their cognitive means for making sense of the world. With 
aesthetics, ‘the imagination is free to provide, beyond that concord with the concept; 
unsought extensive undeveloped material for the understanding’.27 For Guattari the way 
aesthetics facilitates creativity is perhaps its most important feature, and although by no 
means a Kantian, Guattari often posits ideas that are not incompatible with Kant’s 
aesthetics in this way. As for Kant, for Guattari aesthetics moves beyond the given, 
supplying ‘a surplus value of subjectivity or, in other terms, the bringing to light of a 
negentropy at the heart of the banality of the environment’.28 Here aesthetics is both the 
activity that makes new experiences possible and a means by which to discern 
restrictive modes of thinking.  
Despite this Kantian inheritance there is an assertion in Guattari’s last work that 
aesthetics is both on the side of the subject (as a faculty, in Kant’s sense) and on the 
side of the object. To account for the relationship between the two, he draws on the 
work of the Chilean biologist Francisco Varela, whose groundbreaking concept of 
autopoiesis (initially formulated with Humberto Maturana) posits a reciprocal relation 
between living entities and the background environments to which they belong. In 
abbreviated form, an autopoietic relationship is one that accounts for the way in which 
entities ‘self separate’ from their background environment at the same time as they 
‘regenerate and realize the network that produces them’.29 Freely expanding Varela’s 																																																								
26  Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
27  Ibid., p. 194.  
28  Guattari, Chaosmosis p. 131.  
29  Francisco Varela, ‘Autopoiesis and a Biology of Intentionality’ in Autopoiesis And Perception: A 
Workshop with ESPRIT BRA 3352 (Addendum), ed. by Barry McMullin and Noel Murphy (Dublin: 
Dublin City University, 1992), pp. 4-14 (p. 7, 4.) As Varela writes, ‘an autopoietic system depends on its 
physico-chemical mileu for its conservation as a separate entity, otherwise it would dissolve back into it. 
Whence the intriguing paradoxicality proper to an autonomous identity: the living system must 
distinguish itself from its environment, while at the same time maintaining its coupling; this linkage 
	 18	
‘bio-logic’ concept to discuss aesthetic objects, Guattari speaks of artworks as both 
expressions of the environments from which they emerge and in some ways constitutive 
of new ‘existential territories’ at the same time.30 In a characteristically lateral move, he 
associates this dynamic with the early aesthetic theory of Mikhail Bakhtin, for whom 
the aesthetic object detaches itself from ‘the unity of nature and the unity of the ethical 
event of being’, before it can speak back to an audience in a way that exceeds their pre-
established ways of making sense of the world.31  
My own account of artworks and their relation to the world is indebted to such 
an approach. Throughout this thesis I tack between what might be considered typically 
aesthetic discussions pertaining to the material composition of artworks, and wider 
ranging sociological concerns related to the conditions under which artworks are 
produced and apprehended. Ultimately the aim is to build a bridge between the two, to 
highlight the way in which the works discussed are inextricably woven into the social 
fabric from which they emerge, yet at the same time irreducible to this fabric. This 
irreducibility is what allows the artwork to overspill its social ‘container’ in an 
autopoietic movement that has the potential to feed back into the production of 
subjectivity at the level of individuals as well as groups.  
The decision to ground the argument in a study of artworks should not be taken 
to impose limits on the definition of aesthetics in general. If, following Kant, the 
activity of aesthetics can be brought to bear on experiences beyond the realm of art, 
then it can also be brought to bear on subjectivity itself. This is one of the fundamental 
insights Guattari and Lacan bring to this thesis, and what makes it an essentially ethico-
aesthetic enterprise, providing answers to the question ‘how might one live?’ Since its 
inception, psychoanalysis has dealt the means by which subjects change themselves. 
Guattari’s broadening of the conceptual resources used to bring about this change is 
accompanied by a greater role for art and aesthetics more generally.  
  
																																																																																																																																																																		
cannot be detached since it is against this very environment from which the organism arises’. p. 7.  
30  Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 15.  
31  Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form in Verbal Art’, in Art and 
Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, ed. by Michael Holquist and Vadim 
Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), pp. 257-325, (p. 306). For Bakhtin the ‘ethical event 
of being’ is roughly equivalent to a chaotic material substance of life. Although he plays a relatively 
minor part in the overall theoretical trajectory of this thesis, Bakhtin’s work will be invaluable in chapters 
4 and 6.   
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A Postscript to Transgression 
 
Having grounded the approach to ethics and aesthetics in particular traditions, it is 
worth now turning to one of the possible conjunctions between the two: transgression. 
Rather than ridding this term of its equivocations, here I would like simply to sketch out 
a few broad characteristics of transgression and transgressive art, allowing space in 
chapters 1-3 for artworks to progressively add flesh to the concept, developing it in the 
process. 
 One characteristic of transgression is that it is an inherently relational concept. 
Any attempt to isolate a transgression from the law or limit it interacts with is doomed 
from the start. This relational aspect is already present in the letters of St. Paul, where 
transgression is shown to enter into a compact with the law, so that without one the 
other ceases to exist.32 Given the interdependency this entails, it might be suggested that 
transgression always operates in a dialectical fashion. While dialectics undoubtedly 
saturates the transgressive imaginary, in this thesis I attempt to expose its other modes 
of interaction and interdependency. As Deleuze claims, the ‘dialectic thrives on 
oppositions because it is unaware of far more subtle and subterranean differential 
mechanisms; topological displacements, typological variations.’33 One of the aims of 
part 1 is to enumerate a typology of different ‘logics’ of transgression that do not 
necessarily adhere to dialectical schema. For example in chapter 1 it will be argued that 
transgression can operate on the basis of an ‘anamorphic’ logic, revealing a space 
beyond the Symbolic categories of good and evil; in chapter 2 the bearer of such 
categories will be subject to a disorientating force that disengages categorical impulses, 
and in chapter 3 the constructive potential of transgression will be explored.  
 Despite the scope of its logical variations, transgression is nonetheless a 
relational concept always in some way bound up with morality. This point allows a 
distinction to be made between a transgressive relationship and one charaterised by 
mere illegality. Transgression goes beyond illegality, not only breaking a law or limit, 
but also doing so in such a way that attracts moral condemnation. This does not 
automatically imply that transgression is itself a moral concept — in some cases the 
opposition to laws or limits becomes a way of life, an existential solution, and in doing 
so it becomes possible to speak of an ‘ethics’ of transgression. It simply means that 																																																								
32  Romans 7. 8. ‘without the law the sin was dead’. 
33  Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 157. 
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transgression is irrevocably linked to morality, regardless of the form this link might 
take.   
 To these two broad characteristics it is possible to add a third: transgression is a 
dynamic concept, which describes an action, or operation, rather than a state of being. 
Even though I have claimed that it is possible to enumerate a number of different 
‘logics’ of transgression, these logics should not be understood as structural constants 
that exist irrespective of history or geography. Needless to say, logic itself has a history 
and geography, even if it has the capacity to reconfigure the very spatial and temporal 
co-ordinates these concepts operate within. Transgression also has a history and 
geography, and the circulation of its logical forms constitutes a dynamic pattern of 
interactions.    
 It is not the intention to give an exhaustive account of these interactions. In this 
way my discussion of transgression stops short of following Chris Jenks, whose book 
centres on the concept itself as it appears in academic disciplines as diverse as 
anthropology, literary studies, philosophy and criminology.34 The main focus of part 1 
remains that of transgressive art, and in particular artworks that while temporally 
dispersed and geographically disparate nevertheless enter into dialogue with one 
another in their mutual construction of the ethico-aesthetic paradigm of transgression. 
Rather than uncovering this epistemological object in one monumental archeological 
enterprise, my own role should be seen as that of a co-creator of this paradigm, 
facilitating a dialogue between the artworks that constitute it. 
Considered as an action or operation, transgressive art cannot be treated as a 
particular style, movement or method. If I stop short of following the concept of 
transgression to the ends of the trans-disciplinary terrain upon which it operates, my 
approach also avoids an art-historical nominalism that would impose artificial limits on 
what can be considered transgressive art by virtue of its production date, appearance, or 
the intention of the artist.35 Speaking of transgression as ‘a logic’ (a primarily relational 
logic at that) compels me to attend to the non-linear patterns of transgressive art’s 
emergence. While historical precedents may indeed exist (in the literature of Baudelaire 
or the painting of Manet, to take two habitually repeated examples), these precedents 																																																								
34  Chris Jenks, Transgression (London: Routledge, 2003). In her account of ‘contemporary transgressive 
art’ Cashell barely casts her gaze beyond the YBA phenomena associated with Damien Hirst, Tracey 
Emin, Marcus Harvey and the Chapman brothers (among others). In another sense the study is narrow 
insofar as it neglects almost all social factors such as the class dynamics at play in the YBA’s work or the 
burgeoning British art market at the time.  
35  Here my approach differs considerably from Anthony Julius’s when he speaks of a ‘transgressive 
period’ with its own back history and canonical stepping-stones throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Anthony Julius, Transgressions: The Offences of Art (London: Thames & Hudson, 2002). 
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cannot be positioned as origins on a historical telos. As a dynamic and relational 
concept, transgression co-evolves in reciprocal dialogue with moral norms, institutional 
arrangements and legal forms — for example article 516 of the Austrian penal code that 
was repeatedly used to prosecute the Viennese Actionists, as will be discussed in 
chapter 1. As I hope to show, the extent to which an artwork can be called transgressive 
is tied to the fate of these arrangements and forms. An artwork cannot be designated 
transgressive once and for all, and filed in an art-historian’s dossier of precedent cases.  
 Given these three broad characteristics — to recapitulate, that transgression is 1) 
relational, 2) bound up with (but irreducible to) morality, and 3) dynamic — a look at 
transgressive art necessarily entails the careful work of contextualisation that brings the 
laws, limits and moral norms of a particular socio-cultural context into sharper relief. 
As I have said, these laws and limits are themselves socially contingent forms, and any 
change in their nature brings about changes to the nature of transgression as well. If the 
first half of this thesis constitutes a critique of the transgressive ethico-aesthetic 
paradigm, this is crucially not a critique on the basis of moral categories of right or 
wrong. Rather it is an attempt to see what happens to such artworks when the socio-
cultural co-ordinates of their production and reception change. Here the proposition put 
forward is a relatively simple one: that a ‘strong’ Symbolic order is a necessary pre-
condition of transgression. The notion that the Symbolic order is in decline (a thesis 
inspired by the work of Lacan) seeks to account for a change in the logic of social 
organisation linked to capitalism.36 While changes to the latter have had a visible effect 
on institutional arrangements and modes of production, it could be argued that they 
have also had a less visible effect on moral frameworks and the Symbolic bonds that 
mediate relations between people. This is not to say that laws, prohibitions, or cultural 
norms have ceased to exist in the contexts I engage with - contemporary society is 
																																																								
36  The phrase ‘decline of the Symbolic’ is used throughout this thesis as an umbrella term to describe a 
number of different changes in the way the Symbolic functions. It appears scattered across Lacanian 
inspired English language scholarship, but nowhere elaborated at any length. See Veronique Voruz, 
‘Ethics and Morality in the Time of the Decline of the Symbolic’, Psychoanalytical Notebooks, 25 
(2012), 167-178 and Neal H. Bruss, ‘Lacan and Literature: Imaginary Objects and Social Order’, The 
Massachusetts Review, 22:1 (1981), 62-92. The idea can also be traced back to two essays by Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, ‘The Effectiveness of Symbols’ and ‘The Sorcerer and his Magic’, where the author 
discuses the power of symbols in magical rites. The social consensus that surrounds the techniques of a 
particular shaman, Lévi-Strauss argues, is based on its relationship to wider systems of meaning that 
attempt to make sense of the world and preserve consistency in their systematic functioning. Magic 
constitutes a language, ‘whose function is to provide a socially authorized translation of phenomena’. (pp. 
184-185). At first gloss, the term ‘decline of the Symbolic’ could be said to describe a situation when this 
authorisation ebbs away, not simply because it is replaced by faith in the power of another language or 
symbolic system, but because of a more general decline in faith itself. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
Structural Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1963).  
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arguably more densely regulated than ever before - but rather that the way authority 
percolates through them has changed, for better or worse. 
If the fixed anchoring points of the Symbolic have indeed become untethered, 
then this undoubtedly also has effects on the production and reception of transgressive 
art. This argument, if correct, should not be used to lure artists into further dialectical 
games. Attempts to outmaneuver capitalism by somehow transgressing transgression 
itself often result in little more than ironic over-identification with norms and 
prohibitions.37 A more pressing task is to look for alternative ethico-aesthetic paradigms 
that are emerging today. Rather than mourn the eclipse of a strong Symbolic order, this 
new paradigm may allow a space for the subject to be preserved through its occlusion.  
 
A Preface to the Sinthome  
 
Moving beyond a critique of transgression, part 2 will focus its energy on developing an 
alternative ethico-aesthetic paradigm. Taking my cue from a similar shift away from 
transgression that occurs in Lacan’s seminars, in this half of the thesis I will draw on the 
resources his later work has to offer. 
Largely overlooked in the secondary literature, Lacan’s late theoretical 
enterprise crystallises around the concept of the ‘sinthome’, and much of chapter 4 will 
be dedicated to piecing together the fragmentary exposition it is given in the 
unpublished seminar Joyce the Sinthome.38 To give an initial gloss on this concept, the 
sinthome represents a reformulation of the classical psychoanalytic concept of the 
symptom, so that it no longer represents a message to be deciphered, or a metaphoric 
product of the unconscious, but a subjective creation that holds Lacan’s three orders of 
the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real together. Lacan hypothesises that Joyce’s 
writing had a sinthomatic function for the author, creating a ‘prosthetic’ ego that 
allowed his psychic world to knot together. The expression ‘knot together’ is used here 
advisedly, for in addition to his reading of Joyce’s text, it is by means of an engagement 
with the topology of knots that Lacan elaborates his concept of the sinthome. Insofar as 																																																								
37  This is the position Anthony Julius puts forward in Transgressions, where he invites the reader to 
‘contemplate the vertiginous thought that the exceeding of boundaries itself represents a notional 
boundary to be exceeded.’ (p. 198). 
38  This seminar has been published in French as Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan: Livre 
XXIII, Le Sinthome, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2005). An official translation 
of the seminar has yet to be published in English. Throughout this thesis I will be quoting from an 
unpublished translation by Cormac Gallagher. To facilitate cross-referencing between the two, the 
original date that Lacan delivered his seminar will be provided. For sake of consistency, this information 
will also be provided when Lacan’s other seminars are quoted, even those whose translations have been 
officially published in English.  
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topology focuses on geometrical figures that withstand continuous deformation, Lacan 
uses it to model processes of subjective change that stave off the devastating effects of a 
psychotic break.   
The twin preoccupations of Joyce and topology that guide Lacan’s final work 
could be seen as a distraction from the main focus of this thesis. However, when they 
are viewed as tools for thinking about processes of subjectivation, I would argue the 
subject of ethics once again comes into play. Put otherwise, Lacan’s engagement with 
both Joyce and the topology of knots supplies tools for answering the question ‘how 
might one live?’ Insofar as these tools factor in artistic creation, they also bear on the 
domain of aesthetics. Furthermore, the implications of this ethico-aesthetic enterprise, I 
would argue, amount to nothing less than a non-oedipal reformulation of psychoanalysis 
itself. This of course is what Lacan’s one-time student Félix Guattari would advance 
under the banner of schizoanalysis.39 In part 2 I attempt to show that a partial synthesis 
between the two thinkers is possible. This attempt cuts against the grain of most 
contemporary scholarship on either Lacan or Guattari, which, with a few exceptions, 
erects persistent barriers to thinking through their work in combination.40 Despite the 																																																								
39  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Bloomsbury, 2012). Much of this thesis 
could indeed be filtered though a certain reading of Anti-Oedipus — in particular, the notion of a ‘decline 
in the Symbolic’ has a strong relation to the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of deterritorialisation — yet to 
do so would fundamentally change the character of the argument in a number of ways. Firstly, a Lacanian 
approach scales back the sheer exuberance for deterritorialising flows that Anti-Oedipus unleashes, 
considering processes of subjectivation that are processual in a sustainable way. Secondly, it makes 
historical claims that are both more modest and more empirically grounded than those made in Anti-
Oedipus - taking into account socio-symbolic changes that (in chapters 1-3 at least) have taken place over 
the last 50 years in specific places. By contrast, the processes of deterritorialisation discussed by Deleuze 
and Guattari are linked to a macro-historical transition between three ‘social machines’ in Anti-Oedipus: 
the savage-territorial, the barbarian-despotic and the civilized-capitalist. While these molar forms are not 
stages of development in any straightforward historical materialist sense (the reader is told, in an 
inversion of the Marxist formulation, that ‘capitalism has haunted all forms of society’ (p. 164)), in 
certain respects they are nevertheless linked to historically situated social formations that span vast 
stretches of history. A final reason for adopting a Lacanian approach rather than one inspired by Anti-
Oedipus concerns the way in which their respective oeuvres historically develop in contact with the 
social. Fundamentally, it is easier to treat Lacan’s work as a praxis that develops in response to social 
change, not only because of its yearly development in his seminars, but also because Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is attuned to the appearance of new symptoms presented in the clinic, which in turn, 
requires an attunement to new social formations that influence them. For the purposes of my argument, 
this has the secondary benefit of highlighting a shift away from transgression that simultaneously occurs 
in Lacan’s work and in artistic practice, and the way in which this shift is conditioned by social change. 
On the notion of Lacanian psychoanalysis as a praxis, see Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Psychoanalysis in Close 
Touch with the Social’ <http://www.lacan.com/jamsocial.html> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
40  These boundaries have, for example, been reinforced by Slavoj Žižek, who in Organs without Bodies: 
On Deleuze and Consequences (Oxon: Routledge, 2004) claims that ‘one can only regret that the Anglo-
Saxon reception of Deleuze (and, also, the political impact of Deleuze) is predominantly that of a 
“guattarized” Deleuze’ (p. 18). Guattari’s crime, for Žižek, would seems to consist in ridding Deleuze of 
the Lacanian influence his early work attests to, and introducing a logic of becoming as production, rather 
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need to overcome these boundaries and deal with the complex relationship between 
Lacan and Guattari’s work, this thesis remains primarily focused on the relationship 
between ethics and aesthetics in contemporary art. For this reason any synthesis is made 
on pragmatic grounds, and in chapter 4 Guattari’s work will be enlisted as a means to 
solve a particular problem in Lacan’s late work linked to his privileging of signification 
over and above other semiotic forms. This is the product of a structuralist inheritance 
that while stripped of its universal pretensions, nevertheless persists in upholding the 
same signifying cut. When it comes to Lacan’s analysis of Joyce and the sinthomatic 
formation that his work manifests, this has the knock-on effect that lends his work a 
certain a-sociality; incapable, according to the psychoanalyst, of having group effects. 
By contrast, Guattari (writing with Negri) stakes a claim for the ‘the collective creation 
of subjectivity through individuals’.41 As I hope to show by engaging with Guattari’s 
work, this is a process that has the capacity to occur through a-signifying means.  
Despite its drawbacks, there are numerous advantages of drawing on Lacan’s 
late work, not least the fact that the concept of the sinthome is ‘conditioned’ or 
contaminated by Joyce’s works of literary art. This thesis could therefore be considered 
to bring about a second process of contamination, considering and developing a 
‘sinthomatic’ approach to specific works of contemporary art. 42  To encourage 
contamination of this sort is to take a necessarily irreverent stance towards theoretical 
conventions. After a careful reading of Seminar XXIII, I attempt to add new, creative 
inflexions to the concept of the sinthome by discussing the ethico-aesthetic concepts of 
‘repair’ in chapter 5 and ‘fabulation' in chapter 6. The concept of repair is inspired by 																																																																																																																																																																		
than becoming as effect. Among the studies that seek to avoid such stark characterisations and find a 
productive engagement between the two thinkers are Simon O’ Sullivan, On the Production of 
Subjectivity: Five Diagrams of the Finite–Infinite Relation (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) and 
Janell Watson, Guattari’s Diagrammatic Thought: Writing Between Lacan and Deleuze (London: 
Continuum, 2009).  
41  Félix Guattari and Antonio Negri, Communists Like Us (New York: Semiotext(e), 1990), p. 19. 
42  Of the two studies that also make use of Lacan’s concept of the sinthome in the discussion of 
artworks, Marc James Léger, Brave New Avant Garde (Alresford: Zero, 2012) is problematic insofar as it 
scales up psychoanalytic concepts to the level of the social without providing any of the necessary 
scaffolding to support them. (p. 121) What he calls ‘sinthomeopathic practice’ mysteriously becomes a 
feature of neo-avant-garde attempts at institutional transformation, which Léger opposes to a Deleuzo-
Guattarian position that supposedly calls ‘for an “exodus” from the established institutions of cultural 
production’ (p. 3) In this case Léger defines sinthomeopathy negatively on the basis of old battle lines 
drawn between different schools of continental philosophy, seeming to forget that it was Guattari who 
coined the term ‘institutional analysis’ and that his work at la Borde in may ways adheres to much that he 
valorises in contemporary avant garde art practice. The second study, an edited book by Parveen Adams 
entitled Art: Sublimation or Symptom (London: Karnac, 2003), hews more closely to the Lacanian text. 
This means that many of the chapter contributions follow up existing leads, for example providing 
additional (Lacanian) readings of James Joyce. Two chapters by Adams herself use the concept of the 
sinthome to discuss David Cronenberg’s Crash and the photography of Joel-Peter Witkin respectively, 
and what emerges is an argument that attempts to expand the concept of the sinthome to account for 
‘group effects’, an attempt I make myself in chapter 4 via a different route.  
	 25	
the sculptures and installations of Kader Attia - an artist whose work testifies to a messy 
set of interactions between peoples and cultures. An attempt to think through the ethico-
aesthetic implications of Attia’s work will allow me to expand the notion of a ‘repair’ 
beyond its quotidian meaning. More than just a set of reflections on material practices 
of repair, this chapter will mobilise the concept to explore its place as a middle term 
between change and continuity, sameness and difference, and matter and meaning. 
Ultimately, it will be claimed, the sinthome is a concept that is inextricably linked to 
processes of repair. Chapter 6 will depart in a similar fashion from concrete works of art 
— in this case by the artists Dora Garcia and Pilvi Takala — in order to consider 
practices of deception, fiction and fabulation (as well as the differences between them). 
Here Bakhtin’s work will reenter the discussion, as his concept of ‘gay deception’ is 
mobilised to account for the critical effects such experiments with truth can have. As 
well as having a critical focus, I intend to show that deception, fiction and fabulation 
can also have a constructive dimension, which creates effects that can in turn feed back 
into the production of subjectivity. While both chapters include extended analyses of 
works of art, they do not so much constitute ‘case studies’ as opportunities for the 
broader implications of a post-transgressive ethico-aesthetic paradigm to be elaborated. 
This could also be said of the first three chapters as regards the ethico-aesthetic 
paradigm of transgression. Focused discussions of a number of artworks by the 
Viennese Actionists in chapter 1, The Cinema of Transgression and Paul McCarthy in 
chapter 2, and Artur Żmijewksi in chapter 3, will each offer up different logics of 
transgression. The critique of these logics will progressively build from chapter to 
chapter, amounting to a more general critique of the ethico-aesthetic paradigm of 
transgression. This critique will be based on the assertion that such transgressive logics 
are undermined by a ‘decline in the Symbolic’ — a notion that will run through each of 
the chapters of part 1, and also provide a backdrop to part 2. Before this argument can 
be made, the work itself must be described, beginning with a notorious performance that 
took place in a cellar in Austria in 1962.  	 	
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Chapter 1 
Transgression: The Dialectical and the Liminal 
 
 
With the formality of a radio announcement Hermann Nitsch described the intended 
content of an early performance: 'On the 4th June, 1962, I shall disembowel, tear and 
pull to pieces a dead lamb'. This statement of intent is the opening line of an early text 
by the artist entitled 'The O.M. Theatre'.43 The essay continues by means of a string of 
explanations and justifications that hinge on the dialectical play of opposites. In Nitsch's 
universe blasphemy provides access to the sacred, brutality leads to ecstasy, and artifice 
collides with the highest of ontological truths.  
Along with Günter Brus, Otto Mühl, and Rudolf Schwarzkogler, Nitsch was a 
key figure in a group that came to be known as the Viennese Actionists, an appellation 
that was not generated by the artists themselves, but by Peter Wiebel in his 1970 co-
edited book of the same name.44 Within its short lifespan of just 6 years (1962 - 1968), 
the group performed acts that shocked the Austrian public and resulted in almost 
continuous criminal prosecution throughout the decade. Actions regularly incorporated 
animal carcasses, mock crucifixions, bodily fluids, and bloodletting. Just as Nitsch's 
first statement about his work contains a string of oppositions, the Actionist’s back 
catalogue as a whole is underpinned by a strong dialectical undercurrent. And yet this 
undercurrent periodically gives way to another, altogether more complicated logic of 
transgression, whereby a ‘liminal’ space beyond both transgression and the law is 
momentarily revealed.  
In order to account for these different logics of transgression, the focus in this 
chapter will narrow on two different readings of Sophocles' Antigone, the first by Hegel, 
and the second by Lacan. At the same time, it will be necessary to place the work of the 
Viennese Actionists in context. The relevance of post-war Austria as a backdrop to the 
group's actions has been well documented in the art-historical literature on the subject. 
This literature often focuses quite narrowly on the socio-political events that took place 
																																																								
43  Hermann Nitsch, 'The O.M. Theatre', in Theories and Documents on Contemporary Art, ed. by 
Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz (Berkley: University of California press, 1996), pp. 747-748 (p. 747). 'O.M.' 
stands for Orgies Mysteries, the collective title for a body of actions Nitsch has choreographed and 
performed over the last 50 years. 
44  Wien. Bildkompendium Wiener Aktionismus und Film ed. by Peter Weibel and VALIE EXPORT 
(Frankfurt am Main: Kohlkunstverlag, 1970). 
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before and during the group's short, intense life span.45 While this is essential to 
understanding the Actionist’s significance, it comes at the expense of thinking about 
how Austrian society has changed since then, and how the reception of the group's work 
has changed with it. By widening the parameters of this historical bracket, I will attempt 
to show that a change has occurred in the way the state reacts to transgressive art, and 
draw from it a lesson about the diminished force of transgression in the Austrian 
context. As the only group member still working in Austria today, largely in the same 
artistic idiom as he did in the 1960s, a more narrow focus on the work of Hermann 
Nitsch will provide a useful vehicle to look at this change.  
 
The Dialectics of Transgression 
 
While the majority of part 1 follows the Deleuzian injunction to look for ‘subterranean 
differential mechanisms’ beyond dialectics, when it comes to the work of the Actionists 
it is worth first lingering above ground. 46  An initial focus on the dialectics of 
transgression is warranted not only by the theoretical rationalisations produced by 
Nitsch, which show a strong tendency to think in terms of opposites being reconciled, 
nor simply in the elements of the performances themselves, but also in the relationships 
between the works and the state apparatus they inevitably came into contact with.47 This 
relationship will be easier to discern once a specific work has been described in detail.  
Nitsch's short text quoted above served as an announcement for the group's first 
collective action entitled The Blood Organ, which took place in the summer of 1962 in 
a cellar belonging to Otto Mühl in the Perinetgasse district of Vienna. Nitsch, Mühl and 
Frohner announced that they would be interning themselves in the cellar for 3 days and 
nights without food, a newly constructed brick wall blocking the entrance and thereby 
preventing them from leaving. In fact the artists had made sure there was a back door 
allowing free access for the duration of the performance. Once inside the cellar, Nitsch 
alternated between working on the dead lamb, using his hands, teeth and tools to tear, 
chew and slice the animal, and creating a nine-metre long drip and pour painting. Mühl 
and Frohner created a number of sculptural assemblages individually that then merged 
into one another. At the end of this period, the public and members of the press were 																																																								
45  The main example of this approach can be found in Vienna Actionism: Art and Upheaval in 1960s 
Vienna, ed. by Eva Badura-Triska and Hubert Klocker (Cologne: Walter Kӧnig, 2012). 
46  Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 157. 
47  In Nitsch's performances the tendency to think in terms of opposites can be seen most vividly in the 
ascription of sharply delineated passive and active roles to performers, a dynamic that carries 
connotations of the master-slave dialectic and sado-masochistic elements.  
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assembled to witness the literal and metaphorical 'opening' of the show. A woman 
wearing high heels and a ball gown was instructed to kick down the brick wall 
separating the performers from their audience and the flashlights of the press 
photographers revealed the results of three days of activity. In a matter of hours the 
police had arrived, and the exhibition was promptly closed.48 
This first, brutal performance by the group should be considered in part a 
reaction to an Austrian social sphere that had not been fully de-Nazified, and an art field 
that Gerald Raunig describes as ‘rigidly conservative.’49 In this context the choice of the 
cellar as a site for the action is significant. It both served as an approximation of the 
kinds of spaces in which the victims of Nazism met their death, and represented the 
physical corollary of a psychological 'depth' to explore. Upon entering the space the 
artists were not only descending into a cellar, but also immersing themselves in the flux 
of repressed libidinal flows in the depths of the psyche. When the performance came to 
an end, this private space was opened to the glare of the public spotlight, and the 
repressed libidinal energies were supposedly unleashed for the psychic good of Austrian 
society. Such therapeutic intentions were openly declared by Nitsch before the 
performance, when he wrote that 'Through my artistic production [...] I take upon 
myself the apparently negative, unsavoury, perverse, obscene, the passion and the 
hysteria of the act of sacrifice so that YOU are spared the sullying, shaming descent into 
the extreme.'50 Nitsch's talk of a 'descent' highlights his fidelity to a depth model of the 
psyche, and his writings freely synthesise the work of Jung, Freud and Reich – the latter 
two being intellectuals the National Socialists had expelled from Austria.51 Above all 
else, however, it is a fairly narrow appropriation of the Freudian theory of abreaction 
that underpins the work, whereby pent-up instincts are released in a supposedly 
liberating discharge.52 In the now voluminous literature on the group, following up such 
stated psychoanalytical intentions has, perhaps unsurprisingly, become a dominant 
																																																								
48  Philip Ursprung, ‘“CATHOLIC TASTES”: Hurting and healing the body in Viennese Actionism in 
the 1960s’, in Performing the Body / Performing the Text, ed. by Amelia Jones and Andrew Stephenson 
(London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 129-142 (p. 136). 
49  Gerald Raunig, Art and Revolution: Transversal Activism in the Long Twentieth Century (Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007), p. 188. 
50  Hermann Nitsch, 'The O.M. Theatre', p. 747. 
51  See Kerstin Barnick-Braun 'Vienna Actionism and Psychoanalysis: Freud, Jung, Reich', in Vienna 
Actionism: Art and Upheaval, pp. 67-68 (p. 67). This quote also highlights the Christian motif of sacrifice 
that permeates Nitsch's work. 
52  The Actionist's reading could be considered narrow because it positions violence, sex (almost 
exclusively heterosexual in their work), and the fundamental desire for excess as natural human instincts 
that are subsequently repressed by an artificial culture, ignoring the subtleties the term Trieb [drive – 
often wrongly translated as instinct] carries in Freud's work, and the more constructivist interpretations 
these subtleties have generated.  
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means of interpreting their output.53 Rather than follow these arguments myself, it will 
be more instructive to look at the way in which they are mobilised as justification for 
the work’s transgressive content.   
Transgressive art has historically been justified in a range of ways, perhaps most 
frequently through recourse to discourses of aesthetic formalism. This justification was 
popularised almost a century before by artists such as Zola, whose disingenuous defence 
of Manet in 1867 implored audiences that ‘He should be judged simply as a painter’.54 
Just as a purely formal reading of Olympia pales in the face of the painting's subject 
matter (not only a naked prostitute, but a naked prostitute whose confrontational gaze 
looks out of the picture plane at a time when the average Parisian viewer was probably a 
visitor of brothels himself), so too would a purely formal reading of The Blood Organ 
be patently insufficient. The Actionists were undoubtedly aware of this, and it is 
uncommon to find defences of their work that claim its formal qualities outweigh any 
offence incurred. Rather than appeal to formalism to justify their work’s transgressive 
content, the Actionists rode the coattails of the still burgeoning discourse of 
psychoanalysis. To the rational, repressive law of the state they opposed a law of the 
psyche, which functioned as a repository of ‘instinctual' energies and repressed traumas. 
The therapeutic benefit of working through these traumas and channelling these 
energies was upheld over and above the right of the state to maintain an order that was 
deemed repressive.   
The psychoanalytic rationale for the Actionist’s work was supplemented by a 
number of religious and mythical motifs, many of which testify to an encounter with the 
work of Nietzsche. Nitsch writes that 'The mauled Dionysus merges with the crucified 
Christ. Dionysus and Apollo unite in the person of Christ […] A chain of ideal figures, 
dreamed out of humankind, whose actions and assertions guided the community, 
becomes manifest.'55 If the first move is to invoke a secular law of psychic functioning, 
this is then both spiritualised and plotted on a grand historical narrative by means of 
references to religious figures and motifs drawn from a classically Eurocentric vision of 																																																								
53  For example Eva Badura-Triska, 'Hermann Nitsch's Orgies Mysteries Theater' in Vienna Actionism: 
Art and Upheaval, pp. 33-34 (p. 33). 
54  Emile Zola, 'A New Manner in Painting: Edouard Manet' in Portrait of Manet by Himself and his 
Contemporaries ed. by Pierre Courthion and Pierre Callier (London: Cassell, 1960), pp. 13-39 (p.18). 
This line of defence was also notably adopted by lawyers representing Cincinnati Contemporary Art 
Center, who had obscenity charged brought against them in 1990 for a display of Robert Mapplethorpe’s 
work in ‘The Perfect Moment’ exhibition (1989). See Daniel McClean, The Trials of Art (London: 
Ridinghouse, 2007) 
55  Hermann Nitsch, das Orgien Mysterien Theater 2, Theorietische Schriffen, Partiturentwurf des 6  
Tagespiels (Munich: Chiessa und Morra, 1976), pp. 118-20, quoted in Vienna Actionism: Art and 
Upheaval, p. 33. 
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world history. By marshalling the language of psychoanalysis, as well as drawing 
continuity between their work and the historical rites of Dionysus and Christian 
imagery, the Actionists oppose the written, juridical laws of the state with a competing 
right, one that they enact in the very interests of the Austrian collective psyche, the roll 
call of historical precedents justifying their intent.   
This relationship between two competing rights is mirrored by a second 
dialectical play that can be discerned in The Blood Organ itself. In this performance the 
wall separating the cellar from the street is not simply an analogue for the ego's 
barricade against the chaotic libidinal energies of the Id — the surface against the depth 
— it is also a temporary membrane between a group of artists wishing to break with the 
culturally sanctioned norms of behaviour, and the state apparatus that would wish to 
keep them in place. In short, it is the physical manifestation of the boundary separating 
the law from its inverse: transgression occurring when the two come into contact. By 
staging this moment of contact between two forces — one residing in the private sphere 
of the cellar, the other in the public sphere of the street — the Actionists sought to 
expose the strong arm of the state and jump-start the juridico-legal powers it wielded. 
Phillip Ursprung even argues that 'the state was the main addressee of Austrian 
Actionist politics, [and] the police were the “ideal” audience.'56 The group's repeated 
brushes with the law, Ursprung goes on to argue, effectively compensated them for the 
lack of official recognition from the art world. Whether or not recognition was the 
underlying motivation of the group's engagement with the law is questionable, but the 
point remains that there was a dynamic of engagement built into the very structure of 
the performances themselves. Duab furthers this point in a discussion of the 
photographs of the actions that were commissioned by the group and often later used as 
evidence in court:  
 
 [T]he performance, albeit hermetic and exclusive in its conception, has its 
scandalisation, its submission before an uncomprehending public, and its 
criminalisation by an overweening state apparatus already built in. It wants to be 
preserved by and integrated into the punitive and penal public discourses through which 
Austrian cultural politics has frequently and traditionally proceeded.57  																																																								
56  Ursprung, ‘“CATHOLIC TASTES”’, p. 137. 
57  Adrian Daub, 'Hermann Nitsch — Austria in the Age of Post-Scandalous Culture' German Life and 
Letters, 67:2 (2014), 260-278 (p. 270). Judging by their decision to include an appendix listing all 
incidents where the Actionists came into contact with the police in their 1970 compendium (cited above), 
Weibel and EXPORT seemed to have shared the opinion that these encounters were central to the works 
themselves.  
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For Daub this argument extends to the group's choice of titles such as Blood Orgy, 
which when performed in London supplied the press with a ready-made sensationalist 
headline - the front of the Evening Standard reading 'Fleet Street “Blood Orgy” — 2 For 
Trial’.58 Here the choice of location for the performance also suggests that the Actionists 
saw the press as an important section of their audience, or at least a conduit to reach a 
wider public. The titles of the works themselves seemed ready made for the newspapers, 
and given Nitsch in particular has cited lyric poetry as one of the influences on his 
work, it is perhaps surprising to find such wilfully direct titles making up the majority 
of his back-catalogue.   
In the brief account of the Actionist’s work given thus far, it is easy to recognise 
the play of opposites emerging in their interactions with the state and the press. But to 
what extent is the opposition truly dialectical, in the sense given the word by Hegel? To 
answer this question it is worth turning to the latter's analysis of Sophocles' Antigone, 
where the central character also rallies against the repressive logic of the state.59  
 
A Tragic Fracture 
 
In Hegel's discussion of the play a fundamental tension is set up between the universal 
and the particular, the state and the family, and human and divine law. In each of these 
oppositions it is not simply the case that one term falls on the side of right and the other 
wrong. Rather, just as the Actionists claimed to be acting in the interests of Austria's 
psychic wellbeing, the fundamental structure of tragedy for Hegel is always that of 
competing rights. Both positions are justifiable; Antigone’s justification comes from 
divine (family) law, while Creon’s comes from the law of the city. In the words of 
Walter Kauffman, Hegel’s central insight was that ‘at the center of the greatest tragedies 
of Aeschylus and Sophocles we find not a tragic hero but a tragic collision, and that the 
conflict is not between good and evil but between one-sided positions, each of which 
embodies some good.’60  																																																								
58  Ibid. 
59  Antigone is notably absent from Nitsch's list of references to Greek myth and tragedy, which include 
'the unmanning of Attis, the killing of Adonis, the killing of Orpheus, the ritual castration, […] the 
blinding of Oedipus'. If the mythic images embodied in these tales are being positioned as emblematic of 
deep psychological structure of humanity itself, Antigone's absence could be taken as revealing a 
particular gender bias in this macro-historical narrative. Hermann Nitsch, das Orgien Mysterien Theater 
2, p. 87, quoted in Vienna Actionism: Art and Upheaval, p. 33. 
60  Walter Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 201-
202. 
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In each case the ‘good’ involved leads to catastrophe precisely because the claim 
is one-sided. Both Creon and Antigone adhere to one value system alone, and this 
blinds them to the other’s competing right. As Hegel writes, each 
 
sees right only on one side and wrong on the other, that consciousness which belongs to 
the divine law sees in the other side only the violence of human caprice, while that 
which holds to human law sees in the other only the self-will and disobedience of the 
individual who insists on being his own authority.61 
 
It would be wrong to suggest that the Actionists were similarly one-sided in their 
transgressive pursuits, but the language Hegel uses is nonetheless striking in the context 
of their work. Not only were many of the actions precisely intended to critique 'the 
violence of human caprice', Nitsch's O.M. theatre being particularly illustrative here, but 
in their wilful criminality the group also asserted the right of groups and individuals to 
act on their own authority, circumventing the authority of the state.62 And yet if one 
reads further into Hegel's analysis of the play, it becomes clear that it is not simply a 
question of opposed sides, but of sides whose reliance on each other has somehow been 
disavowed. Antigone and Creon are in fact constituted of one and the same ‘ethical 
substance’. This implies that the two positions the characters embody do not exist 
independently from one another before being brought into conflict. They are inseparable 
in the first place, as Hegel makes clear: 
 
Neither of the two is by itself absolutely valid; human law proceeds in its living process 
from the divine, the law valid on earth from that of the nether world, the conscious from 
the unconscious, mediation from immediacy – and equally returns whence it came. The 
power of the nether world, on the other hand, has its actual existence on earth; through 
consciousness, it becomes existence and activity.63 
 
In other words, human law is in the first place derivative of divine law and should not 
disavow the root of its own power. Conversely, divine law is by its very nature 
‘unconscious’, ‘unwritten’ and ‘unmediated’, and therefore requires human law as a 
conduit though which to find expression. Human law gives strength and light to ‘the 																																																								
61  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 280. 
62  Numerous references to modern warfare were present in Nitsch's six-day staging of the O.M. Theatre 
in 1998, but perhaps the most redolent of the 'violence of human caprice' was the sight of two Panzer 
tanks repeatedly grinding over animal carcasses in a trench, pointlessly rolling back and forth on their 
caterpillar tracks. 
63  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 275. 
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law of weakness and of darkness’, and yet the law of ‘force and publicity’ (human law) 
is in the first place an offshoot from the divine.64 The relationship between competing 
rights in Antigone is therefore more of a violent fracture of a single ‘ethical substance’ 
than a tragic collision of discrete elements. According to Hegel, both characters are 
blind precisely because they do not see the connection between the laws they invoke. In 
viewing the other’s right as external to their own they unwittingly undermine the very 
foundation of their own position.  
The interconnectedness of the competing rights that Antigone and Creon evoke 
in Hegel's analysis of the play is mirrored by the Actionist's entanglement with the 
Austrian state. Not only were the Actionists continually engaging the state as a potential 
audience, openly publicising their actions in the knowledge that this publicity would 
ultimately find its way into the hands of the authorities, they also made use of the press 
as a means to distribute and thereby amplify their message. As well as acting as an 
engine for the production of scandal (and discourse more generally) the press literately 
and metaphorically illuminated The Blood Organ. If, in Hegel's analysis, the 
unmediated divine law uses human law as a cypher, this dynamic finds its visual 
analogue in the illumination of the blood-spattered cellar by the flashlights of the press.  
  
Transgression at the Limits of Language 
 
Nitsch's last public performance took place on the 23rd April 1967, when a particularly 
chaotic event in a Viennese restaurant entitled Zock-Fest ended in the arrival of two 
hundred riot police and their dogs. 65  The following year, the rest of the group 
participated in a notorious event at the University of Vienna entitled Art and Revolution. 
At the invitation of the Austrian Association of Socialist Students, Brus, Mühl, Peter 
Weibel and Oswald Wiener staged a series of provocations in a lecture theatre that 
began with a speech insulting the recently murdered Robert Kennedy, as well as the 
Austrian minister of finance Stephen Koren (Mühl and Weibel), continued with Brus 
cutting his chest with razor blades, drinking his own urine, defecating on stage and 
smearing himself with his own faeces while singing the national anthem, and ended in 
Mühl whipping a masochist and drinking some beers before organising a pissing contest 																																																								
64  Ibid., pp. 286-287. 
65  Susan Jarosi, 'Traumatic Subjectivity and the Continuum of History: Hermann Nitsch’s Orgies 
Mysteries Theater', Art History, 36:4 (2013), 834–863 (p. 844). For a full description of this action see 
Otmar Bauer, Autographische Notizen zu Wiener Actionismus, Studentenrevolte, Underground, Kommune 
Friedrichshof, Mühl, Ottos Sekte (Meria Enzerdorf: Rosesner, 2004), pp.18-20, quoted in Raunig, Art and 
Revolution, pp.194-196. 
	 35	
on stage. All the while Oswald Wiener attempted to deliver a lecture on consciousness 
and cybernetics and Weibel set his arm on fire whilst giving a talk on the Leninist 
question 'What is to be done?'66  
As the apogee of the group's provocations, the Art and Revolution event resulted 
in a series of prompt exits from the Austrian public sphere. After relocating to Berlin in 
the summer of 1967 and meeting the psychologist and poet Beate König, Nitsch 
purchased Prinzendorf castle in 1971 (largely with König's money), which would 
become the focus of his energies for the next 40 years and the staging ground for his 
Orgies Mysteries Theatre. 67  Mühl spent four weeks in prison for flagellating the 
masochist, then established his Action-Analytical Commune in Burgenland, which 
survived until 1990 when he was tried and sentenced to six-and-a-half years in prison 
for child abuse. Following the action at Vienna University Brus received a six-month 
sentence for disturbing public order and violating the Austrian flag and in order to avoid 
the charges fled to West Berlin where he remained until the late 1970s when his 
sentence was reduced to a fine. In 1969 Schwarzkogler either fell or jumped to his death 
from the window of his apartment in Vienna.  
This series of escapes following the Art and Revolution event is mirrored in 
many ways by the Actionist's repeated efforts to escape the limits of language in their 
performances. In a quite literal sense, the physical actions performed in the Art and 
Revolution event and the sheer chaos they generated not only rendered Weiner's verbal 
contribution inaudible, it also sought to parrot the discourse of the students themselves, 
by reducing their serious-minded ruminations on the relationship between art and 
politics to an on-stage pissing competition. In both cases the verbal was very much 
displaced by the physical — also illustrated in the use of screaming and noise in various 
Actionist performances.68 These examples highlight the drive to exceed the limits of 
language in the group’s work. The performances of Nitsch notably exclude any textual 
or verbal component, and in his writing the voyage to the far reaches of language is 
given a quasi-mystical character.69 
In many ways this characteristic resonates with Hegel's reading of Antigone, 
insofar as a connection between the unwritten and the divine is established in the latter’s 
appeal to the Gods. However, a more illuminating point of reference can be found in 																																																								
66  A more detailed account can be found in Raunig, Art and Revolution, pp. 197-198.  
67  Jarosi, 'Traumatic Subjectivity' p. 844. 
68  Adrian Daub, ‘“The Abyss of the Scream” – The Music of Hermann Nitsch’, in Blood Orgies: 
Hermann Nitsch in America, ed. by Aaron Levy (Philadelphia: Slough Books, 2008) pp. 35–72. 
69  Hermann Nitsch, Orgien, Mysterien, Theater / Orgies, Mysteries, Theatre (Darmstadt: Ma ̈rz-Verlag, 
1969). 
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Lacan’s reading of Antigone, conducted in Seminar VII. Here it is not my intention to 
add yet another interpretation to the secondary literature on either Lacan or Sophocles. 
Numerous book length studies on Seminar VII already exist.70 What follows is as much 
a ‘raiding’ as it is a reading; a look at this seminar justifed on the basis that it will allow 
me to elaborate a second logic of transgression at play in the work of the Actionists. 
The main significance of Lacan’s analysis of the play is that it dispels the notion 
of two competing rights. In this way it shatters the symmetry of Hegel’s reading. Lacan 
emphasises that Antigone is not a play about one law against another — the law of the 
state against the law of the family, backed up by the law of the gods — but rather a play 
about one law against something else. This ‘something else’ is perpetually encircled in 
the play, and the symmetry is broken decisively towards the end, when Antigone gives 
up justifying her actions on the basis of divine law and yet continues on her trajectory 
towards death. ‘What law of the mighty Gods have I transgressed?’ she asks, ‘Why look 
to the heavens any more?’71 With these words Antigone ceases to invoke the laws of the 
Gods as the basis for her actions. After initially transgressing Creon’s edict with this 
law on her side, she now wonders whether she has in fact transgressed both laws — 
Creon’s and the God’s — and yet this does not deter her from insisting on the necessity 
of her actions.  
In turning away from the heavens Antigone does not however use a secular 
principle of justice or morality in her brother’s defence. For Lacan, Antigone is 
‘autonomous’.72 The ‘something else’ that she opposes to the law is not something that 
can be tempered into the measure of an action’s moral worth. Lacan introduces 
Antigone ‘with a view to finding something other than a lesson on morality.’73 Her 
action neither follows nor produces a law, unwritten or otherwise.  
Creon could not be more different in the way he provides justification for his 
edict. In contrast to Antigone’s autonomy, he marshals the whole juridical apparatus of 
the state in defence of his actions, claiming to be acting in the neutral interests of 
maintaining order. With a rationally codified system of norms and morals at his 																																																								
70  See for example Charles Freeland, Antigone, in Her Unbearable Splendor: New Essays on Jacques 
Lacan's The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (New York: SUNY, 2013); Frances L. Restuccia, Amorous Acts: 
Lacanian Ethics in Modernism, Film, and Queer Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); 
Calumn Neill, Without Ground: Lacanian Ethics and the Assumption of Subjectivity (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2014); Marc de Kessel, Eros and Ethics: Reading Jacques Lacan’s Seminar VII (New York: 
SUNY, 2009).  
71  Sophocles, The Three Thebian Plays: Antigone, Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus (London: 
Penguin, 1984), p. 106 (lines 1013-14). 
72  Lacan comments on the adjective 'autonomous', used by the chorus, in Seminar VII, p. 282 (June 8 
1960). 
73  Ibid., p. 307. 
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disposal, he has ‘the good’ on his side. Within the logic of the play, his edict to prevent 
Antigone’s brother Polynices from receiving a proper burial would have been perfectly 
understandable to a Greek audience. Polynices had, after all, led an invasion against the 
city of Thebes. Why should public enemy number one be granted funeral honours by 
the state he sought to conquer? And yet if the edict is filtered through Lacan’s 
interpretation, it begins to seem that Creon, while not unreasonable in the justification 
for his actions (indeed, reason is part of the problem), has nevertheless overplayed his 
hand.  
For Lacan, the significance of forbidding Polynices a proper burial can be seen 
in the notion, borrowed from de Sade, of a ‘second death’.74 If a first death is biological, 
a second death is Symbolic. Needless to say, the purpose of a gravestone is to preserve 
the memory of a person’s life, marking their biological death, while ensuring the 
continued existence of their name as a signifier within the Symbolic. Creon’s edict can 
be interpreted as an attempt to remove the signifier ‘Polynices’ from public memory 
altogether, as if he had never existed. By forbidding him a proper burial, with a name 
above his grave, Creon effectively condemns Polynices to a second death. The reason 
he fails is essentially because all he has at his disposal are Symbolic means. The law is 
always Symbolic, working with language and legislation, and Creon’s blindness 
consists in not being able to see this fact. He stands for ‘the law without limits, the 
sovereign law, the law that goes beyond or crosses the limit.’75As Lacan points out, 
‘The good cannot reign over all without an excess whose fatal consequences are 
revealed to us in tragedy.’76  
To summarise this line of argument, the play contains not one but two 
transgressions, each carried out by one of the two main characters. In standing up for 
her brother, Antigone transgresses the rational and codified law of the state. For his part, 
Creon’s transgression consists in attempting to extend this law too far: transgressing the 
limits of the law through the law. How do these transgressions relate to one another, if 
not through dialectical opposition?  
To answer this question, it is necessary to remember that Lacanian theory posits 
the existence of an order beyond the limits of language where meaning breaks down, an 
order outside the Symbolic order, but which nevertheless sustains the desire that 
inhabits it. This order, for Lacan, is the Real. The point at which the two transgressions 
of Creon and Antigone meet is precisely the point at which the Symbolic and the Real 																																																								
74  Marquis de Sade, Juliette (New York: Grove Press, 1968), p. 772.  
75  Lacan, Seminar VII, p. 259 (June 1 1960). 
76  Ibid, p. 319. 
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come into contact. In her specific mode of transgression, Antigone guards the ‘criminal 
excess’ that cannot be absorbed into rational law. In the words of her sister Ismene, 
Antigone is ‘in love with impossibility’, which, following Lacan’s analysis, can be 
interpreted as meaning she is in love with the Real.77 If Creon’s edict represents an 
attempt to extend the Symbolic over the Real, eliminating the latter, Antigone’s gesture 
is to halt this advance. In a final twist, this gesture is one that preserves a space for 
desire. By seeking the ‘good of all’, Creon is effectively trying to make sure that the law 
prevails over desire, including his own. Antigone, by contrast, protects the Real that 
sustains the desire in the Symbolic.  
Lacan’s reading of Antigone is useful because it moves beyond a straightforward 
dialectic between the law and transgression. There is clearly something a lot more 
intricate at play, involving more than one transgression, and yet only one law that 
maintains its function as a principle of action (the second law of the Gods slowly melts 
away). Both transgressions take place at the point where the Symbolic and the Real 
meet, and yet each functions in a different way. The relationship between the two does 
not result in the ‘sublation’ of one by the other, as it might in a dialectical model. What 
is left is a peculiar kind of opposition without synthesis: neither character triumphs. The 
nature of this relationship can be discerned more clearly by following up a reference to 
the visual device of anamorphosis Lacan discusses in Seminar VII.  
 
Anamorphic Actions 
 
A few months prior to conducting his reading of the play, Lacan discusses 
anamorphosis with brief reference to Holbein’s famous painting The Ambassadors, 
before showing his audience a smaller example borrowed from his friend Jacques 
Prevert.78 This last example consisted of a flat painted surface on which a mirrored 
cylinder is placed. Without the mirror, the image on the flat surface appears as an 
indecipherable smudge of paint. Yet when the cylinder is applied and both elements are 
looked at from the right position, a painting of the crucifixion by Reubens snaps into 
focus.  
 
																																																								
77  Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays, p. 64. 
78  Ibid., p. 166-7.  
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Figure. 1: Domenico Piola the Elder (1627-1703), Anamorphosis of Rubens, oil on canvas with mirrored 
cylinder.  
 
The anamorphosis in question (figure 1) can be paired down to two essential 
components: a flat painted surface and a mirrored cylinder. For Lacan, the way these 
two components relate to one another bear directly on the effect tragedies such as 
Antigone have, and allow an alternative logic of transgression to be elaborated.   
The starting point for these effects is the plot of the play. Breaking with 
Aristotle’s theory of tragedy, according to which a highly complex chain of causes and 
effects suddenly explodes at the moment of the tragic hero’s downfall, Lacan considers 
tragedy as operating on the basis of something initially more opaque.79 Rather than a 
logical construction that can be followed as the narrative unfolds, for Lacan the plot of 
Antigone involves a number of confusing omens and events that no one character fully 
controls, and which the audience, unless they already know the story, would be hard 
pressed to fully understand. It is only once Antigone’s actions reach their extreme limit 
that they snap into focus with a startling ‘éclat’. In their modes of interaction, Lacan is 
comparing the two characters of Antigone to the two elements of the anamorphosis he 
has at his disposal, further filtering this through his conceptual categories. The plot 
loosely represents the flat painted surface. It is the Symbolic domain that Creon 
																																																								
79  Aristotle, Poetics (London: Penguin Classics, 1997). This argument is made in de Kessel, Eros and 
Ethics, p. 210.  
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operates within. Insofar as this domain contains a series of confusing facts and events, it 
can be described as a set of signifiers without signifieds. It is only through the 
application of the mirrored cylinder to the flat painted surface that these signifiers 
stabilise and find their point of reference. Following this line if analysis, is it therefore 
possible to equate Antigone with the mirrored cylinder? For Lacan, rather than the 
cylinder itself, Antigone is rather the ‘victim at the center of the anamorphic cylinder of 
the tragedy’.80 Or rather, Antigone passes into the centre of the cylinder by the end of 
the play, into the space of the Real.  
Before showing how this relates to the work of the Viennese Actionists, it is 
worth looking further at the dynamics this anamorphic logic implies. For one, it is 
unidirectional. While the cylinder lends coherence to the meaningless smear of paint on 
the flat surface, the same cannot be said in reverse. The anamorphic cylinder does not 
reciprocate by reflecting its image back onto the smear below. All action tends towards 
the centre of the cylinder, which pulls characters and events into its gravitational field 
like a strange attractor. Both Antigone and Creon move towards this dark centre of the 
tragedy (albeit in different ways), they do not move in opposite directions, as Hegel’s 
reading of the play would imply.  
Another significant point regarding anamorphosis in general, which can take 
forms other than the one illustrated above, is that it shows the process of representation 
in action; the passage from non-meaning to meaning coinciding with the ‘translation’ of 
the painted smear into the reflected image. Like a watch with its clockwork exposed, the 
painted surface stretches out in front of the cylinder, showing an observer the workings 
of its construction. Similarly, the play works in such a way to allow the limits of the 
Symbolic to be exposed, creating a time lag where signifiers momentarily fail to create 
recognisable meaning effects. The ethical significance of the play arguably lies not in 
any example it might offer for ethical action — either a positive example in the case of 
Antigone, or a negative example in the case of Creon — but in the anamorphic ‘effect’ it 
generates, revealing the nature of the interrelation between the Symbolic and the Real.81   
Returning to the work of the Viennese Actionists, it is possible to discern a 
similar set of dynamics in some of their performances. The two threads of Lacan’s 
analysis of Antigone that I have isolated above — one relating to the content of the play, 
																																																								
80  Lacan, Seminar VII, p. 282 (June 8 1960). 
81  Treating Antigone’s actions as an example would amount to an exhortation to suicide. Nevertheless, 
this has not deterred Žižek from doing just this, insofar as Antigone’s act can be understood to ‘exemplify 
the unconditional fidelity to the Otherness of the Thing that disrupts the entire social edifice’. Slavoj 
Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? (London: Verso, 2001), p. 157. 
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the other to its underlying anamorphic structure — each provide tools to think through 
some of the Actionists’ works non-dialectically. In light of the anamorphic logic 
outlined above, it is interesting to consider Susan Jarosi's description of Nitsch's six-day 
Orgies Mysteries Theatre performed in the grounds of his castle in Prinzendorf in 1998: 
 
Each day’s events took place from sunrise to sundown and comprised multisensory, 
synchronous, thematic actions interspersed with breaks for eating and drinking […]. 
While the flexible structure ultimately allowed the individual viewer to adjust the 
rhythm of his or her own experience after a few days, the immediate and overwhelming 
stimulatory demands imposed by the performance quickly led to physical, sensory, and 
psychological exhaustion. […] On the afternoon of the second day, for example, the 
major action staged in the courtyard comprised a series of vignettes that layered 
elements of religious ritual and mythological narrative. […] Nitsch orchestrated the 
events, directing his chief assistant, who in turn supervised actors assigned to undertake 
either ‘passive’ or ‘active’ tasks, which served as metaphors for contrasting states of 
being: passive performers remained inert, tied to crosses, blindfolded, often naked, and 
subject to actions such as being inundated with blood and draped with entrails; active 
performers transported the bound actors, poured the blood and rent the entrails, and also 
smashed and stomped on grapes and tomatoes. Carefully composed, the assemblage of 
tableaux traced the pattern of a cross in the space of the courtyard, wherein the 
longitudinal and vertical axes themselves consisted of a series of crosses from which the 
blindfolded actors were suspended next to flayed animal carcasses. The effect was of 
choreographed chaos, produced from highly structured, programmed, and precisely 
executed tasks characterized by dynamic excess and frenzy. The string orchestra, the 
heurige band, and the church bells played raucously; the synthesized sounds droned 
incessantly; sirens blared, bodies milled, geese ran about. The reek of blood and viscera 
permeated the air, blending incongruously with the enticing smell of fried dough being 
prepared during the action and served in a makeshift kitchen on one side of the 
courtyard.82  
 
Despite the highly choreographed nature of the performance and the dialectical play of 
passive and active elements within it (echoed, in many ways, in the passive role 
accorded to the audience as bystanders), Nitsch's Orgies Mysteries Theatre seems intent 
on staging the visceral extremes of human experience, layering sensory assemblages on 
top of one another in an arrangement that eschews linear narrative flows. Just as Lacan's 
anamorphic reading of Antigone highlights the chaotic 'smear' of actions and events that 																																																								
82  Jarosi, 'Traumatic Subjectivity', pp. 835-838. 
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give way to a striking éclat, so too in the OMT do images of war and suffering 
crystallise as actors group and re-group, and symbols stabilise into meaningful forms 
without the aid of written or verbal language.  
 
 
Figure 2: Hermann Nitsch, Second day of the six-day-play of the Orgies Mysteries Theater (1998), 
Prinzendorf, Austria. © Studio Hermnn Nitsch 
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None of the roles adopted by the participants represent examples to be followed. 
To interpret the OMT as an exhortation to transgress the moral prohibition against, for 
example, the ritual use of blood, would fall seriously wide of the mark. The significance 
of the performance can be located in the anamorphic ‘effect’ it generates, temporarily 
exposing the liminal space between the Symbolic and the Real, ultimately aiming, in 
Nitsch’s words, to obtain a ‘pure, unburdened contemplation of the substance’ — that is, 
unburdened by language itself.83    
But Lacan's reading of the play does not only apply to the internal dynamics of 
Nitsch's more recent work, it also resonates with the Actionists relationship with the 
Austrian state in the 1960s. If, for Lacan, the character of Creon represents a Symbolic 
order that knows no limits, issuing edicts in order to distinguish good from bad, right 
from wrong and friend from enemy, so too did the Austrian state wield an expansive set 
of socio-symbolic tools at the time. As Daub puts it, 'Actionism arose in a culture of 
inflationary respect, in which a great many institutions that elsewhere have no 
association or alignment with the government or state apparatus require or solicit 
respect as somehow official organs of the state.'84 Not only were they up against a state 
quick to flex its juridical muscles, this state also encouraged widespread amnesia 
regarding the Second World War, and therefore amnesia about the origins of its own 
power rooted in the desire of the populace. Just as Creon attempted to eliminate the 
signifier ‘Polynices’ from the Symbolic sphere of Thebes, so too did the Austrian 
government advance a ‘victim’ narrative in order to cover any hint of complicity with 
the Nazis. As Badura-Triska and Kandutsch write, after the war 'numerous former Nazis 
or Nazi sympathisers emerged comparatively unscathed and were indeed able to 
reoccupy influential positions, which is why the political, social and cultural climate of 
the post-war decades had many “post-fascist” traits'.85 As a reaction to this lasting 
legacy of the war, the Viennese Actionists could be said to have provided an x-ray of 
the ailing body of the state, revealing the source of the country's wounds to be internal. 
Again, their actions were neither intended as an example to be followed (perhaps with 
the exception of Mühl's commune, which spawned a number of similar groupings) nor 
																																																								
83  Nitsch quoted in Stefan Beyst, ‘Hermann Nitsch’s Orgien Mysterien Theater: The Artist as a High 
Priest?’ <http://d-sites.net/english/nitsch.htm#.VV72b1VViko> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
84  Daub, 'Austria in the Age of Post-Scandalous Culture', p. 275. 
85  Eva Badura-Triska and Kazuo Kandutsch, 'The Political Situation in post-War Austria and its 
Historical Background', in Vienna Actionism: Art and Upheaval, p. 12 (p. 12). 
	 44	
as an incitement to debauchery in the manner of Sade.86 Their actions rather had the 
effect of guarding the limit between the Symbolic and the Real, providing an ethico-
aesthetic image that brought this limit into focus.  
The anamorphic logic teased from Lacan’s reading of Antigone suggests that the 
Actionist’s work is not only significant because of the way it manipulates signifiers and 
places them in dialectical opposition. Nor does its value necessarily lie in its much 
lauded theraputic intent, which served as a competing right that dialectically opposed 
the rights of the state. Considering the Actionists in light of the unidirectional nature of 
anamorphosis is useful here insofar as it shows that the group and the state were often 
encircling the same point of excess; and yet where the state sought to eliminate it, the 
group resisted. The force of their work does not consist in its ability to overthrow the 
Symbolic order tout court, just as the force of transgression does not lie in its ability to 
overturn the law. In the work of the Actionists, at least, it constitutes a strategy to 
prevent this order from overstepping a limit. In the process it has the ability to lay bear 
the support the state’s authority relies upon.  
 
Actionism without a Cause 
 
To bring the discussion up to date it is worth citing a number of recent events that 
indicate a shift in the reception of the Actionist's work in Austria. In 2004 three of the 
country's largest art museums - The Museum Moderner Kunst, the Museum of Applied 
Arts (both in Vienna), and the Neue Galerie Graz — staged retrospectives of the group 
and its members, and a further exhibition on the theme of 'the Feminine' in Viennese 
Actionism was mounted in 2012-13 in Prague.87 Nitsch now has not one but two 
museums dedicated to his work, the first in the Austrian town of Mistelbach, the second 
in Naples. This institutional recognition has been matched by official state awards, and 
in 2005 Nitsch was singled out as 'a central figure in Austrian art creation' by the artistic 
senate of the Austrian state and awarded the Grand Austrian state prize (Brus had 
																																																								
86  Seven years after it was initially set up in Vienna, the Aktionsanalytische Organisation had several 
communes in West Germany and other groups in Toulouse, Lyon, Oslo, London, Nuremberg, 
Amsterdam, Düsseldorf and Vienna. Karl Iro Goldblat, ‘The Commune – a Chronology’, in Otto Muehl, 
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87  The exhibition 'AMOR PSYCHE ACTION – VIENNA. The Feminine in Viennese Actionism' ran at 
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previously picked up the award in 1996).88  In the same year the OMT even made an 
appearance in the 2005 edition of the Lonely Planet guide to Austria,89 prompting 
Bernhard Doppler to note that Actionism has now become 'quite compatible with the 
concept of “provincial tourism” in Austria.’90 
All this could be taken as evidence of the time-limited nature of transgression 
and the calming influence of almost 50 years history.91 Or it could equally serve as a 
parable of the institutional recuperation of transgression at the hands of a global culture 
industry that has demolished almost every barrier in the conversion of art into profit. 
While neither of these factors can be denied, it is my belief that the diminished force of 
the Actionist's transgressions is also linked to a more deep-seated social change in the 
way transgression functions. 
  If the two forms of transgression discussed in this chapter can be distilled into a 
series of relationships between a law or limit on the one hand, and an actor or group of 
actors who somehow overstep this limit on the other, then a consideration of the 
diminished force of transgressive art in Austria necessarily requires the changing role of 
laws and limits to also be considered. From a Lacanian perspective, the latter operate 
within the Symbolic order. As is well known, the two primary inspirations for Lacan in 
his theorisation of the Symbolic order were structuralist linguistics and anthropology. In 
both cases, the Symbolic is figured as a locus of differential elements that allows for 
social mediation and exchange. If, following Saussure, language is considered to 
comprise a tissue of signifiers, each relating to one another within a system of 
difference, then for Lacan at least one signifier is required to prevent this tissue from 
blowing away all together — to provide a temporary ‘quilting point’ [point de capiton] 
that anchors language to the Real. The privileged Lacanian name for this signifier is ‘the 
name of the father’. The concept has relevance to this discussion because it serves as an 
anchor to prohibition, thereby providing the structural conditions that make 
transgression possible. Following this concept forward in Lacan’s work will allow me 
to show how these conditions might have changed, and will by extension shed light on 																																																								
88  The German term used was ‘eine zentrale Figur österreichischen Kunstschaffens’, Volker Ladenthin, 
‘Literatur als Skandal’, in Literatur als Skandal: Fälle – Funktionen – Folgen, ed. by Stefan Neuhaus and 
Johann Holzner (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), pp. 19-28, quoted in Daub, ‘Austria in the 
Age of Post-Scandalous Culture’, p. 262. 
89  Neal Bedford, Mark Honan and Gemma Pitcher, Austria (London: Lonely Planet, 2005). 
90  Bernhard Doppler, ‘Hermann Nitsch’s Festivals: Observations from the Prinzendorfer Six-Day-Play 
in 1998’, in Literature, Film, and the Culture Industry in Contemporary Austria, ed. by Margarete Lamb-
Faffelberger, (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), pp. 64-76 (p. 65). 
91  Daub makes the point that Nitsch's work represents an attempt to create a truly trans-historical 
scandal, and when this reaction is not forthcoming, it consequently fails on its own terms of success. See 
Daub, ‘Austria in the Age of Post-Scandalous Culture’, p. 264. 
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the changing nature of transgression itself.92 Although the focus will be mainly on the 
internal dynamics of Lacanian theory, it should be recalled that this theory was 
essentially conceived as a praxis continually formed and reformed in relationship to 
social change, and that the notion of the 'name-of-the father' undergoes revisions 
precisely for this reason, rather than as a means to otherwise bolster the Lacanian 
conceptual armature.   
The term is first introduced in the early 1950s in a paper on ‘The Function and 
Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis’.93 Here and elsewhere the homophony 
between le nom du père (the name of the father) and le non du père (the ‘no’ of the 
father) is exploited to emphasise the dual function of the father as both the one who 
prohibits incest in the Oedipus complex, and the name that symbolises the Law in 
Freud’s myth of the primal horde. Lacan writes that ‘It is in the name of the father that 
we must recognise the basis of the symbolic function which, since the dawn of 
historical time, has identified his person with the figure of the law.’94 A few years later 
in Seminar III the concept is written ‘Name-of-the-Father’ and elevated to a 
fundamental structuring principle of the Symbolic order. In abbreviated form, Lacan’s 
argument here is that in the Oedipus complex, the historical function of the father is to 
enact a separation between the child and its mother. The child must substitute the desire 
of the mother for the Name-of-the-Father. This process of substitution has the effect of 
creating a template for all future metaphorical substitution, enabling the subject to 
manipulate language and ultimately produce meaning.  
As he edges towards outlining a post-oedipal vision for psychoanalysis, in the 
year 1963-1964, Lacan announces 'The Names of the Father' as the title of his seminar. 
In the wake of his fateful excommunication from the International Psychoanalytical 
Association, the first session of this seminar also turned out to be the last. Nevertheless, 
here and almost a decade later in Seminar XXII, it is significant that one is no longer 
dealing with one Name-of-the-Father, but many.95 What does this shift imply? In the 
first place, that the name is no longer unique, and that both the Law and the Symbolic 																																																								
92  Lacan's use of gendered language here and elsewhere bears scrutiny. While it does display a certain 
degree of casual sexism, Lacan nowhere claims that it is necessarily the physical father who names or 
lays down the law in the family. The father is simply a function. Furthermore, the gendered language is in 
part explainable (but not entirely excusable) when the term is considered in the context of Lacan’s ‘return 
to Freud’, which involved the appropriation and formalisation of pre-existing Freudian concepts.  
93  'The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis', in Écrits: The First Complete 
Edition in English (New York: Norton, 2006), pp. 197-268. 
94  Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English (New York: Norton, 2006), p. 230. The 
reference here is to Freud’s myth of the primal horde in Sigmund Freud, ‘Totem and Taboo’, in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey, Vol. 
13 (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), pp. 1-162.  
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have changed as well. According to Marie-Hélène Brousse, in this period of Lacan’s 
work ‘there’s a change from the power of one element organizing all the other elements 
to the swarm implying a multiplicity of signifiers functioning together but not 
centralized in relation to one which they would obey.’96 
In 1973 Lacan stretches the term to breaking point when he calls his seminar ‘les 
Non-dupes errant’.97 This can be roughly translated as ‘the non dupes stray’, but doing 
so misses the homophony between les non-dupes errant and ‘les nons/noms du père’. 
Here ‘the non-dupes’ should be understood to be those who claim to know a truth 
outside of discourse, thinking they have shattered its fictions and pinned the father 
down once and for all. In their constant invocations of the 'base' instincts of violence 
and sexuality that need to be unleashed by stripping back social imperatives and 
language more generally, the Actionists seem to approximate this stance. Their mistrust 
of language reveals an affirmative trust in its exterior. A critique drawing on this period 
of Lacan's work would posit this as fundamentally misguided. Instead of ignoring or 
seeking to escape discourse it would advocate a submission to its logic in order to 
actively ‘become its dupe’. Only then is it possible to recoup some agency from its 
Symbolic webs. Parenthetically, this is at least one way of justifying Lacan’s seemingly 
excessive wordplay; he is allowing himself to be duped by language. 
  As if in reply to these ‘non-dupes’, in Seminar XXIII Lacan puts forward a 
confounding claim, that one can ‘do without the Name-of-the-Father […] provided one 
makes use of it.’98 What does this mean? In the first place, that one cannot just ‘make do 
without the name of the father’ and leave it at that. From a Lacanian perspective, doing 
so could bring about a psychotic break, as I will argue in more detail in chapter 4.  
The idea that some principle of unity needs to be retained in the wake of a 
pluralisation of the N.O.F does not resolve the paradox that Lacan puts forward, 
namely, that ‘making use of something’ excludes ‘doing without something’. This 
supports the assumption that Lacan is talking about two different Names-of-the-Father, 
a point confirmed by Jacques-Alain Miller, who glosses the expression in the following 
way: ‘One can make do without the Name-of-the-Father qua real on condition that one 
																																																								
96  Marie-Hélène Brousse, ‘Ordinary Psychosis in the Light of Lacan’s Theory of Discourse’, 
Psychoanalytical Notebooks, 26 (2013), 23-33, p. 26. The notion of the master as a ‘swarm’ is already 
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makes use of it as semblant’.99 To qualify the expression still further, it could be said 
that the Name-of-the-Father qua Real is the principle underpinning the Symbolic order, 
as a foundation of meaning, while the Name-of-the-Father qua semblant is a 
constructed principle that comes to operate in its stead as a subjective ‘repair’.100  
In summary, over the course of Lacan’s work the Name-of-the-Father is 
progressively eroded, emptied out, until with this final formulation it is nothing more 
than a semblant, a construction that one ‘makes use of’. At each stage of his work, 
Lacan devlops his work along this axis in response to wider socio-cultural changes: the 
events of 1968, changes in family dynamics, and the appearance of new symptoms in 
the clinic. The rise of a 'new spirit of capitalism' that Boltanski and Chiapello have 
identified as embracing connexionist, networked, and ‘flat’ management structures, 
rather than all-powerful directors and centralised corporations could also be tied to this 
shift.101 
To return to the two models of transgression discussed above, it should be clear 
that both the dialectical and the liminal models rely, at least in part, on a strong 
Symbolic order, and by extension, a univocal Name-of-the-Father. In 1960s Austria, 
this is precisely what the Actionists were up against. Not only was there a restrictive 
permit system for performances and events such as those held by the Actionists, 
institutions that were otherwise unaffiliated with the state commanded respect and 
wielded power as if they were acting on its behalf. At a more fundamental level, a 
particular entanglement of Catholicism and fascism survived the war and resulted in 
what Daub calls a 'vast harmonising consensus between nominally disparate institutions 
or apparatuses'.102 In short, it could be said that at the time the Actionists were making 
their most transgressive performances, there existed a strong socio-symbolic authority 
coloured with religious and fascist elements, which ultimately paralysed political 
discourse. As I have said, one significant aspect of the Actionist's work is its ability to 
make this organisation of power more visible.   
																																																								
99  Jacques-Alain Miller and Eric Laurent, ‘The Other Who Does Not Exist and His Ethical Committees’, 
Almanac of Psychoanalysis, 1 (1998) 15-35 (p. 19) [my italics]. 
100 An additional point of reference here can be found in Jean Baudrillard's discussion of transgression in 
Seductions (Montréal: New World Perspectives, 1990) where he seeks to distinguish the law from the 
rule, writing of the latter that ‘One neither believes nor disbelieves a rule – one observes it. The diffuse 
sphere of belief, the need for credibility that encompasses the real, is dissolved in the game. Hence their 
immorality: to proceed without believing in it, to sanction a direct fascination with the conventional signs 
and groundless rules.’ (p. 133) Factoring in this description, the Name-of-the-Father qua semblant could 
be considered closer in form to a rule than a law.   
101 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism (London: Verso, 2005). 
102 Daub, ‘Austria in the Age of Post-Scandalous Culture’, p. 276 . 
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The dialectical model, relying as it does on the interaction of two parties who 
each invoke a competing right, be it 'decency' or 'order' on the part of the Austrian state 
apparatus in the 1960s, or 'psychic health' on the part of the Actionists, relies on just 
such an edifice of power.103 Once the edifice starts to crumble and the right to overtly 
police culture is revoked, then the transgressive pole in the dialectic is fundamentally 
weakened. The authorities are now more likely to offer crowd control for Nitsch's 
performances than persecute him, and following a period of public soul-searching in the 
1980s, when Austria’s official 'victim' narrative regarding World War II was finally put 
into question, claims about the therapeutic effects of Nitsch's work have slowly faded 
into the background; they now advertise themselves as offering audience members an 
opportunity for 'self-discovery'.104 Furthermore, Nitsch no longer relies on the press to 
create discourse about his work — his writings are published by a state owned 
publishing house, and there has been a considerable amount of ink spilled by art 
historians in recent years on all four main protagonists of the Actionists.105  
In respect to the liminal model of transgression, Lacan's anamorphic reading of 
Antigone positioned her at the limits of the Symbolic, resisting Creon's over-extended 
sovereign power. Her effort to protect the Real void at the heart of the community was 
seen as a response to the attempt to condemn her brother Polynices to a ‘second death’. 
As I have shown, in the Austrian context, a similar dynamic was at work in the 1960s as 
regards the cultural amnesia that still reigned over the nation. Not only were some of 
those in positions of authority directly linked to actual acts of killing, but the attempt to 
eradicate the memory of these killings from the cultural discourse, (to forcefully 
eliminate them as a signifiers from the Symbolic) approximates the idea of a 'second 
death' highlighted by Lacan. 106  On a more abstract level, the idea that liminal 
transgression relies on a strong Symbolic order finds metaphorical expression in the 
example of a missing book in a well-ordered library. When the library is thrown into 
disarray and the indexing system scrambled, the gap where the missing book was 
removed is more difficult to locate. Similarly, when a Symbolic regime is weakened, as 																																																								
103 The law most frequently used against the Actionists was article 516 of the penal code which 
concerned gross violations regarding decency and public nuisance. Eva Badura-Triska, and Kazuo 
Kandutsch, 'Art and the Authorities: Criminal and Police Prosecutions of the Vienna Actionists', in 
Vienna Actionism, Art and Upheaval, pp. 188-189 (p. 188). 
104 Nitsch quoted in Doppler, ‘Hermann Nitsch’s Festivals', p. 75. 
105 These publishers include ‘Residenz’ and ‘Edition Brandstätter’ that are subsidiaries of the state-owned 
'Österreichischer Bundesverlag’. 
106 As a point of fact, the psychologist called to give an assessment of Brus at the trial that followed the 
Art and Revolution event was Henrich Gross, who had worked for the Nazis at the 'Am Spielgelgrund' 
psychiatric clinic for children where he was involved in the murder of disabled children and adolescents 
in order to examine their brains. Gross was indicted but never convicted and continued to work as a 
doctor in Vienna. Badura-Triska, and Kazuo Kandutsch, ‘Art and the Authorities’, p. 188.  
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it appears to have been in Austria, then the very liminal space that it 'produces' is harder 
to locate.  
As the last remnants of the old political consensus all but vanish in Austria and 
power starts to function in a different way (no less perniciously perhaps), then strange 
things start to happen to the logics of transgression discussed above. In response to 
barriers which are now porous, or power which is now networked to a much greater 
extent, Nitsch's OMT could be viewed as a peculiar reaction formation. Staged in the 
private grounds of a castle, and drawing on a range of classical art forms such as lyric 
poetry and opera, as well Greek mythology and ecclesiastical iconography, Nitsch's 
work possesses a distinctly aristocratic tenor. The artist has repeatedly called 
Prinzendorf 'his Bayruth' (after the town in which Wagner’s performances are regularly 
staged) and expressed a strong desire that his festivals pass into tradition and continue 
to be celebrated for centuries to come.107 In the context of a society where class 
stratifications still have an influence on cultural life, these references will have ‘blue 
blooded’ connotations for many Austrians. Once the roll call of historical and mythical 
figures invoked by the Actionists is no longer mobilised against the laws of the state, 
they take on a less oppositional function, and seem to serve as a means to inscribe the 
artist's work in a long history of 'important' names. In Nitsch’s work, classically 
Eurocentric references are supplemented with a number of specifically Austrian 
folkloric traditions, incorporating musical elements to dancing and drinking games into 
his performances.108 If power no longer functions in a univocal way in Austria, as I have 
suggested it did in the 1960s, then these references in Nitsch’s work can be seen as 
embodying nostalgia for modes of power that have long since vanished.  
With these references in mind, it is perhaps curious that in the instances Nitsch’s 
performances have attracted criticism in recent years, it is not from the government or 
the popular press, but from right-wing parties such as the FPÖ (Austrian Freedom Party 
[Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs]), who use Nitsch's work as a battering ram to attack 
the state, invoking familiar questions about the use of tax-payer money to support 
artistic productions which are 'anti-Austrian'.109 Perhaps this configuration sets the stage 
																																																								
107 Nitsch quoted in Doppler, ‘Hermann Nitsch’s Festivals', p. 74. 
108  The 1998 play incorporated folkloric elements and traditional Austrian dances such as the 
Schuhplatter – a rural dance that involves clapping rhythmically with one's shoe – and the wine-drinking 
tradition of the Heuringen, according to Doppler, ‘Hermann Nitsch’s Festivals’, p. 73. 
109 As Doppler points out, Nitsch has in fact never received federal tax euros in support of his actions. 
They are mostly funded from the sale of tickets and post-performance reliquaries. Doppler, ‘Hermann 
Nitsch’s Festivals’, p. 69. 
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for a new cultural era of transgression in Austria, paradoxically with Nitsch on the side 
of the sate, and the FPÖ on the side of the transgressors.  
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Chapter 2 
From Inversion to Disorientation 
 
 
Of the many metaphors used to talk about morality, the notion of a 'moral compass' is 
particularly revealing, underscoring the role accorded to adequation in much moral 
thought. Just as a compass requires two essential elements — a fixed base inscribed 
with cardinal points and a moving needle — moral judgment requires a set of pre-
established norms and a moral actor who uses them to navigate through life. According 
to this model, moral judgment would seem to require little more than alignment with the 
fixed points of morality. This chapter is about two different ways in which art might be 
able to alter a moral compass by means of transgression.  
The first entails the straightforward inversion of the cardinal points, so that good 
takes the place of evil, top becomes bottom, and right replaces wrong. While this model 
might suggest the Nietzschian idea of a transvaluation of all values, in fact it falls some 
way short of such a radical proposition, remaining within the bounds of morality.110 
Inversion simply entails the swapping of good for evil, and the obstinacy to explore 
what Paul de Man called 'the imaginative possibility of an upward fall.'111 In the first 
half of this chapter inversion will be isolated in the work of a loose-knit group of 
filmmakers operating in 1980s New York known as 'the Cinema of Transgression’ 
(henceforth CoT). The work of these filmmakers will be used as a springboard to 
explore the themes of Lacan's essay ‘Kant with Sade’, which hinges on the idea that 
Kant's moral system is in surprising allegiance with the anti-morality of the Marquis de 
Sade.112  
The second way that art might tamper with one’s moral compass is to send the 
needle spinning. Disorientation can occur when one or more objective points of 
identification are put into question. While the word is more commonly used to describe 																																																								
110 The transvaluation of values [Umwerthung aller Werthe] is a concept elaborated by Nietzsche in The 
Anti-Christ, where he uses it to argue that Christianity inverts the 'natural' values of life, (for example 
countering the natural value of procreation with the virtue of chastity). Nietzsche argues that these 
Christian values should, in turn, be transvalued. This transvaluation therefore entails identification with 
the natural values of 'life', and Nietzsche's position could be interpreted to pit an ethics of immanence 
against a morality of transcendence. In this chapter inversion is treated mainly within the bounds of 
morality alone, where its inversion becomes an anti-morality, rather than ethics. Friedrich Nietzsche, The 
Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). 
111 Paul de Man, ‘Ludwig Binswanger and the Sublimation of the Self’, in Blindness and Insight: Essays 
in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 36-50 (p. 46) 
112 Lacan, 'Kant with Sade'. 
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a perceptual-affective state, in this chapter it will be shown to operate in a number of 
different domains, including morality. Unlike the two logics of transgression discussed 
in the last chapter, disorientation does not automatically entail the crossing of limits. 
That is to say, disorientation is not endogenous to transgression. To work out the precise 
relationship between the two, I will turn to the work of Paul McCarthy, an artist well 
known for provocative performances and installations that can have a disorientating 
effect on the viewer. Here, as in all of the chapters of this thesis, it is not my intention to 
give a comprehensive account of McCarthy's output over the past 50 years. Instead a 
close look at two of his works in particular will allow another logic of transgression to 
be articulated around the concept of disorientation.  
In the same way that the transgressive strategies of the Viennese Actionists were 
shown to possess limited force in the context of Austria’s current socio-political reality, 
in this chapter it is my ambition to show that the paradigms of inversion and 
disorientation have also diminished in power. Building on the notion of a 'decline of the 
Symbolic', it is my contention that the CoT and McCarthy (and the ethico-aesthetic 
paradigms their works embody) are not so much opposed to the contemporary social 
bond, but in surprising accord with processes of social change that have led to its 
production.  
 
A Thrust for Life 
 
The short film Thrust in Me (1985) opens with a shrill guitar riff and a pair of feet 
pacing the streets of New York’s Lower East Side. Cymbals splash and the camera pans 
up to show a man in his mid 20s wearing mirrored sunglasses and a trench coat. After a 
few seconds the film cuts to show the same man, only this time he’s staggering around a 
dishevelled apartment in a dress, a wig and smudged lipstick. Both characters are played 
by Nick Zedd, the principle architect of an ‘80s underground film movement known as 
‘The Cinema of Transgression’.   
Comprising one third of The Manhattan Love Suicides, a trilogy of films 
directed by another of the movement’s central figures, Richard Kern, Thrust in Me 
follows a linear narrative to its dark and shocking conclusion. Dejected, the woman 
slumps down on a couch and flicks through a self-help book called How to be Your 
Own Best Friend. Seemingly dissatisfied with it she then turns abruptly to a book on 
suicide before tossing that to one side just as quickly. The man strides along 
aggressively kicking rubbish and colliding with other pedestrians. He passes rows of 
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boarded-up shops and derelict buildings, one of which carries a piece of graffiti reading 
‘exist exist exist’ or ‘exit exit exit’. 
As the narrative unfolds it becomes clear that this sign provides a coda to the 
film as a whole. The woman, now apparently intent on taking her own life, rips a picture 
of Jesus from a prayer book and pins it to the wall of the bathroom. She runs a bath, 
gets in, and picks up a knife from behind the taps. Without pause for reflection she 
makes two deep cuts to her wrist and collapses backward as the blood drips onto the 
bathroom floor. Meanwhile the man continues to act out his frustration on the streets of 
New York; he pushes violently through a fighting couple before stumbling up the steps 
to his apartment. The editing speeds up and two still images quickly follow each other.  
The first is the picture of Jesus, crowned in thorns and eyes turned upwards to God. The 
second is a black and white photograph of the man, looking up in the same direction as 
Jesus, yet the look in his eyes is one of defiance rather than rapture.  
What follows this already violent narrative is an angry scream of images that 
include blasphemy and necrophilia. The film plays almost like a music video, the low-
grade super 8 footage serving as a visual analogue of the post-punk soundtrack that 
scores the film from start to finish. Filmed on an ultra-low budget, sometimes on stolen 
equipment, and screened alongside music and performance acts in New York clubs such 
as CBGB’s, films like Thrust in Me arose out of the fringes of the New York no-wave 
and post-punk culture. Nick Zedd, Richard Kern, David Wojnarowicz, Tommy Turner, 
and Lydia Lunch formed the core of a movement whose work displayed the unwavering 
ambition to outrage and annoy as many people as possible.  
On the face of it, Thrust in Me would seem to display traits of the dialectical 
mode of transgression identified in the last chapter. The film stages a series of 
oppositions: bible morality is countered with blasphemy, self-help with suicide, and the 
two characters embody existential solutions that come into violent conflict with one 
another. As an embodiment of the kind of virulent nihilism inherited from punk, the 
CoT was a movement that essentially defined itself against other cultural forms. In this 
section the nature of this opposition will be explored. To do so, it will be necessary to 
first give a brief characterisation of the socio-political backdrop to the group. 
 
Inversion without Reprieve  
 
Neither Reagan nor the Moral Majority are referenced explicitly in Thrust in Me, and 
yet they both serve as implicit targets for the blasphemy and anger the film channels. At 
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a time when Jerry Falwell and his followers were opposing equal rights for 
homosexuals, pornography, and sex education in schools, the CoT broke as many of 
these moral prohibitions as they could. Employing typically inflammatory rhetoric, in 
1988 Falwell rallied his followers against the Civil Rights Restoration Act by warning 
that it could force churches to hire 'a practicing homosexual drug addict with AIDS to 
be a teacher or a youth pastor.'113 
Against this backdrop the CoT must have embodied the worst fears of the Moral 
Majority. Many members of the group were active drug users, a fact reflected 
unflinchingly in some of their artistic output. Kern’s film Zombie Hunger (1984) is a 
straightforward depiction of a man shooting up before demolishing an apartment, and 
Tommy Turner and Tessa Hughes-Freeland’s grim collaborative film Rat Trap intercut 
images of a rat drowning with footage of a man injecting heroin. Certain members of 
the group were openly homosexual, such as David Wojnarowicz, who died of AIDS in 
1992, and others experimented with various forms of sadomasochism, such as Richard 
Kern, whose film Fingered (1986) opens with the warning: ‘Although it is not our sole 
intention to SHOCK, INSULT, or IRRITATE, you have been warned that we are 
CATERING only to our own preferences as members of the SEXUAL MINORITY.’ 
The film is perhaps one of Kern’s most offensive, consisting of variety of violent sexual 
fantasies strung together into the narrative form of a road movie.114  
This disclaimer highlights an essential difference between the CoT and the 
Viennese Actionists. While both opposed the establishment values of their time, the 
Actionists claimed to do so in the interests of society at large, invoking psychoanalytic 
arguments about abreaction to justify artworks that would supposedly 'heal' Austrian 
society. By contrast, the CoT embodied a minoritarian spirit, as Carlo McCormick puts 
it: 'The cinema of transgression was a deliberate attempt to regain that essence of a 
community, to create something in every way unpalatable for broader public 
consumption'.115 This withdrawal also meant that the group rarely used their films to 
campaign on the issues that affected them. They simply took what was endorsed by the 
state and inverted it, for the most part eschewing social commentary or any affirmative 
values that would redeem them in the eyes of mainstream America.   																																																								
113 Gustav Niebuhr, 'Why "Moral Majority," A Force for a Decade, Ran Out of Steam', Wall Street 
Journal, 25 September 1989, p. 1. 
114 When screened publicly, the film did insult and irritate. At the Kino Eiszeit in Berlin for example, 
Franz Rodenkirchen reported that ‘ten men and women attacked the staff, stole the money, destroyed the 
projector and sprayed the film with paint.’ Rodenkirchen quoted in David Kerekes, Sex, Murder, Art: The 
films of Jӧg Buttgereit (Manchester: Critical Vision, 1994), p. 33.  
115 Carlo McCormick, ‘Cinema of Transgression: Reprisal in Rewind’, in You Killed Me First: The 
Cinema of Transgression, ed. by Susanne Pfeffer (London: Koenig Books, 2012), pp. 34-41 (p. 39).  
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A notable exception to this general characterisation can be discerned in a 
number of filmmakers who operated on the periphery of the Cinema of Transgression. 
Casandra Stark's delirious depiction of domestic abuse in Wrecked on Cannibal Island 
(1986) was not intended to titillate a minority with a sexual preference for sadism but 
rather highlight and condemn masculine aggression. Similarly, Tessa Hughes-Freeland's 
stark depictions of rape in a late film, Nymphomania (1994) caricature and critique 
sexual aggression in the myth of Pan. Additionally, the fiction of David Wojnarowicz 
and the films of Beth B (made both collaboratively with her former husband Scott B 
and individually) could also be said to display a number of 'redeeming' qualities in their 
overtly political content.116 Black Box (1978), directed by the B’s, for example, depicted 
the nauseating effects of a torture device used by the US military known as 'the 
refrigerator'. In each of these cases, it could be said that the mode of transgression is 
more explicitly dialectical insofar as a competing right is invoked in opposition to 
perceived social injustice, often distancing these films from directors more central to the 
movement for whom any positive value, even those typically associated with the punk 
heritage they inherited were to be avoided at all costs.  
This general lack of appetite for the promotion of values was also played out in 
the spatial politics of New York where the members of the CoT lived. The art critic 
Cynthia Carr compared the experience of living in the East Village in the 1980s to 
living in the ‘epicenter of the world heroin trade’, encountering ‘whole blocks that 
would be deserted except for the vague drug itch hanging in the air.’117 In a wide 
ranging article about the effects of gentrification on the East Village, Deutsche and 
Ryan claim that over fifteen per cent of residents left the neighbourhood between 1970 
and 1980, attributing this exodus not to upward mobility, but to ‘arson and the 
wholesale abandonment of buildings by landlords.’118 According to the authors, this was 
part of a coordinated strategy to gentrify the Lower East Side and make way for a new 
class of white-collar employees working in the nearby financial district.119 In a familiar 
narrative, the burgeoning arts scene and beat heritage of the Lower East Side came to 																																																								
116 This point is made by Sargent, who sets the B's movies apart from some of the other members of the 
group. See Jack Sargent, DeathTripping: The Cinema of Transgression (San Francisco: Creation, 1999) 
p. 24. 
117 Cynthia Carr, 'Hanging Out on the Lower Worst Side', The New York Times, 22 October 2006, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/nyregion/thecity/22downt.html?_r=0> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
118 Rosalyn Deutsche and Cara Gendel Ryan, ‘The Fine Art of Gentrification’, October, 31 (1984), 91-
111 (p. 98) 
119 Deutsche and Ryan describe the process as follows: ‘Through a strategy of urban neglect, the city has 
been biding its time until enough contiguous lots can be put together to form what is known in the real 
estate business as “assemblages.” These are sold for large sums of money at municipal auctions to 
developers who thus amass entire blocks for the construction of large-scale upper income housing.’ ‘The 
Fine Art of Gentrification’, p. 97. 
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serve as an attractive selling point to prospective investors, inevitably driving many of 
the artists living there to leave as soon as the rent spiralled upwards. With ‘operation 
pressure point’ in 1984 Major Koch made the area a safer bet for investors by cleaning 
up some of the drug trade, an operation that Zedd describes as an ‘occupation army’ in 
the Lower East Side.120 
Given the fact that the deserted blocks Carr refers to often served as makeshift 
projection spaces, squats, or film sets for the CoT filmmakers, one would expect 
gentrification and the 'war on drugs' to have provided the raw materials for an open 
engagement with the state, using them in the same knowing way the Actionists did. 
While certain themes did seep into the work of the CoT, such as heavy handed policing 
in Zedd's film Police State, for the most part the group avoided direct contact with the 
authorities.121 At best, it could be said that they produced work that was unlikely to add 
to the selling point of the area. Operating somewhat separately from the small and 
‘vibrant’ art scene that was increasingly being made complicit in the wholesale 
displacement of a community, the group's output was shocking enough to exclude it 
from mainstream conceptions of ‘bohemia’, thereby rendering it unsuitable marketing 
material for the agents of gentrification. Nevertheless, to claim this was a conscious 
strategy on the part of the CoT would be misleading. Once again, the primary mode of 
engagement with the dominant Symbolic values of the day seemed to be one of 
inversion — affirming the aesthetic qualities of a city where people argue, buildings lay 
dormant, and needles litter the streets. Though they lack the same political intent, here 
the CoT’s strategies are reminscent of the message on the back cover of the 1983 ‘Yes 
Sir, I Will’ LP by Crass: ‘BE WARNED! THE NATURE OF YOUR OPPRESSION IS 
THE AESTHETIC OF OUR ANGER’.122 The aesthetic of the CoT’s anger can be seen 
in this way, and yet their hesitancy to connect it directly to oppression was part of a 
more general aversion to positing political values.  
																																																								
120 Sargent and Zedd, ‘An interview with Nick Zedd’ in Sargent, DeathTripping, pp. 57-78 (p. 65). The 
fact that Zedd doesn't make the connection between the police operation and the wider gentrification of 
the Lower East Side is perhaps symptomatic of his resistance to being seen as a political filmmaker. Here 
he simply claims that heavy-handed policing was due to 'a lot more cops [being] in the neighbourhood 
who didn't understand the people living in the neighbourhood, because they didn't live there.' 
121 Police State (1987) depicts the arrest and torture of a young man accused of taking drugs. The film 
becomes increasingly absurd as the man is asked to alternately stand on a table and sit on a chair by the 
two police officers. Notably, however, it does not hint at any systematic corruption within the police 
force, but rather focuses on sadistic and thuggish individual police officers. In an interview with Jack 
Sargent, Zedd recalls spraying the title of the film on the back of a police car, which then served as the 
title credit of the film. Sargent, Deathtripping, p. 65. 
122  Crass, Yes Sir, I Will LP (back), 1983, record cover, in Russ Bestley and Alex Ogg, The Art of Punk 
(London: Omnibus Press, 2012), p. 169.  
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A final example of the group's opposition to dominant values can be seen in 
their attitude towards avant-garde films produced at the time. This opposition was not 
particularly subtle, and in the group’s manifesto, Zedd bombastically proclaims that ‘all 
film schools be blown up and all boring films never be made again’, encouraging other 
filmmakers to ‘violate the command and law that we bore audiences to death in rituals 
of circumlocution.’123 The life span of the CoT coincided with a period when film 
theory was being elevated to the level of a recognised discipline in universities across 
America. David Bordwell describes the film theory of the 1970s and 80s pejoratively as 
‘SLAB’, because it routinely invoked the ideas of Saussure, Lacan, Althusser, and 
Barthes — theorists that had little or no influence on the CoT.124 This newly found 
academic recognition brought about a traffic of ideas between avant-garde filmmakers 
and the academy. Stan Brackhage for example, described his films as a kind of ‘moving 
visual thinking’. 125 It would be difficult to imagine Nick Zedd or Richard Kern 
describing their films in such as way, as it would to imagine them working in a 
university, as many avant-garde filmmakers such as Brackhage did at the time.  
At a more formal level, there is a stark difference between films such as 
Brackage's, which draw on a modernist tradition of interrogating the medium of film 
itself, translating 'the intrinsic grammar of the most inner […] structure of thought’126 
into pulsing, swirling and flickering sequences of light and colour, and the output of the 
CoT, which followed conventional linear narrative forms such as parallel montage, and 
gave rise to few, if any formal innovations. Even the medium of Super 8 itself, which 
was developed as a substandard to the substandard (beneath both the industry standard 
of 35mm and the cheaper alternative of 16mm) and marginalised by the film industry 
and established avant-garde filmmakers alike, was adopted by the group 
enthusiastically. As the inheritors of 'trash aesthetic' developed by the likes of Jack 
Smith, the Kuchar brothers and John Waters, the CoT celebrated everything that was 
generally deemed to be amateur, illegitimate, or unfashionable by avant-garde 
																																																								
123 Nick Zedd, ‘The Cinema of Transgression Manifesto’, in You Killed Me First: The Cinema of 
Transgression, ed. by Susanne Pfeffer (London: Koenig Books, 2012), pp. 10-17 (p. 17). In the same 
vein, Carlo McCormick describes the CoT sweepingly as a ‘vital corrective moment’ that comes into play 
when the avant-garde gets ‘smug, complacent and overly ossified in its orthodoxies.’ McCormick, 
‘Reprisal in Rewind’, p. 40.   
124 David Bordwell, ‘Historical Poetics of Cinema’, in The Cinematic Text: Methods and Approaches, ed. 
by R. Barton Palmer (New York: AMS Press, 1989), pp. 369-398. 
125 Brakhage described moving visual thinking as 'a streaming of shapes that aren’t nameable — a vast 
visual ‘song’ of the cells expressing their external life.' Suranjan Ganguly, ‘All That is Light: Brakhage at 
60’, Sight and Sound 3:10, (1993), 20-23 (p. 21). 
126 Stan Brakhage, ‘Arabic 0 + 10’ <http://canyoncinema.com/catalog/film/?i=286> [accessed 
01/06/2015]. 
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filmmakers of the day.127 Aside from Zedd's polemic in his manifesto, the group did not 
really engage with the discourse generated by avant-garde filmmakers, except by way of 
simply affirming a set of values that they excluded, resulting in films that often 
displayed an openly anti-intellectual stance.  
In summary, it could be said that while there were a number of exceptions, the 
dominant spirit of the CoT was characterised by two things: the inversion of 
majoritarian or mainstream values, and the unwavering reluctance to posit any new 
values of their own. If the group asserted any competing right, it was simply the right to 
be different (where different often meant opposite) and if it posited any affirmative 
value, it was simply the value of transgression in and of itself. In this spirit, when asked 
in an interview by Mark Doucet to give a nutshell definition of the Cinema of 
Transgression, Nick Zedd's answer is emblematic: Fuck You.128  
 
Kant Upside Down 
 
The logic of inversion in the work of the CoT is also central to Lacan's essay 'Kant with 
Sade', and unpacking some of its arguments will bring the concept into sharper focus. A 
turn from the CoT to Kant's moral theory may seem like an abrupt shift in register - a 
perverse  (perhaps even ‘père-verse’) response to the CoT’s aversion to theory. And yet 
when read alongside the work of the Marquis de Sade, a set of relationships will emerge 
that justify this theoretical experiment, which seeks to isolate a logic of turning, of 
perversions and aversions, beyond any one domain.  
As is well known, in the history of moral philosophy Kant is largely responsible 
for emptying concepts such as 'the moral law' of their empirical or emotional content, or 
at least arguing that they cannot be derived from this content a posteriori. With Kant 
morality cannot be derived from any pre-determined value, and this is precisely what 
forces the subject to take responsibility for their actions, rather than blindly pursuing 																																																								
127 Jack Smith's name is now firmly inscribed in underground cinematic history for films such as Flaming 
Creatures (1963), which was filmed on out-dated celluloid, giving the film a bleached effect. As a 
resident of the Lower East Side until 1989 (when he died of AIDS related illnesses), Smith worked with 
filmmakers associated with the CoT on a number of occasions, starring in Beth and Scott B's The Trap 
Door in 1980. George and Mike Kuchar's films were also notably trashy, and works such as 
Thundercrack (1976) displayed a transgressive impulse that influenced the CoT. John Waters is perhaps 
the most infamous of the three directors. His trash trilogy (Pink Flamingos (1972), Female Trouble 
(1974), and Desperate Living (1977)) featured transgressive acts such as a character eating real dog shit 
in one unedited take. Jack Sargent describes the trilogy as 'a blueprint for punk aesthetics and behaviour, 
with the emphasis on the screeching desperation of the protagonists, anxious to annihilate every value', 
Sargent, Deathtripping, p. 12. 
128 Mark Doucet, 'Nick Zedd Interview', Subterrenea, 7 (1991), 5-10 (quoted in Sargent, Deathtripping, 
p. 27). 
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moral imperatives specified by particular societies, rulers, or ideologies. False 
incarnations of the law, such as moral imperatives associated with nationhood, loyalty, 
or religion, shift responsibility for the moral act onto a range of authorities external to 
the subject themselves, and instantiate positive values where pure duty alone should 
reign. As soon as this duty is contaminated by motivations such as self-interest, a desire 
for happiness (either for oneself or for others), or in fact anything other than duty itself, 
then an act can no longer be considered moral in a strict sense. In fact, for Kant, any 
motivation other than duty is consigned to the realm of 'pathological interests', a move 
which decisively distances his philosophy from the eudaimonic ethics of Epicurus or 
Aristotle. The only other stipulation that Kant imposes on a moral act is that it should 
hold true as a principle of universal action, a stipulation that finds its most concise 
expression in the famous categorical imperative. It is this formal 'emptiness' of the 
moral law in Kant's work — expressed through the principles of duty and universality 
— that opens his system up to the operations of inversion.129 
Perhaps the obvious targets for such an operation are the classical poles of good 
and evil. If the moral law is defined in Kant's system as a law which commands a 
subject to purge themselves of all pathological interest in respect to the moral law and 
act in a way that holds true for all, then a preliminary definition of 'the good' would be 
an act that fulfils these criteria. Given this definition of the good, how is a definition of 
evil produced? In fact Kant provides a range of evils from which to choose. There is the 
evil of failing to apply a moral law consistently or in full, either out of weakness of 
heart or logical error; the evil of allowing pathological motivation to impact upon moral 
decision-making, and the related evil of acting in accordance with the moral law only 
when it coincides with one’s pathological motivation — a species of evil Kant labels 
'radical'.130 To these three categories of evil, Kant adds a fourth: diabolical evil. It is here 
that one finds the possibility for inversion, for in this concept there lays a principle of 
action that follows evil neither out of self-interest nor out of a moral failing, but out of 
duty alone. Diabolical evil elevates the transgression of the moral law to a law in itself, 
and in this respect it is indistinguishable from the highest good.  
																																																								
129 To be more precise, what I am calling the 'operation of inversion' is not so much applied to Kant's 
work itself in the essay 'Kant with Sade'. Rather, Lacan shows that Kant's moral philosophy renders the 
opposition between good and evil in classical systems of ethics less stable (and therefore reversible), 
rather than rendering its own definitions of these concepts less stable.  
130  The concept of radical evil is developed in Immanuel Kant, ‘Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason’, in Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology, ed. by Alan W. Wood and George di 
Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 39 -216.  
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Although he doesn't call it by name, it is clear that Lacan discerns just such an 
expression of diabolical evil in the work of the Marquis de Sade. If Kant's ethics has a 
desubjectifying effect on the moral actor, requiring her to purify her will of all 
pathological motivation and make herself into an agent of the moral law, this structure 
is mirrored in Sade’s willingness to endure considerable personal sacrifices in pursuit of 
transgression. At times this sacrifice is carried out in the name of a higher authority, 
such as 'mother Nature', and in Philosophy in the Bedroom Sade writes that 'were she to 
order us to set fire to the universe, the only crime possible would be in resisting her: all 
the criminals on earth are nothing but agents of her caprice….’131 It is in such passages 
that Sade's work takes on a peculiarly moral flavour, and his characters' dutiful 
submission to a law of transgression would seem to adhere to Kant's definition of the 
morally good. But what about Kant's other stipulation required for an act to be moral — 
the criteria of universality?  
On this point Lacan's argument gets more complex. In Kant with Sade he zones 
in on two expressions of the moral law. The first, taken from Kant’s Critique of 
Practical Reason, is none other than the categorical imperative itself: ‘So act that the 
maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle in a giving of 
universal law.’132 The second expression of the moral law is what Lacan calls ‘a rule for 
jouissance’ derived from Sade’s writings. Lacan expresses this second law as follows: 
'“I have the right to enjoy your body,” anyone can say to me, “and I will exercise this 
right without any limit to the capriciousness of the exactions I may wish to satiate with 
your body.”'133 Despite the element of caprice in the maxim derived from Sade, it 
nevertheless formally adheres to the requirement of universality in Kant's work, 
precisely because this caprice is not expressed on the side of the subject, but is 
something done to the subject by the Other. In this way it takes on the characteristics of 
an impersonal command to do one's duty, and to act only for the sake of this duty alone.  
Lacan writes that Sade's maxim is 'more honest that Kant's […] since it unmasks 
the split in the subject that is usually covered up.'134 To understand this point, it is 
necessary to look again at the two maxims Lacan provides. Whereas the categorical 
imperative is univocal, a product of the ‘common rational moral cognition’ that 																																																								
131 Marquis De Sade, Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom, & Other Writings (New York: Grove Press, 
1965), p 361. 
132 Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 164. 
133 Lacan, Écrits, p. 648. A more direct quote from Sade is provided in Lacan, Seminar VII, p. 202 
(March 30 1960): ‘“Lend me the part of your body that will give me a moment of satisfaction and, if you 
care to, use for your own pleasure that part of my body which appeals to you.”’ 
134 Lacan, Écrits, p. 650. 
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supposedly resides within each and every subject, Sade's rule for jouissance is bi-vocal, 
containing two subjects.135 This is clear at the level of grammar. Taking the form of 
reported speech, the Sadian maxim possesses two voices; an enunciating subject– the ‘I’ 
appearing within quotation marks – and the subject of the statement – the ‘me’ 
appearing in the middle of the sentence. The enunciating subject proclaims the right to 
enjoy the subject of the statement's body, and furthermore, 'anyone' can stake this claim 
and in doing so occupy the position of the enunciating subject. This 'anyone' can 
therefore be allied with the Other. Furthermore, the relationship between the subject of 
the statement and the Other is non-reciprocal.136 The enunciating subject (as Other) is 
free in comparison to the subject of the statement, who is bound by the duty that the 
former proclaims, and it is this structure that once again brings Sade's maxim into 
congruence with Kant's moral law.  
Lacan believes that there are also two subjects implied in Kant’s maxim, but one 
of them is hidden. As a product of the autonomy of the will, the moral law in Kant's 
ethics supposedly comes from the subject herself, as a voice from within. Lacan accuses 
Kant of exaggerating the tranquillity of this voice of conscience, but this accusation is 
contradicted by a look at the Metaphysics of Morals, where the moral law is cast in a 
more pernicious light: ‘Every man’, Kant writes ‘has a conscience and finds himself 
observed, threatened, and, in general, kept in awe (respect coupled with fear) by an 
internal judge.’137 Here a string of affects characterise the moral law: awe, respect, 
fear.138 For Lacan, the threatening judge Kant speaks of may seem internal, but in fact it 
is nothing less than an internalisation of wider social imperatives. The voice of 
conscience that constantly pursues the subject is nothing other than the wrathful voice 
of the superego.139  
																																																								
135 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997). 
136 Lacan, Écrits, p. 649: ‘we can already credit our maxim [Sade’s] with serving as a paradigm for a 
statement that as such excludes reciprocity (reciprocity and not “my turn next time”)’ 
137 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 189. 
In the footnote accompanying this passage Kant writes revealingly that ‘a human being who accuses 
himself in conscience must think of a dual personality in himself, a doubled self which, on the one hand, 
has to stand trembling at the bar of a court that is yet entrusted to him, but which, on the other hand, itself 
administers the office of judge that it holds by innate authority.’ [my italics] 
138 See Alenka Zupančič, Ethics of the Real (London: Verso, 2000) on the role of affect in Kant's work, 
especially chapter 7: 'Between the Moral Law and the Superego'.  
139 It was Freud who first hinted at the presence of the superego in Kant's work, for example in ‘The Ego 
and the Id' writing that 'As the child was once under a compulsion to obey its parents, so the ego submits 
to the categorical imperative of its super-ego’. Sigmund Freud, ‘The Ego and the ID’, in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey, Vol. 19 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), pp. 12-66 (p. 48). 
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 The logic of the superego is such that the closer one gets to fulfilling one’s duty, 
the more one admonishes oneself for not living up to its demands. In this way it 
displays overtly sadistic traits, pushing one ever further in the realisation of its will. 
Turning back now to the CoT, it is just such a sadistic impulse that can be discerned in 
Zedd's programmatic manifesto for the group:  
 
Since there is no afterlife, the only hell is the hell of praying, obeying laws, and 
debasing yourself before authority figures, the only heaven is the heaven of sin, being 
rebellious, having fun, fucking, learning new things and breaking as many rules as you 
can. This act of courage is known as transgression.140  
 
More than anything else, it is the idea of 'courage' that stands out in this passage, and it 
highlights the function of the superego in Zedd's declaration of intent. Here 
transgression is elevated to the status of a moral imperative, an imperative that entails 
subjecting the 1980s bible morality to the logic of inversion. In the description of the 
film that opened this section, Thrust in Me, it is possible to find almost a condensation 
of this operation. Here an image of Jesus is quickly followed by another of Zedd, both 
with eyes turned upwards and mouths agape (figure 3). The relationship between the 
two images manifests the iconoclastic spirit of much punk and post-punk imagery, from 
Jamie Reid’s Sex Pistols album cover featuring a swastika embellished Queen 
Elisabeth, to Gee Vaucher’s incorporation of religious imagery into her work with 
Crass.141 In all three cases icons of authority are defaced, challenged and inverted. 
Although on first glance the two images in Thrust in Me appear to be a relatively 
straightforward example of such strategies, a neat separation between the images and 
the ideas they represent is rendered more complicated in the detail. In particular, the 
words ‘Kill me’ written on the epaulette of Zedd’s black leather jacket are significant, 
constituting a message to God, a challenge that bridges both the cinematic cut between 
the two images and the separation between good and evil. Like the grammatical 
structure that characterises Sade's maxim, this challenge represents a relationship that is 
non-reciprocal. God can choose to kill Zedd if he wants to, the message seems to imply, 
and the latter remains at the mercy of this decision. Here it would seem that by willing 
destruction, a more general state of indeterminacy is also destroyed. The inscription on 																																																								
140 You Killed Me First, p. 17. 
141  For further examples of punk and post-punk artwork and graphic design displaying these traits see 
Bestley and Ogg, The Art of Punk and Punk: An Aesthetic, ed. by Johan Kugelberg and Jon Savage (New 
York: Rizzoli, 2012). 
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Zedd’s jacket is above all a challenge for God to exist. By sending such a message, 
Zedd not only entangles himself in the nets of religion, but also reveals his desire to 
eliminate contingency. This highlights a feature fundamental to all of the various 
inversions discussed in this section: they each in one-way or another will the Other into 
existence. In this way the image displays the logic of sadism, in which, as Lacan claims, 
the pain of existence (which for him is fundamentally a pain associated with 
indeterminacy and lack) is discharged on to the Other, which takes the form of an 
authority who replaces agonising deliberation with clear, univocal imperatives. 142 
Accompanying this discharge is a transfer of responsibility, and in turning him or 
herself into the object of the Other's enjoyment (Kill me if it pleases you) the sadist 
becomes the instrument of the Other's will.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Richard Kern, Thrust in Me (1985), film stills. © Richard Kern. 
 
 
Instead of producing new values, or producing new subjects that might act as bearers for 
these values, many of the films associated with the CoT simply take the underside of the 
law and elevate it to a principle of action. Just as for Lacan Sade's 'apology for crime 
impels him to an oblique acceptance of the Law'143, the batteries that discharge the 
electric shock in films such as Thrust in Me are batteries first of all charged by the Law. 
Bound up with a supergoic imperative to transgress at all costs, these works display a 
curious rigidity in both their commitment to transgression and their formal properties. 
In summary, it could be said that whereas in psychoanalysis the superego is 
conceptualised as an internalisation of society's imperatives, in the work of the CoT this 
internalisation occurs with a twist: in their work it is the inversion of majoritarian social 																																																								
142 Lacan, Écrits, p. 656. 
143 Ibid., p. 667. 
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values that are given the force of an imperative, and in doing so, these inverted values 
become the sticks with which they beat themselves. 
 
An Introduction to Disorientation  
 
When such inversions are repeated several times their effects can no longer be limited 
to an exchange, a flip, or a 180-degree turn. They start to mutate into processes 
associated with disorientation. Looking in greater detail at this concept of disorientation 
will provide the basis for another logic of transgression to come to the fore.  
Disorientation implies the loss of one’s bearings, a fact already suggested by the 
range of landscapes that are considered disorientating: the shifting ground of the desert, 
where sand dunes decompose and recompose again in new locations, or the empty 
expanse of the ocean, where the swell of waves and an unbroken horizon make 
navigation difficult. In both cases the Symbolic referents used for orientation disappear 
and the ground is rendered unstable. But an environment characterised by change is not 
enough to cause disorientation by itself. As Kant points out in his essay 'What Does it 
Mean to Orientate Oneself in Thinking?', it is only possible to orientate oneself 
geographically by combining the objective data in one’s surroundings with the 
subjective ground of differentiation.144 Without an a priori conception of the difference 
between left and right, or top and bottom, a feeling of disorientation could arise on the 
straightest of paths and the firmest of grounds. Disorientation is therefore a concept that 
straddles the subjective and the objective. It could be caused by the introjection of an 
environment in flux, or involve the projection of a disorientating state of mind onto the 
things that surround a subject.  
Disorientation is above all a feeling, but this feeling is often alloyed to other 
feelings, such as pleasure. The survivors of shipwrecks lost at sea rarely claim to have 
relished the experience, but they might confess to enjoying wandering around a maze or 
a hall of mirrors. The disorientating effects of psycho-active substances, alcohol, and 
fairground rides are actively sought on a regular basis, but for every pleasantly 
disorientating experience there is the bad trip, the spinning room, the vomit left after the 
fair leaves town.145 In most cases it is controlled disorientation that yields pleasure, 																																																								
144 Immanuel Kant, ‘What Does it Mean to Orientate Ourselves in Thinking’, in Religion and Rational 
Theology, ed. by George di Giovanni and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), pp. 1-18 (p. 9).  
145 It is also worth noting the use of disorientation in practices of interrogation and torture. In the 1970s 
the so called 'five techniques' of wall-standing, hooding, subjection to loud noise, deprivation of food and 
drink, and sleep deprivation were used by the British government in Northern Island, and various 
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whereas being caught in 'spatial systems beyond [one's] control', to use the words of 
Anthony Vidler, have a tendency to induce anxiety.146 Vidler argues that architecture's 
historical attempts to hold off this feeling of anxiety by means of rigid geometries and 
rational planning were thwarted by another history of thinking about space that 
attempted 'to permeate the formal with the psychological'.147 Art, too has had a role in 
this, and over the past century a number of artists have induced, staged, or symbolised 
acts of disorientation. In this section the work of Paul McCarthy will serve as an 
example.  
Long hailed as a central figure in the history of American performance and 
installation art for his visceral performances in architectural enclosures involving food 
substances and psycho-sexual pastiche, in recent years McCarthy's back-catalogue has 
been reappraised and a quieter side to the artist's work has been emphasised.148 This was 
especially so in a recent exhibition at the Whitney Museum of American Art in New 
York, which, to paraphrase the exhibition’s curator Chrissie Iles, explores the themes of 
rotation and dislocated space in a number of McCarthy's works from the 1960s-
1990s. 149  While offering an important vantage point on the artist's oeuvre, this 
exhibition isolated a series of themes related to disorientation but failed to shed light on 
its connection to the more overtly transgressive elements that span his work from the 
last five decades.150 It would be wrong to claim that disorientation is itself a form of 
transgression, as I said in the introduction to this chapter, but there nevertheless exists a 
relationship between the two. It is by looking at the work of McCarthy that this 
relationship will be brought into clearer focus.   
  
 
 
 																																																																																																																																																																		
practices of disorientation and sensory deprivation have been used more recently in Guantanamo bay. See 
Stephen Soldz and Julian Assange, 'Guantanamo document confirms psychological torture', Wikileaks, 
November 17 2007 <https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Guantanamo_document_confirms_psychological_torture> 
[accessed 01/06/2015]. 
146 Anthony Vidler, Warped Space: Art, Architecture, and Anxiety in Modern Culture (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 2000), p. 1.  
147 Ibid., p. 2.  
148 Sarah Thornton, ‘Paul McCarthy’, Art Forum, April 2008, pp. 320-321, p. 321.  
149 ‘Paul McCarthy: Central Symmetrical Rotation Movement. Three Installations, Two Films’, curated 
by Chrissie Iles, Whitney Museum of American Art, New York, June 26 - October 12, 2008. 
Accompanying exhibition catalogue published as Chrissie Iles, Central Symmetrical Rotation Movement 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) 
150  ‘Disorientation’ is not positioned as the pre-eminent concept in the exhibition, and appears clustered 
with other concepts relating to movement, including rotation, mirroring and vertigo. Ibid. 
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Motion Sickness: on the Work of Paul McCarthy  
 
In many ways Paul McCarthy's Spinning Room (1971 / 2008) is atypical of the artists 
oeuvre.151 There are no scatological or pop cultural allusions, no nudity or horseplay, 
and his signature materials of ketchup, mayonnaise and mustard are notably absent. But 
it is by looking at this piece before better-known works that it will be possible to isolate 
the trope of disorientation with greater ease.  
 
Figure 4: Paul McCarthy, Spinning Room (1971 / 2008), mixed media. © Hauser & Wirth, London/ 
Zurich.  
 
 
The first thing one notices about Spinning Room is that it is made up of a room that does 
not spin. A cuboid frame supports four large double-sided projection screens that 
remain rooted to the spot. From outside, this makeshift enclosure looks like something 
that might be taken on tour with a band, the lightweight metal frame allowing for easy 
assembly and disassembly. Outside the enclosure four projectors beam images onto the 
screens, the latter leaving openings at the corners to allow viewers to enter into the 
cube's interior. Once inside, a tiered cylindrical pedestal becomes visible at the centre of 
																																																								
151 Conceived in 1971, Spinning Room was only realised in 2008 for the exhibition ‘Central Symmetrical 
Rotation’. Ibid. 
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the structure. This pedestal supports four cameras arranged like points of a compass on 
a platform that spins irregularly, changes direction, changes speed, and periodically 
stops altogether. Coloured electrical wires carefully routed through the centre of the 
pedestal disappear into a custom made computer at the base. This is what controls the 
spinning movement, as well a series of visual effects applied to the imagery after it has 
been captured. Other than the camera pedestal the only thing the viewer sees inside the 
space is themselves; enlarged, distorted, and back-projected onto one of the four 
screens. Because the cameras also film projections of the images they capture, this 
creates a mise-en-abyme, and the viewer is trailed by a series of recursive ghost images 
that recede to the limit of the projector's resolution.  
If the mise-en-abyme were the only visual effect that the piece created then this 
discussion would be able to proceed on familiar critical territory. Since Andre Gide, 
numerous artists, authors, and theorists have discussed the device as indicative of self-
reflexivity. Gide drew attention to the role of mise-en-abyme in the 'play within a play' 
in Shakespeare's Hamlet, as well as Velázquez's painting Las Meninas (1656), and the 
term has been employed extensively in various fields, from literary theory to film 
studies.152 But Spinning Room attacks the viewer with a range of visual and spatial 
effects: the video-feed periodically flips upside down, changes speed or direction, is put 
into photographic negative, or subjected to a small delay, throwing it out of sync with 
the viewer's live movements. Four overhead studio lights suspended on the corners of 
the frame flash off and on without ever creating a genuinely stroboscopic effect. While 
this ensemble of effects may be caused by pre-programmed invariants, no discernible 
pattern stabilises to put the viewer at ease. Periodically, one of the cameras will project 
the coloured bands of a test pattern instead of the video feed, providing a point of 
orientation that serves the machine and its colour matching imperatives rather than the 
viewer themselves.  
Several associations immediately spring to mind when considering Spinning 
Room. McCarthy has himself made references to Michael Snow's film La Région 
Centrale (1971) and it is worth following up this comparison.153 Set in an area of 
wilderness in northern Quebec, La Région Centrale was made by stationing a camera on 																																																								
152 Lucien Dällenbach, Le récit spéculaire: Essai sur la mise en abyme (Paris: Seuil, 1977) was the first 
book length study of the subject. Various works in the field of film studies have foregrounded the 
concept, for example Deborah Linderman, ‘The Mise-en-Abîme in Hitchcock's "Vertigo"', Cinema 
Journal, 30:4 (1991), 51-74. Velázquez's painting Las Meninas is also discussed by Michel Foucault in 
the opening section of The Order of Things (London: Routledge, 1989). 
153 Although made in the same year that 'spinning room' was conceived, McCarthy claims not to have 
seen the film until the late '70s. According to the artist, he did however see images of the spinning camera 
mount used by Snow earlier in the decade. Iles, Central Symmetrical Rotation Movement, p. 64. 
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a mountaintop. With the exception of the first thirty minutes, which contains footage of 
the crew setting up the camera, the landscape is entirely devoid of evidence of human or 
animal activity. The star of the film is arguably a pre-programmed rotating camera 
mount that traces a series of horizontal and vertical pans, lens rotations and zooms. In 
using this device Snow claimed to be breaking with the tradition of subjecting camera 
movement to the dictates of plot, or consigning it to the role of imitating the human eye, 
by giving the camera 'an equal role in the film to what is being photographed.'154 The 
film has a cosmological dimension, and over the course of 180 minutes the sun rises and 
sets, the clouds pass, and the camera movement builds into a crescendo of twisting and 
swirling motions that cause the images to become increasingly abstracted.  
While the effect created by both La Région Centrale and Spinning Room is 
above all disorientation, a number of subtle differences exist between the two works. 
For one, Snow's decision to place the camera in such a landscape is clearly not without 
significance, and the film vibrates with references to science fiction, the footage of the 
first moon landing broadcast just 12 years before, as well as a long preoccupation with 
wilderness in Canadian art that stretches back to Emily Carr and the Group of Seven.155 
Such an element is entirely lacking from McCarthy's work, which reflects viewers back 
at themselves in a contextually unremarkable space. Despite Snow's efforts to avoid 
making the camera into an extension of the human eye, the film nevertheless forces a 
viewer to identify with the camera and position themselves at the fulcrum of its 
movements (the only part of the landscape which remains hidden). This is true even 
when it supplies us with what Harun Farocki called 'phantom images' - that is, images 
that are not normally accessible to a viewer without technical mediation.156 McCarthy's 
film also does this, but identification is destabilised by means of a video feed that shows 
the viewer his or her own image. They no longer put themselves in the place of the 
camera because it is standing in front of them (the nearest one gets to this in La Région 
Centrale is catching a glimpse of a the shadow of the camera mount). In Spinning Room 
the viewer’s image returns as if from another place, and the feeling of disorientation is 
redoubled by the fact that they are robbed of the fixed centre of vision that Snow's film 
provides.  																																																								
154 Michael Snow and Louise Dompierre, The Collected Writings of Michael Snow (Waterloo, Ontario: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1994), p. 53. 
155 A number of critics have pointed out the importance of landscape to the film, for example Bill Simon, 
‘A Completely Open Space: Michael Snow’s La Région Centrale’, Millenium Film Journal, 4–5 (1979), 
93–100. Snow himself alluded to the group of seven - a group of Canadian Landscape painters who 
worked together from 1920-1933 and included Tom Thomson and Emily Carr. The Collected Writings of 
Michael Snow, p. 53. 
156 Harun Farocki, ‘Phantom Images’, Public, 29 (2004), 12-24. 
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Despite these differences, both films unleash a force that is first and foremost 
corporeal, presupposing a particular sensory apparatus to act upon. This is a point that 
Tila Landon captures well in a discussion of Snow's film:  
 
[La Région Centrale] calls upon a spectator with mobile, stereoscopic vision, with 
hearing and the ears’ semicircular canals, and with the long habitual experience of 
being vertical and seeing at eye-level, of handedness, dorso-ventrality and human gait. 
The screen image rends the eyes, attacks balance in the inner ear, challenges the 
stomach, contests eye-ear integration, and denies the pace and focus of perception 
constrained in a head that looks forward, on a neck with restricted rotation, on a body 
that walks, turns, stops and blinks to see.157  
 
As Landon makes clear, La Région Centrale is as much an embodiment of manifold 
sensory assaults on the human body as it is a film about the Canadian wilderness. The 
film dramatises the convergence of a range of analogue camera effects on the viewer's 
motor-sensory apparatus. As in Spinning Room, the primary effect is disorientation. 
Recalling Kant's claim that orientation requires as its pre-requisite the a priori 
distinction between left and right (or top and bottom), it could be said that both works 
seek to collapse this distinction at a physical-perceptual level, sweeping away 
habituated distinctions in favour of speeds and intensities. As one critic put it, in La 
Région Centrale, 'the world is inverted for so long, that when the camera swings 
vertically through a full circle to restore the horizon line to its rightful position, above 
the earth, it looks wrong.'158 
The psychical dimensions of disorientation are exposed in two other associations 
the film sets off: fairground rides and psychedelia. The generation of West Coast 
American artists McCarthy is often associated with — among them Mike Kelly, 
Raymond Pettibon, and Tony Oursler — is usually allied to a punk sensibility rather 
than the psychedelic countercultural movements that came before it. Many of the 
clichés of psychedelic art such as lurid or neon colour schemes, obsessive detail, 
amoebic blobs, or fluid forms are absent from McCarthy's oeuvre. And yet within 
Spinning Room other psychedelic tropes are clearly at work. Those used in the camera 
feed verge on the kaleidoscopic or fractal, and the multi-screen projection environment 
is reminiscent of the liquid light shows of psychedelic groups such as the Brotherhood 																																																								
157  Tila L. Kellman, Figuring Redemption: Resighting My Self in the Art of Michael Snow (Waterloo, 
Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2002), p. 117. 
158 Peter Rist, 'La Région Centrale: The most spectacular experimental film', Off Screen, 6:11 (2002) 
<http://offscreen.com/view/region_centrale> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
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of Light or The Heavy Water Light Show in the 60s and 70s. The elaborate visual 
performances mounted by these groups, sometimes using little more than overhead 
projectors, colour wheels, heat responsive pigment, or liquid crystal, were almost 
exclusively designed to accompany performances of live music. By contrast, when 
exhibited at the Whitney Museum the only sound that filled the space emanated from 
another nearby kinetic sculpture entitled Bang Bang Room (1992), in which a four-
walled room continuously pulled itself apart into two right angle corners. As these 
corners converged and detached the doors on each of the walls repeatedly slammed 
closed.159 Spinning Room presents a kind of cooled down trip; slow moving globular 
forms in warm hues are replaced by digital video feeds of figures that seem more 
mineral than larval. The slamming doors do not contribute to an immersive soundscapes 
but resound like gunshots through the gallery space. From the beginning psychedelic art 
both sought to replicate the subjective states brought about by substances such as LSD 
and mescaline and provided imagery that intensified these states, or steered them in a 
'positive' direction. 160  While Spinning Room in some ways borrows the visual 
vocabulary from psychedelic art (a vocabulary that has become so ubiquitous that it is 
admittedly difficult to call it specifically psychedelic), the effect is anything but 
conducive to a 'good trip'. Like much psychedelic art Spinning Room could be said to be 
concerned with the effects of a loss of control. But there are many different ways to lose 
control. Here the exit from reality is not an escape from the body or an exploration of its 
internal depths, but rather a recursive splintering of the surface. In a small, almost 
negligible way this could be said to offer passage to an 'altered state', but this altered 
state is characterised by disorientation that yields little in the way of insight.  
In the same exhibition space at the Whitney Museum is Mad House (2008), a 
work that takes the form of a fairground ride and empties it of any actual or anticipated 
pleasure. Comprised of a small room with four windows and one chair inside, the box 
spins manically on a vertical axis in an opposite direction to the chair inside. Like many 
of McCarthy's architectural spaces, the box has an anthropomorphic quality, and the 
piece as a whole confronts a viewer with the image of psychological disorientation - the 
collective 'family fun' of the theme park experience reduced to a solitary vertigo. 
Imagery drawn from fairgrounds and theme parks, particularly Disneyland, can be seen 																																																								
159 The bleeding of the sound from one piece to another was part of a strategy on the part of McCarthy 
and the curator to make works less discrete from each other. The customary labels identifying the title and 
dates of the works were missing, and a large mirror covered the back wall of the space.  
160  See Lars Bang Larson, ‘A History of Irritated Material: Psychedelic Concepts in Neo-Avant-Garde 
Art’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Copenhagen, 2011) for a comprehensive discussion of 
psychedelic art.  
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in many of McCarthy's works, and often acts as shorthand for a critique of American 
consumer spectacle. The most elaborate example of this to date is an exhibition 
conceived and executed together with the artist's son Damon McCarthy at a project 
space in London.161 Caribbean Pirates (2005), was inspired by the Pirates of the 
Caribbean Disneyland theme park ride in California, and predates the release of the 
subsequent films produced by Jerry Bruckheimer. Filling a vast warehouse space off 
Brick Lane, the exhibition featured various vessels: a houseboat, frigate, and a pirate 
ship heaving back and forth on a giant mechanical frame. Props and detritus from a film 
shoot littered the space and filled the nostrils, as severed prosthetic limbs lay in pools of 
ketchup and wrecked power tools dripped with chocolate sauce.162 Videos of pirate 
themed bacchanalia were haphazardly projected around the space, and involved 30 
buccaneers enacting violent scenarios of pillage and terror for a month. Any speech or 
dialogue in the films was lost as the soundtracks merged into a chaotic maelstrom of 
babble, shrieks and cries. 
 
 
Figure 5: Paul McCarthy in collaboration with Damon McCarthy, Cakebox (detail, from Caribbean 
Pirates), (2001-2005), mixed media. © Hauser & Wirth, London/ Zurich.  																																																								
161 'Paul McCarthy: Caribbean Pirates', Whitechapel Gallery (off-site), 23 October 2005 - 8 January 
2006. 
162 According to Adrian Searle, McCarthy's son Damon (a frequent collaborator with his father) lost two 
real fingers in an accident that took place during filming. One can only speculate whether or not these 
fingers were left as post-performance reliquaries in the exhibition. Adrian Searle, 'Shiver Me Timbers', 
Guardian, 24 October 2005 <http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2005/oct/25/1> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
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If Spinning Room embodies disorientation on a primarily perceptual-affective level, 
then Caribbean Pirates combines this with both moral and semantic disarray.163 The 
large kinetic sculptures are a nauseating sight from the beginning, and the feeling is 
augmented by almost every other element in the exhibition, from jerky video 
projections to a confusing mess of scattered limbs. The transubstantiation of body fluids 
for foodstuffs in the piece (and in many others by McCarthy) is not only an abject 
appropriation of American family brands such as Hershey but also a semiotic 
substitution in which one signifier assumes the place of another in a disorientating 
metaphoric movement. McCarthy argues that  
 
objects don't necessarily have to relate to themselves, they can be a symbol for 
something else. Ketchup can represent blood, it's not necessary that it be blood. […] I'm 
proposing that reality itself can fluctuate. The bottle of mayonnaise within the action is 
no longer a bottle of mayonnaise; it is now a woman’s genitals. Or it is now a phallus.164 
 
The theme of moral disorientation in the exhibition bears more scrutiny. As well as 
referring to Disney, the exhibition literature positions the pirate theme as a trope of 
‘invasion and occupation of foreign lands […] that resonate[s] with contemporary 
global events’.165 More generally, the pirate is a figure of disorientation par excellence, 
existing in a Symbolic space where the legal and moral structures of the land cease to 
govern so tightly. The pirate is an outlaw with respect to these structures, and in 
associating the outlaw with the American state McCarthy is reversing the usual 
transgressive arrangement where the former is acting against the interests of the latter. 
Here the authority that underpins the law and the actor that undermines it become one 
and the same thing, and the state assumes the power to suspend prohibitions when this 
coincides with its own interests. This places McCarthy himself in a rather ambiguous 
position. While his work is frequently labelled transgressive for its sexual and violent 
content, here he seems to be using these strategies to critique transgression itself, using 
it to cast a spotlight on American foreign policy. From this standpoint, McCarthy’s 
work does not therefore embody a transgression against the law (the dialectical model), 																																																								
163 The term 'semantic disarray' is borrowed from Ralph Rugoff, ‘Mr. McCarthy's Neighborhood’ in 
Ralph Rugoff, Kristine Stiles and Giacinto Di Pietrantonio, Paul McCarthy (London: Phaidon, 1996) pp. 
30-87 (p. 33). 
164 Paul McCarthy, 'Interview by Kristine Stiles', in Rugoff, Stiles and Di Pietrantonio, Paul McCarthy, 
pp. 6-29 (p. 14). 
165 Paul McCarthy, ‘LaLa Land Parody Paradise’ [exhibition hand-out] (London: Whitechapel, 2005). 
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a transgression at the limits of the law (the liminal model), nor even a transgression 
elevated to the status of morality (the model of inversion), but a species of transgression 
that turns back on itself, suspending the boundary lines that divide the law from its 
transgression in the first place.166  
To draw the discussion of McCarthy to a close it will be necessary to 
recapitulate on the relationship between transgression and disorientation that his work 
embodies. If transgression is first of all considered a concept tied to morality, 
disorientation could be considered an amoral concept that either results from a 
transgressive act, or creates the conditions of possibility for transgression. In the first 
case, acts associated with the consumption of substances considered in themselves 
transgressive might bring about a subjective state of disorientation. In the second case, 
an experience of disorientation might cause limits to blur or disappear entirely — the 
moral equivalent of being spun around on a fair ground ride so fast that the limits 
separating the objects in one’s field of vision disappear into a smear of colours. Here 
disorientation serves as the pre-condition for an act of transgression that may be only 
partially deliberate. To these two possibilities a third could be added: that disorientation 
serves as the symbol of transgression. 167  It is just such a relationship between 
transgression and disorientation that can be seen in the work of McCarthy. If Spinning 
Room shows a drive to place the viewer’s habituated categories of perception under 
duress, then this drive migrates into the domain of morality in works such as Caribbean 
Pirates. In this installation the usual codes and categories that shape the world are 
deformed on multiple planes at the same time: moral, semantic and perceptual-affective, 
with each stratum reinforcing the powers of the others. The result is not intended to be 
progressive, constructive, or conducive to new subjective forms. Here disorientation is 
the clearinghouse for a new value that McCarthy, like the CoT, is unwilling to deliver.  
 
Commanded Enjoyment  
 
The two logics of inversion and disorientation discussed in this chapter have so far been 
isolated and described in relationship to the primary topic of transgression. What 																																																								
166 This point is made in Cary Levine, Pay for Your Pleasures: Mike Kelley, Paul McCarthy, Raymond 
Pettibon (London: University of Chicago Press, 2013), p. 6: 'McCarthy and Pettibon can likewise be 
described as simultaneously transgressive and antitransgressive. Or, put more precisely, all three artists 
[Mike Kelley being the third] are transgressive in their refusal to blindly accept established myths of 
artistic transgression.'  
167 It would be interesting to develop this in dialogue with Kant's much discussed assertion that beauty 
serves as a 'symbol of morality'. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p. 225.  
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remains to be done is to open these arrangements up to critique by showing that they are 
not altogether dissimilar to the more general engines of social transformation associated 
with capitalism. To do so, I will once again draw inspiration from the 'decline of the 
Symbolic' thesis in the work of Lacan and his interpreters. 
One such interpreter is Todd McGowan, who follows Lacan in arguing that there 
has been a fundamental shift in the logic of social organisation along the axis of 
enjoyment: ‘Whereas formerly society has required subjects to renounce their private 
enjoyment in the name of social duty, today the only duty seems to consist in enjoying 
oneself as much as possible’.168 The simplicity of this quote belies both a complicated 
social shift in the operations of consumerism, and a paradoxical relationship between 
enjoyment and its renunciation. Rarely one to address socio-economic questions 
directly, in Seminar II, Lacan recycles a story from Freud’s Jokes and Their Relation to 
the Unconscious to illustrate the relationship at stake. A man walks into a bakery and 
asks for a cake, but before being asked to pay he changes his mind and asks for a glass 
of liqueur instead. When he’s asked to pay for the liqueur he replies that he paid for it 
with the cake. ‘But you haven’t paid for the cake either’, replies the baker, to which the 
man replies, but I hadn’t eaten it.169   
From a psychoanalytic perspective the price a subject is asked to pay upon 
entering society is enjoyment. Like the man in the bakery however, the subject never 
really had this enjoyment in the first place. It is only created retroactively on the basis of 
prohibition. It is not simply that in ‘traditional societies’ people enjoyed less, and that 
today’s social forms create a haven of enjoyment. Rather, the renunciation of enjoyment 
is precisely what introduces the possibility of its attainment. Enjoyment is always 
already figured as a sacrifice, and for this reason, it is what constitutes subjects as 
desiring. As McGowan summarises: ‘Desire is, in this sense, part of what one gets in 
exchange for the sacrifice of one’s enjoyment.’170 This supports the notions that while 
the decline of the Symbolic may on the face of it represent the erosion of social barriers 
to enjoyment, this does not necessarily mean that enjoyment becomes readily 
accessible. For McGowan, since the Symbolic is what prohibits enjoyment and 																																																								
168 Todd McGowan, The End of Dissatisfaction?: Jacques Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment 
(New York: SUNY, 2003), p. 2. McGowan uses the word ‘enjoyment’ as a translation of Lacan’s 
jouissance throughout the book.  
169 Sigmund Freud, ‘Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious’, in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey, Vol. 8 (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1960), pp. 9-238 (p. 60), quoted in Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book II: The 
Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis. 1954-1955, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller 
(New York: Norton, 1991), p. 234 (18 May 1955) 
170 McGowan, The End of Dissatisfaction?, p. 16.  
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therefore makes it possible, with its decline the possibilities for enjoyment become even 
more remote, along with the capacity of a subject to desire.  
Another aspect of this movement is embodied in a relationship between the 
superego and enjoyment. As was said above, for Lacan the superego encourages a 
subject to think that they can eliminate lack altogether. It fills out the gaps in the 
Symbolic order with Imaginary supplements. On the face of it, this would appear to run 
counter to Freud’s assertion that the superego acts as a buttress to Symbolic prohibition, 
serving as a ‘vehicle of tradition and of all the time resisting judgments of value’.171 In 
fact the superego’s demands are only partly bound up with tradition. Where traditional 
Symbolic prohibitions stop, the superego continues. As was claimed above, the super-
ego only becomes more demanding the more one complies with its commands. There is 
a certain violence in the way the superego relentlessly pursues the subject beyond the 
limits of the Symbolic law. As Walter Benjamin argued, there is violence at the origins 
of every law.172 For Lacan, this violence survives in the superego, which represents a 
law ‘insofar as nothing more than its root remains’.173 As I argued with respect to the 
CoT, this root is planted upside down, so to speak, so that it is the opposite of traditional 
and mainstream social values that constitute the 'content' of the superego's commands.  
Nevertheless, the superego is still social in origin. As well as the obligatory 
references to fascism to illustrate the logic of the superego, McGowan also draws on a 
range of (mostly American) examples to support his argument. Among them is George 
Bush’s message to the American public that it was their ‘patriotic duty’ to go shopping, 
and following September the 11th, that the public should ‘get on board’ and ‘go to 
Disneyland.’174 Although rarely so explicit, what these official messages reveal is a 
more general social shift that positions enjoyment as a social duty. The contemporary 
superego, as an internalisation of these messages, has the effect of constructing an 
illusory image of total enjoyment. Because this image is totalising, which is to say 
without lack, it simultaneously strips a subject of their desire and leaves them 
unsatisfied. It does not mean that they enjoy themselves more, or that authority ceases 
																																																								
171 Sigmund Freud, ‘New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis’, in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey, Vol. 22 (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1964), pp. 5-182 (p. 67). 
172 Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings: Volume 1, 1913-1926 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004), p. 243-4. ‘The power that guarantees a legal contract is, in turn, of violent origin even if 
violence is not introduced into the contract itself’.  
173 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book I: Freud’s Papers on Technique. 1953-1954, ed. 
by Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: Norton, 1991), p. 102 (10 March 1954). 
174 McGowan, The End of Dissatisfaction, p. 36. 
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to exist. Only that they no longer experience authority as taking a bite out of their 
enjoyment.  
 
From the Discourse of the Master to the Discourse of Capitalism 
 
As I have shown, the idea of a ‘decline in the Symbolic’ essentially denotes a change in 
the logic of social organisation. McGowan follows Lacan in placing emphasis on 
enjoyment in the contemporary social configuration, which has a destructive 
relationship to Symbolic prohibition. In Seminar XVII Lacan frames the issue in slightly 
different terms, as a change of discourse. Like Foucault after him, Lacan grants 
discourse an expansive conceptual range, defining it broadly as a ‘social link [lien 
social], founded on language’.175 In his seminar he identifies four types of social link — 
the discourse of the university, the hysteric, the analyst and the master — and two years 
later in a paper delivered in Milan he identifies a fifth: the discourse of capitalism.176 
Although these discourses do not eclipse one another in a historical sequence, Lacan 
does point out that ‘something changed in the master’s discourse at a certain point in 
history’.177 In this section I will look at how this change contributes to the decline in the 
Symbolic.  
For Lacan, a ‘discourse of the master’ anchors the transindividual relationships 
at work in traditional societies based on prohibition. The figure of the master could 
apply to the traditional role of the father in family structure, the monarch or ruler in 
social structure, or any transcendent Idea structuring knowledge. Lacan condenses his 
reflections on discourse into several ‘mathemes’, which he returns to throughout 
Seminar XVII and beyond.178 Rather than structures that are ontologically prior to 
reality, as can be inferred from Lacan’s discussion of these mathemes in his seminar, it 
is my claim, contra Lacan, that they should be treated as cartographies of particular and 
contingent social relationships.179 From this standpoint the possibility of imagining 																																																								
175 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XX: Encore. 1972-1973, ed. by Jacques-Alain 
Miller (New York: Norton, 1998), p. 17 (December 19 1972). For Foucault, ‘discourse is not a slender 
surface of contact, or confrontation, between a reality and a language (langue), the intrication of a lexicon 
and an experience; [but] practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.’ Michel 
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), p. 54.   
176 Jacques Lacan, ‘On Psychoanalytical Discourse’ <http://web.missouri.edu/~stonej/Milan_ 
Discourse2.pdf> [accessed 01/06/2015].  
177 Jacques Lacan, Seminar XVII, p. 177 (10 June 1970). 
178  Of Lacan’s seminars currently published in English, the four discourses are also discussed in Seminar 
XX.  
179 The ontological ‘priorness’ of the four discourses can be inferred from the following remarks in 
Seminar XVII: ‘[I] specify an arrangement that has absolutely not been imposed in any way- as they say, 
from a certain point of view, nothing has been abstracted from any reality. On the contrary it's already 
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alternatives to the five arrangements Lacan outlines is held open.180  Rather than 
exploring this possibility here, a closer look at the discourse of the master and the 
discourse of capitalism will facilitate the consideration of a significant vector of social 
change congruent with the decline of the Symbolic. 
 
 
Figure 6: The Discourse of the Master. 
 
In each matheme the position of the symbols is as important as what they represent. 
Broadly speaking, the symbols above the bar are official, or overt, and those below are 
unofficial, or repressed, with the top left position claiming primacy over the entire 
discourse. In this discourse the master (S1) makes every effort to conceal his nature as a 
split subject (S), addressing the Other (S2), who in turn produces a surplus (a) that is 
hidden and cannot be reabsorbed (//). 
Lacan’s most obvious point of reference here is Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, 
and just as for Hegel the master is only dominant by virtue of his saying so, for Lacan 
the master signifier as such means nothing. The master’s position is established simply 
by decree, it cannot be justified and requires him to continually exercise his power. The 
passage from one symbol to another takes the form of an interrupted circle, and every 
time this circuit of power is traversed a remainder (a) is produced. In a fairly loose 
appropriation of the terms of Marx’s labour theory of value, Lacan dubs this remainder 
surplus jouissance.181 In fact, at this stage surplus jouissance is very different from 
surplus value. It stands for an ineliminable remainder that cannot be integrated back into 
the system, whereas surplus value can absolutely be reintegrated for Marx. Lacan shows 																																																																																																																																																																		
inscribed in what functions as this reality I was speaking about before, the reality of a discourse that is 
already in the world and that underpins it, at least the one we are familiar with. Not only is it already 
inscribed in it, but it is one of its arches.’ pp. 14-15 (26 November 1969). Oliver Feltham discusses the 
difficulties such a classically structuralist position causes for Lacan when he is faced with the issue of 
historical change. See Oliver Feltham, ‘Enjoy Your Stay: Structural Change in Seminar XVII’, in Jacques 
Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Justin Clemens and Russell Grigg (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 179-194. 
180  One commentary on this seminar and its subsequent interpretations that expands the number of 
discourses is Levi R. Bryant, ‘Žižek’s New Universe of Discourse: Politics and the Discourse of the 
Capitalist’ International Journal of Žižek Studies, 2:4 (2008) <http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/ 
article/view/163/257> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
181  The term also functions as a loose translation of Freud’s ‘lustgewinn’, typically translated as ‘yield of 
pleasure’. 
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that the production of surplus jouissance in feudal societies causes problems for the 
master, and he works hard to limit its impact. In an interesting but vague association, 
Lacan claims that surplus jouissance is in many ways at the root of the ethical systems 
of antiquity: 
 
The problems of ethics here, suddenly, start to abound […] Nobody knows what to do 
with this surplus jouissance. In order to successfully place a sovereign good at the heart 
of the world, you need to be as embarrassed as a fish with an apple.182 
 
Here ethics serves an essentially regulatory function. The master is embarrassed by an 
excess beyond his control, and by generating a system of ethics (or according to the 
division set up in the introduction, morality) he attempts to tie it to a specific place 
through prohibition, staving off the effects of moral disorientation in the process. For 
Lacan, Symbolic prohibition is a necessary accompaniment to the master’s discourse. 
 
 
Figure 7: The Discourse of Capitalism. 
 
Lacan says very little about the discourse of capitalism, but in a paper presented at the 
university of Milan in 1972 he formulates another matheme. This discourse is a 
variation on the discourse of the master, which as Lacan points out, is formed by 
making ‘a little inversion between S1 and S.’183 It seems possible to read into this 
matheme two crucial points.  
Firstly, by placing S1 ‘below the bar’ Lacan is highlighting the fact that under 
late capitalism authority takes a different form. The split, supposedly liberated subject is 
the agent in the discourse of capitalism, but this freedom is illusory, because its hidden 
truth is mastery. Needless to say, beneath the clamour of voices proclaiming freedom of 
choice for the worker or the consumer lies a vast tangle of macro and microeconomic 
mechanisms, nudge tactics, employee evaluation procedures, pharmaceutically 
guaranteed psychological solutions, codes, scripts, and surveillance apparatus that are 																																																								
182  Lacan, Seminar XVII, p. 175 (10 June 1970). 
183 Jacques Lacan, ‘On Psychoanalytic Discourse’, p. 11. 
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designed precisely with control in mind. In contrast to the master’s discourse, where the 
‘split’ nature of subjectivity is hidden and power is positioned as univocal, in this new 
discourse the split is plain to see, but this does not have the effect of removing authority 
from the equation.  
A second, altogether more interesting implication of this new social structure is 
implied by the removal of the blockage between the subject and surplus jouissance. In a 
point that speaks to the theme of disorientation, the discourse of capitalism can be read 
accordingly as a sequence of infinite circulation (∞), which ‘works as if on wheels’.184 
For Lacan, this is something that emerges at a specific historical juncture, and 
contributes to the emergence of Capital proper. Whereas in the master’s discourse 
surplus jouissance posed a problem that required prohibition, under capitalism the 
surplus is packaged up and reintegrated into circulation. ‘The important point is that on 
a certain day jouissance became calculable, could be counted, totalized.’185 This logic 
can be seen at work in a range of contexts, from the capitalist construction of ‘leisure 
time’ as critiqued by Lefbvre, to Laporte’s account of the history of shit and its 
profitability.186 In both cases that which formerly served as waste for capitalism comes 
to be integrated into the system.  
Two secondary consequences arise from these changes that support my earlier 
arguments. As claimed in the last section, the saturation of the social order with 
jouissance leads, paradoxically, to its absence. Lacan goes as far to identify this as 
‘imitation surplus jouissance’. 187  This should not be opposed to any ‘authentic’ 
jouissance that can be located in the social order, because the only authentic jouissance 
is experienced as impossibility, as a gap in the Symbolic. To use the vocabulary of 
Deleuze and Guattari, under capitalism the location of this point of impossibility is 
constantly deterritorialised and reterritorialised — a process that has disorientating 
effects. The drive to jouissance serves as a motor that continually opens up new 
																																																								
184  [Ca marche comme sur des roulettes]. Lacan, ‘On Psychoanalytic Discourse’, p. 11. 
185 Lacan, Seminar XVII, p. 177 (10 June 1970). 
186 Lefebvre shows both how the freedom to indulge in leisure activities exists in an economy that 
requires citizens to ‘buy’ this time with work, and how it is inextricably bound up with consumption. 
Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life Volume One: Introduction (London: Verso, 2008), p. 31. See 
also Dominique Laporte, History of Shit (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002). Another point of 
reference here might be Jonathan Crary, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (London: Verso, 
2013), in which he argues that sleep provides one of the last frontiers to capitalism and its various 
technical apparatus of control.   
187 Lacan, Seminar XVII, p. 81 (11 February 1970). 
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possibilities for profit.188 Under this regime surplus jouissance becomes a potentially 
infinite source of surplus value.  
This has a dramatic effect on the logic of social organisation. As Frédéric 
Declercq points out, ‘For Lacan a society that revolves around the production and 
consumption of objects of libidinal enjoyment connects subjects with objects and not 
with other subjects.’189 This has a destructive effect on social relations within and 
between groups, which are largely based on shared Symbolic frames of reference. 
Where the discourse of the master is based on Symbolic recognition, on a relation 
between the subject and the Other — albeit one mediated by a master signifier (S g S1 
g S2) — in the discourse of capitalism the subject is continually bombarded with 
objects of enjoyment (a g S). The Symbolic is still in place, but it serves not as a locus 
of social organisation but as a storehouse for illusory parcels of jouissance.  
 
Pushing at an Open Door 
 
What becomes of the transgressive logics of inversion and disorientation under the 
conditions of commanded enjoyment and the discourse of capitalism? Before answering 
this question it is worth recapitulating the basic argument so far. This has centred 
around the work of two American artists, Paul McCarthy and Nick Zedd, the latter of 
which was the main ideologue of the Cinema of Transgression. It was argued that 
certain works by Zedd and the CoT embodied the transgressive logic of inversion, and 
that by elevating transgression to the position of an imperative the group became 
victims of their own supergoic commands. The work of McCarthy on the other hand 
was shown to embody a spirit of disorientation that operated in multiple registers: 
semiotic, perceptual-affective, and moral. While working in different artistic milieus 
and living on opposite sides of North America, McCarthy and the filmmakers 
associated with the CoT nevertheless share a certain punk sensibility. This is manifested 
in their mutual iconoclastic reprocessing of mainstream American visual culture, as well 
as the values this culture carries. It is also manifested in a common lack of appetite for 
																																																								
188 As Zupančič puts it, ‘Drives are plastic; just let them come up with another Symbolic (or Imaginary) 
configuration of enjoyment that can then be detached from enjoyment per se.’ Alenka Zupančič, ‘When 
Surplus Enjoyment Meets Surplus Value’, in Reflections on Seminar XVII, ed. by Justin Clemens and 
Russell Grigg (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 155-178 (p. 173). 
189 Frédéric Declercq, ‘Lacan on the Capitalist Discourse: Its Consequences for Libidinal Enjoyment and 
Social Bonds’, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 11, (2006) 74–83 (p. 75). Broadly speaking this is also 
Marx’s argument, that under commodity fetishism relationships between people are confused with 
relationships between things.  
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positing any values of their own. Yet while the CoT elevated transgression to the status 
of morality, giving it a value in and of itself, McCarthy does not even give the viewer 
this option; his work pushes beyond the logic of inversion and shows that transgression 
is itself compromised, and ultimately associated with dubious surpra-legal state power. 
The antagonistic attitude shared by McCarthy and the CoT has not however 
precluded them from gaining institutional recognition and support. In the case of the 
CoT, this can be seen in a recent survey exhibition at the KW Institute in Berlin.190 
Eschewing the usual white emulsion and polished concrete of the art museum, the 
exhibition’s curators instead recreated a strange facsimile of ‘80s New York. For three 
months in the Spring of 2012, Thrust in Me was projected for a strictly 18+ audience 
amongst freshly spray-painted graffiti, painstakingly smudged windows and stuffed 
beanbags that resembled rats — an unusual solution to the problem of gallery seating. 
Like many other transgressive artists before them, Nick Zedd and Richard Kern had 
finally entered the museum. For his part, McCarthy has never left. Although large 
museum retrospectives were devoted to the artist only later in his career, and in Europe 
before they were in America, McCarthy remains very much an art-world insider — a 
fact reflected in both his visibility in the art-press and the more recent commercial 
success of his work. In both cases, this institutional recognition does not mean that the 
transgressive nature of their work is automatically compromised. To stop here would be 
to level a rather superficial critique. More significant than the dynamics of recuperation 
is the relationship between the transgressive strategies of inversion and disorientation 
and the aspects of the decline of the Symbolic discussed above.  
In many ways, the conceptual figure of inversion finds its perfect illustration in 
the case of commanded enjoyment. If the CoT can be said to have applied a twist to the 
usual operations of the superego, flipping the script on timeworn values and fixed moral 
codes, then this inversion now dovetails neatly with a set of social pressures that 
actively command enjoyment. While religion undoubtedly still enjoys a privileged place 
in American society, buttressing all manner of prohibitions and prejudices, these have 
slowly yielded to the pressures of a consumerism. The Reagan era imperative to ‘just 
say no’ has arguably been eclipsed by the exhortation to ‘just do it’.191 Under this 
																																																								
190 'You Killed Me First: The Cinema of Transgression', curated by Susanne Pfeffer at KW Institute for 
Contemporary Art, Berlin, 19 February 2012 – 9 April 2012.  
191 Nike’s slogan was reportedly inspired by the last words of the serial killer Gary Gilmore before he was 
executed by a firing squad, lending it a further frisson of transgression. Jeremy W. Peters, ‘The Birth of  
“Just Do It” and Other Magical Words’, The New York Times, 9 August 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/08/20/business/media/20adco.html?_r=0> [accessed 01/06/2015].  
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regime, strategies of transgression associated with inversion no longer oppose the norm, 
but find their apogee in various mainstream practices and products.192 
The shift from the discourse of the master to the discourse of capitalism bears 
less affinity with the operations of inversion than with disorientation. In replacing a 
univocal, fixed point of identification with a tangle of control mechanisms that operate 
in a less overt manner, the discourse of capitalism is one that acts as a corrosive on 
social forms that stand in its way. The removal of blockages in the circulation of capital 
often coincides with the removal of the Symbolic prohibitions that serve as points of 
orientation. Despite a desperate effort on the part of mainstream politicians to retrofit a 
certain conception of morality onto the mechanisms of capitalism, the latter is 
fundamentally beyond good and evil, overturning moral prohibitions when they stand in 
the way of profit. McCarthy's work could be said to allow the viewer to navigate 
through the wreckage of morality by offering up a kind of cognitive map. This is a 
paradoxically disorientating map, for it produces a cartography of disorientation itself. 
In his work the infinite transformation of surplus jouissance into surplus value under 
capitalism finds its visual analogue in the substitution of consumer condiments for 
bodily substances, where food and excrement ultimately become part of one and the 
same infernal flow of capital. The 'internal' critique of transgression within his work 
also exposes a contemporary bind between the law and transgression in mainstream 
politics. Together, these elements may temporarily send a viewer spinning, but they also 
stabalise into an image of disorientation itself, isolating it in a series of aesthetic forms.  
 
 
  
																																																								
192  This point could be linked to a number of recent cultural franchises, from the hugely popular Sex and 
the City to the more recent 50 shades of Grey, both of which commodify sexual transgression and present 
it as a consumer choice. See Alex Dymock, ‘Flogging sexual transgression: Interrogating the costs of the 
Fifty Shades Effect’, Sexualities 16 (2013), 880-895. 
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Chapter 3 
Programmes for Life 
 
 
In perhaps one of the most famous and discredited psychological experiments of the 20th 
century Phillip Zimbardo boarded up both ends of a large corridor in the basement of 
the university department where he worked and constructed a mock prison. Zimbardo 
paid 24 male students $15 a day and randomly assigned them the roles of prisoner and 
guard, enlisting the local police force to ‘arrest’ the prisoners in their homes and bring 
them to the facility. The primary aim of the Stanford prison experiment was to study the 
effects of deindividualisation and institutional validation on an individual's behaviour. 
Despite Zimbardo’s intention to run the experiment for 2 weeks, it was aborted after just 
6 days, by which time the guards had begun to display increasingly sadistic behaviour. 
After the experiment had finished, Zimbardo declared it fundamentally unethical to 
carry out research in such a way.193 Repeating the experiment in America today would 
be impossible in a research context, breaching both the American Psychological 
Association code of ethics and the widely implemented Belmont report.194 As well as 
these concerns, there have been serious questions raised about the scientific validity of 
the experiment, the way in which the participants were hired, and the fact that the 
results were never peer-reviewed. 
From the outset then, the decision by the artist Artur Żmijewski to re-stage the 
experiment in 2005 was a wilfully transgressive gesture. While most of the details were 
duplicated as closely as possible, several key differences in the way the second 
experiment differed from the original make for an interesting comparison. In 
Żmijewski’s experiment, the participants were not students but unemployed men, and 
																																																								
193 Furthermore, in his book The Lucifer Effect, Zimbardo apologised for his role in the experiment, 
writing that ‘I was guilty of the sin of omission — the evil of inaction — of not providing adequate 
oversight and surveillance when it was required.’ ‘The findings came at the expense of human suffering. I 
am sorry for that and to this day apologize for contributing to this inhumanity.’ Philip Zimbardo, The 
Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil (London: Random House, 2011), pp. 181, 235.  
194 The Belmont Report is a document published in 1979 that outlines a set of ethical guidelines for 
research involving human subjects. Despite the fact it was written with behavioural and biomedical 
research in mind, according to Papademus the Belmont Report set out ‘basic ethical principles for the 
many particular ethical prescriptions and evaluations of human actions in general.’ See Diana Papademas, 
‘Editor's Introduction: Ethics in Visual Research’, Visual Studies, 2:19 (2004), 122-126. For a full text of 
the Belmont Report see United States National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Research, Volumes 1-2 (Washington: United States. Dept. of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, 1978). There would be grounds to argue that the Stanford prison experiment 
itself contributed to the perception that formal codes of ethics were needed for research. 
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the prison was located not in the basement of a university but in an industrial unit on the 
outskirts of Warsaw. Furthermore, while the experiment ended prematurely, it did so 
not through the intervention of the ‘warden’, but rather through mutual agreement 
between the prisoners and the guards. Another crucial difference between the two films 
involved the surveillance employed by Żmijewski — 5 cameras placed behind mirrored 
glass and several CCTV cameras inside the ‘prison’ — the footage from which was then 
edited into a 75-minute film entitled Repetition, which was displayed in the Polish 
pavilion at the Venice Biennale in 2005.  
 
 
Figure 8: Artur Żmijewski, Repetition (2005), film still. © Foksal Gallery Foundation, Warsaw and 
Galerie Peter Kilchmann, Zurich.   
 
 
The title of the book published on the occasion of this exhibition is suggestive: If it 
happened only once it’s as if it never happened.195 Rather than being simply a disavowal 
of contingency, it highlights an ambition to challenge the status of the knowledge 
produced by Zimbardo’s experiment, and suggests that art is equally entitled to answer 
																																																								
195 Joanna Mytkowska, Artur Żmijewski: If it happened only once it’s as if it never happened (Ostfildern: 
Hatje Cantz, 2005). The title is a translation of a German proverb, Einmal ist Keinmal.  
	 86	
such questions.196 In an interview with Daniel Miller, Żmijewski claims that ‘I repeated 
the Phillip Zimbardo experiment because, unlike scientists, I can do this, because in art 
it is still allowed. It doesn’t mean that there is more freedom in art; it just means that 
there is cultural permission for rebellion in art.’197 This comment opens out onto a range 
of points about the contextual differences between the two fields and the different moral 
parameters they operate within. It also lends support to the arguments made in previous 
chapters concerning the paradox of socially sanctioned transgression. While these 
considerations are no doubt central to Repetition, they only take the argument so far. In 
this chapter I want to approach Żmijewski‘s practice from a different angle, one that 
takes into account not only the 'negative' logics of transgression in its relation to 
existing laws or rules (logics embodied in different ways by each of the artists discussed 
so far) but also the way in which a set of rules might be actively created in a work of art, 
being the very material out of which it is constituted. Two further examples drawn from 
Żmijewski’s oeuvre help this aspect of his work to be discerned.  
The first of these is set in an environment resembling an art school. In a large 
whitewashed space with painted stud walls and overhead strip lights groups of 
participants apply paint to supported sheets of paper. The participants belong to one of 
four groups: elderly Catholic women, members of the neo-nationalist Union of Polish 
Youths, Jewish teenagers and young left-wing activists. In Them (2007), the task 
Żmijewski has set them for the day is to make a symbol of their organisation and their 
beliefs. The results range from a boldly outlined painting of a church to a mixed media 
collage of the Szczerbiec sword - a nationalist symbol of Poland. When the groups are 
satisfied with their efforts Żmijewski takes photographs of the works, and the next day 
hands them T-shirts with their designs printed on the front. He announces what will 
happen next: "our game begins here. If you don’t like something about this situation 
you can change it. You can re-edit it, re-write it, draw it again, destroy or add 
something. There are no restrictions". The groups go to work on each other’s paintings, 
at first working tentatively: the activists carefully cut between the church doors to open 
them up; the Jewish teenagers apply a rainbow flag across the Szczerbiec sword. As the 
exercise continues however, the alterations get increasingly destructive, culminating in 
																																																								
196 Insofar as the original experiment can be said to have produced knowledge, the title of the works it 
generated such as The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil would suggest that the status of this 
knowledge is not only scientific but also moral.  
197 Daniel Miller, ‘The Politics of Fear: Artur Żmijewski interviewed by Daniel Miller’, Art Monthly, 333 
(2010), 1-4 (p. 2)  
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several of the pieces being entirely burnt, and one of the elderly Catholic women having 
her mouth taped shut with gaffer tape.198  A	third	example,	The	Game	of	Tag	[Berek]	(1999), is ostensibly a lot simpler 
than the other two works. For just under four minutes a group of around 8 participants 
of mixed ages and genders play the game naked. They shuffle into a small concrete 
room timidly, swinging their arms or jumping up and down to keep warm. As the game 
begins they become more relaxed, laughing and engaging in horseplay as the power 
shifts around the room. The game picks up a rhythm and they run around in circles or 
group together in corners. Mid way through the film the camera cuts to another space 
that appears very similar to the first. The participants are playing the same game with 
similar exuberance. It is only when the credits roll that the viewer is told in a matter-of-
fact way where the film was shot: in the first place the basement of a private house, in 
the second, the gas chamber of a former concentration camp. The veracity of this 
information is worth questioning, but has until now passed without interrogation in the 
art press.  
When it was exhibited at the exhibition Side	by	Side.	Poland	–	Germany.	A	1000	
Years	of	Art	and	History, at the Martin-Gropius-Bau Berlin199, the video was removed 
from the exhibition at the request of Jewish leaders, specifically Hermann Simon,	 the	director	 of	 the	 New	 Synagogue	 Berlin	 and	 Centrum	 Judaicum	 Foundation,	 who	wrote	 a	 letter	 to	 the	 director	 of	 the	 gallery	 expressing	 his	 condemnation	 of	 the	video.	A	year	later,	when	Żmijewski was	appointed	curator	of	the	Berlin	Biennial,	he	chose	 to	re-exhibit	 the	piece,	 in	his	own	words,	 ‘to react against this impulse to 
censor, self-censor, and close off discussion.’ 200  Reacting against such an act of 
censorship was again clearly a transgressive gesture, especially since this censorship 
was enforced on primarily moral grounds.  																																																								
198 A very similar ‘game’ was played between Żmijewski and Paweł Althamer on the occasion of their 
joint exhibition at CCA Ujazdowski Castle Warsaw in 2005, entitled [S]election.pl. Żmijewski and 
Althamer invited former colleagues to contribute to the exhibition on the condition that anyone could 
adapt, improve or destroy the work on display. As the exhibition developed, Althamer invited more and 
more participants, including a group of children, his daughter, and at one stage a group of prostitutes. The 
English title of the exhibition hints at a range of possible meanings. The idea of ‘selection’ highlights the 
ongoing input of each participant, who effectively select the works they would like to preserve and those 
they would like to change. Understood in this way, it could be said that the exhibition evolved over time 
by means of ‘natural’ selection, with only the ‘fittest’ artworks surviving.  The loosely democratic nature 
of the process is denoted by the word ‘election’, and ‘.pl’ could reference the polish web domain.  
199 The exhibition was curated by Anda Rottenberg and took place from September 23, 2011–January 9, 
2012. 
200 Artur Żmijewski, ‘Berek’ <http://www.berlinbiennale.de/blog/en/projects/berek-by-artur-zmijewski-
22243> [accessed 01/06/2013]. The decision to place the video in a black-box viewing room on the top 
floor of the K.W. institute in Berlin makes for a more tepid challenge to the ‘censorship’ than the Biennial 
literature makes out. 
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The Game of Tag is perhaps the starkest example of the two features of 
Żmijewski’s work I want to foreground in this chapter. The first concerns the way in 
which the artist designs visual or verbal games that performers then play out. All of the 
works above involve games of one sort or another, and these games only function by 
means of a set of rules of engagement, stages of progression, and roles assigned and 
exchanged among participants. For now all of these features could be subsumed under 
the Lacanian category of the Symbolic (later in this chapter I will attend to the 
specificity of the different functions at play). While Żmijewski's games could be said to 
involve the creation of Symbolic microcosms, in each case the boundaries of these 
microcosms are unstable, extending beyond the apparent bounds of the artwork itself - 
for example in the case of Repetition connecting up with the unemployed status of the 
men taking part, and in the case of A Game of Tag with the cultural sensitivity that 
usually surrounds discussions of the Holocaust. The second feature is the transgressive 
strategies that each of these works employ. In the 1990s Żmijewski was a key proponent 
in the ‘Critical Art’ movement in Poland, which included Katarzyna Kozyra, Zbigniew 
Libera and Grzegorz Klaman among others.201 As distinct from some of the artists 
associated with The Cinema of Transgression discussed in the last chapter, the Critical 
Art movement in Poland made work that was avowedly political. What then is the 
relationship between transgression and political intent in Żmijewski’s work? Is 
transgression being positioned as a predominantly political tool? And if so how is this 
tool wielded?    
These two overarching concerns — the game-like character of Żmijewski’s 
work and the relationship between transgression and political intent — could be treated 
separately. However, to do so would be to miss the significance of their interrelation. 
For one, both transgression and the creation of games involve an attitude towards the 
Symbolic. Identifying the specific character of this attitude requires a look beyond the 
artworks themselves and into the socio-political context in which they were made. By 
looking at this wider backdrop, as well as a handful of artistic precursors to Żmijewski’s 
work, I hope to discern a submerged logic that bridges the gap between a predominantly 
																																																								
201 A good round up of the 'Critical Art' movement in Poland is provided in Trembling Bodies: Interviews 
with Artists, ed. by Artur Żmijewski (Krakow: Kronika, 2010). Several of the artists interviewed are 
known for work that could in one way or another be considered transgressive, among them Zbigniew 
Libera's Lego Concentration Camp (1996), which drew legal complaints against the artist from Lego, 
Katarzyna Kozyra's Olympia (1996), an uncompromising series of photographs and a video that 
documents the artist's fight with cancer, and Grzegorz Klaman's Flag for Third Polish Republic (2001), a 
violation of the ban on placing a three coloured polish flag on the facade of the building in Gdańsk.  
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negative impulse to transgress, and the experimental modelling and remodelling of 
reality and behaviour.   
 
Open Forms, Closed Forms 
 
What are the historical precedents for the performances described above? Insofar as 
they proceed from a set of authored rules, or constraints, they bear a resemblance to the 
scored happenings and performances of Allan Kaprow and John Cage (in particular the 
latter's use of the I-Ching) in the 1960s, as well as many others associated with the 
Fluxus movement around the same time.202 There is however a lesser-known history of 
Polish artists who explored similar issues around structure and agency in their work. In 
the following paragraphs I will attempt to trace this history and its influence on 
Żmijewski’s practice.  
As one of several internationally known Polish artists (including Katarzyna 
Kozyra and Pawel Althamer), Żmijewski was educated at the Academy of Fine Arts in 
Warsaw in the 1980s and 90s. The ‘game’ that acts as the motor of Them is largely 
based on a similar game that Żmijewski played when at art school under the tutelage of 
Grezegorz Kowalski, who was in turn influenced by the avant-garde architect Oskar 
Hansen (1922-2005).  
As an architect, educator, theorist and urban planner, perhaps the most 
significant influence Oskar Hansen exerted on Polish art hinged around his concept of 
the ‘open form’. This theory was elaborated in The Open Form Manifesto, which was 
enthusiastically received at the Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM) 
in Otterlo in 1959. Hansen put great store by his concept, writing that the open form 
‘will awake the desire of existence for every one of us, it will help us to define 
ourselves and find ourselves in the space and time in which we live.’203 The theory as a 																																																								
202  John Cage’s Music of Changes (1951) is a composition for piano in which a chart system allowed the 
composer to consult the I-Ching and convert the book’s symbols into musical notation. See John Cage, 
‘To Describe the Process of Composition Used in Music of Changes and Imaginary Landscape No. 4’, in 
Silence: Lectures and Writings, 57–59 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), pp. 57-60. 
Although less preoccupied with the issue of contingency, Kaprow is well known for the guidelines he 
provided for the participants in his happenings. These were often sequential in nature, and prescribe a set 
of actions or conditions that should be fulfilled for the happing to be successful. See Allan Kaprow, 
Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life (Berkley, University of California Press, 1993). 
203 Oskar Hansen, ‘Forma Otwarta’, Przeglad Kulturalny, 5:5 (1959), 5-6 (p. 5), English translation 
available from: <http://open-form.blogspot.co.uk/2009/01/original-1959-open-form-manifesto.html> 
[accessed 01/06/2015] There has been a recent resurgence of interest in Hansen's work within the art-
world leading to a number of major museum exhibitions such as 'Oskar Hansen – Open Form' at Museu 
d’Art Contemporani de Barcelona (MACBA), 10 July 2014 to 06 January 2015 (curated by Soledad 
Gutiérrez and Łukasz Ronduda in collaboration with Aleksandra Kędziorek.) 
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whole can be described as an early attempt to make architecture more responsive to 
individual and group desire. Amenable to multiple uses and scales of operation, the 
theory extended over art, architecture and urban planning, and in each case 
foregrounded social use over and above ‘rational’ planning, presupposing a form of 
subjectivity based on diversity and process, rather than unity and stasis.204 For Hansen, 
the ideal outcome of any given project involved the ascendency of the ‘user’ to the 
position of co-author. This was decisively not the case in what he called ‘closed forms’, 
‘in which the formal and often also the contextual components are fixed.’205 Closed 
forms objectify those who live in them, making them feel as if they were living among 
‘somebody else's souvenirs, feelings, somebody else's houses and housing 
settlements.’206 As much as possible, a building or urban space should facilitate the 
subjective emancipation of its users, rather than their objectification and alienation. 
Although these ideas are relatively commonplace today, in their time they ran against 
the grain of technocratic rationalism that characterised much early modernist 
architecture, and the group of architects known as 'Team 10' of which Hansen was a part 
gradually distanced themselves from the orthodoxy of Le Corbusier and his followers, 
eventually creating a schism within the CIAM organisation itself.207  
Despite the emphasis he placed on process and indeterminacy, Hansen also 
wished to cultivate a quasi-scientific approach to his projects. As Łukasz Ronduda et al 
write, the theory and practice of the open form combined a ‘determination to move 
experimentation from the field of art to the socio-political sphere [with a] fascination 
with the attitude of the scientist-artist participating, on par with the contemporary 
science, in the transformation of reality.’208 One way Hansen occupied the role of the 
‘scientist-artist’ was to minimise his own subjective input in various projects, distilling 
his creativity into a series of objective rules or functions that were nevertheless flexible 
enough to respond to the user’s needs. Although there is little to suggest Hansen had 
anything other than a passing acquaintance with cybernetics, the subsequent 																																																								
204 Łukasz Ronduda, Michal Wolinski, and Alex John Wieder, ‘Games, Actions and Interactions: Film 
and the Tradition of Oskar Hansen's Open Form’, in 1,2,3… Avant-Gardes Film/Art between Experiment 
and Archive, ed. by Łukasz Ronduda, Florian Zeyfang (New York: Sternberg Press, 2007), pp. 88-103 
(pp. 91-2). 
205 Oskar Hansen, ‘Forma Otwarta’, p. 5. 
206 Ibid. 
207 One of the events that signalled disquiet within CIAM was Hansen's presentation at the 1949 
Bergamo congress, where he used the opportunity to publicly criticise a speech by Le Corbusier, an 
action that earned him the support of another Polish architect Jerzy Sołtan. See Łukasz Stanek and Dirk 
Van Den Heuvel, 'Introduction: Team 10 East and several Other Useful Fictions' in Team 10 East: 
Revisionist Architecture in Real Existing Modernism, ed. by Łukasz Stanek (Warsaw: Museum of 
Modern Art in Warsaw, 2014), pp. 11-33 (p. 14). 
208 Ronduda et al ‘Games, Actions and Interactions’, p. 92-3. 
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interpretation of his work by a generation of artists he trained in the 1970s, in particular 
Przemysław Kwiek and Zofia Kulik (together known as KwieKulik), suggests that the 
open form theory contained within it principles that were easily filtered through a 
cybernetic frame of reference.209 For one, the objective rules and functions mentioned 
above could be described as command structures within a cybernetic model, and their 
responsiveness to the behavioural 'output' of the people who used them could be said to 
constitute a feedback loop, in that the principles underpinning the design of buildings 
were open to reformulation.210 This extended to the principle of open form itself, which 
was left constitutively vague as a means to accommodate change. Furthermore, various 
projects by Hansen display what Pask has described as a 'system orientated thinking' in 
architecture, in which buildings were not designed as discrete entities but components in 
larger arrangements.211 This is no more the case than in Hansen's Linear Continuous 
System project, which was developed together with his wife Zofia Hansen, and 
constituted a wildly ambitious master plan for the reorganisation of Polish urban space 
that would replace the concentric model with four large settlement strips spanning the 
width of the country.  
Before reaching Żmijewski, many aspects of Hansen’s theory of open forms 
found artistic expression in the work of Grezegorz Kowalski, who after studying at the 																																																								
209 Zofia Kulik and Przemysław Kwiek worked together between 1971-1987, mainly in the medium of 
film and performance. In 1971 they collaborated with various other students at the academy of Fine Arts 
Warsaw on the film Open Form, which interpreted Hansen's theory by means of a series of visual games 
and structured performances. Elsewhere Kwiek discussed his interest in cybernetics as it related to 
television: 'The cybernetic model says that what and how we know is the result of the way we currently 
organize reality. This is one of the central tenets of cybernetics, a science that organizes reality into 
systems and sub-systems and examines the relations among them. The creation of value is based on the 
same mechanism.... What fascinated me about television was the simultaneity in observing the effect and 
the working cause so that one could create model situations in which the effect of an action was 
instantaneous, and in which one could observe and turn that observation into another object of cognition 
to be manipulated in turn.' Przemysław Kwiek quoted in a hand-out accompanying the exhibition 
'Operator’s Exercises: Open Form Film & Architecture' at Arthur Ross Architecture Gallery, Buell Hall, 
New York. March 30–May 7, 2010. Curated by Łukasz ‘and Mark Wasiuta. p. 6. In line with this interest, 
in 1971 KwieKulik, together with a number of other artists, attempted to set up a section on aesthetics at 
the Polish Society of Cybernetics. This resulted in a series of meetings between artists and cyberneticists, 
one of which involved the artists presenting their artwork Activities and Visual Games, which was then 
analysed in the cybernetic vocabulary of 'input', 'output' and 'feedback'. KwieKulik were also invited to 
discuss their work at Professor Stanisław Piekarczyk’s seminar in mathematics and logics at the 
University of Warsaw. While few other students threw themselves at the field with such enthusiasm, the 
efforts of KwieKulik provided a conduit for ideas associated with cybernetics to influence great number 
of other artists of the era. 'Operator’s Exercises' p. 20. 
210 Insofar as cybernetic principles can be retrofitted to Hansen's theory of Open Form, these theories 
bear more resemblance to ideas associated with the 'New Cybernetics' of Humberto Maturana, Francisco 
Varela, Felix Geyer and Hans van der Zouwen that emerged in the 1970s. Bailey characterises this body 
of work as having a focus on 'information as constructed and reconstructed by an individual interacting 
with the environment.' Kenneth D. Bailey, Sociology and the New Systems Theory: Toward a Theoretical 
Synthesis (New York: SUNY, 1994), p. 163. 
211 Gordon Pask 'The Architectural Relevance of Cybernetics', Architectural Design, September 1969, 
pp. 494-6 (p. 496). Pask wrote in 1969 that 'nowadays there is a demand for system orientated thinking 
[within architecture] whereas, in the past, there was only a more or less esoteric desire for it. 
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Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw worked as a teaching assistant in Hansen’s studio. 
Kowaslki also established the Repassage gallery in Warsaw along with a number of 
other young artists. In an autobiographical essay, Kowalski writes that ‘Ninety-nine per 
cent of those people had [been] through Hansen’s studio and, to a greater or lesser 
extent, assimilated the principles of “Open Form”’.212 
In the 70s and 80s Kowalski made a series of performances at the gallery he 
loosely called ‘action-questions’. The format of these performances involved a range of 
Kowalski’s friends responding to a question such as Could You and/or Would You Like 
to Treat Me Like an Object? (1979), for which Kowalski put his body at the mercy of 
his friends and fellow artists.213 One response came from Wiktor Gutt, who tied a 
hammer to one of Kowalski’s hands, and a metal spike in the other. He asked Kowalski 
to imagine an earthworm under the peen of the hammer, and his son under the point of 
the spike. Having tied Kowasski’s hands up in such a way that they dangled on puppet 
strings, Gutt let them fall to the floor with a crash. His response to Kowalski’s action-
question was intended to embody another question: ‘Could you and would you like to 
be treated as an object in the mental sphere?’ 
Performances such as these positioned the artist as an initiator and regulator of 
the artwork, setting up a series of inputs or constraints, but minimised his or her 
authorial voice in their processual realisation. In this respect they drew on the 
cybernetic characteristics and dialogic nature of Hansen’s approach, while at the same 
time broadening the parameters to include a wider range of potential effects and 
responses. Ronduda et al argue that ‘Kowalski always tried to imbue the quasi-scientific 
(objective and rationalist) paradigm of games and interactions [...] with humanist 
elements, powerfully existential, sensual, subjective, irrational, psychological, 
subconscious (even spiritual), and was open to situations eluding rational analysis.’214 
Żmijewski came into contact with Kowalski when he studied under him at the 
sculpture department at the Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw, which has been 
nicknamed ‘kowalnia’ (the smithy) for the number of well-known artists that were 
trained there.  Some of Kowalski’s pedagogic activities functioned in a formally similar 
way to his artworks, and in cases such as Common Space, Individual Space, Realisation 
VIII (1993), a filmed version of which is now held in the Museum of Modern Art in 
																																																								
212 Żmijewski, Trembling Bodies, p. 169. 
213 This piece is also highly reminiscent of an artwork by Marina Abramovich, Rhythm 0 (1974) held at 
the student centre in Zagreb, in which she placed 72 objects on a table, and invited the audience to use 
them on her body in any way they chose. 
214 Ronduda et al ‘Games, Actions and Interactions’, p. 102. 
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Warsaw, it is difficult to pinpoint where one ends and the other begins.215 Previous 
realisations of Common Space / Individual Space involved a group of participants who 
interacted with each other by means of non-verbal communication. As the title suggests, 
the performance area was divided into collective spaces and individual spaces. When 
the participants were in the common spaces, they were encouraged to react to one 
another’s gestural or physical messages, simultaneously checking whether or not 
someone else is interpreting them. The primary aim of the exercise seems to be to 
encourage students to cultivate a sense of the communicative power of art. The common 
space (as a field of inter-subjective communication) stood in for public space in general, 
and having the students occupy this space was intended to teach them the responsibility 
that work in the socio-political sphere entails.216 This responsibility is distributed evenly 
among the participants. As Kowalski himself described the piece:  
 
We all find ourselves in “common space, private space,” students and teachers, on 
equal terms… The goal of the exercise… is to ensure active participation in the process 
of non-verbal communication. The course of the process is unpredictable and depends 
on the participants’ ingenuity and the temperature of the interaction between them. We 
agree on one thing: we avoid destructive behaviours.217  
 
In Żmijewski’s reworking of Kowalski’s activity, the major difference seems to be that 
this agreement is suspended. Destructive behaviours are given full expression just as 
they sometimes are in society at large.  
Aside from the direct comparisons between Common Space, Individual Space 
and Żmijewski’s work Them, there are several threads running from Hansen, through 
Kowalski, and into the work of Żmijewski. The objective to participate in ‘the 
transformation of reality’ in Hansen's architectural work and Kowalski's pedagogic 
approximation of public space translates into Żmijewski’s work as a refutation of art’s 
autonomy, a gesture that has added significance in Poland, as will be shown in the next 
section.218 The dialogue with science is also carried forward from Hansen to Żmijewski, 																																																								
215 A full version is available from <http://www.artmuseum.pl/en/filmoteka/praca/kowalski-grzegorz-
kowalnia-obszar-wspolny-obszar-wlasny> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
216 For further information on this point see Karol Sienkiewicz, ‘The Necessity of Existence: Grzegorz 
Kowalski and the Milieu of the Repassage Gallery in Warsaw’, OwnReality, 4, (2013) 2-25 (p. 23). 
217 Grzegorz Kowalski, ‘Excerpt from Sculpture Studio Programmatic Premises’ (1985), quoted in 
Ronduda et al, p. 103.   
218 For a programmatic elaboration of this point see Artur Żmijewski, ‘The Applied Social Arts’, in 
Trembling Bodies: Interviews with Artists, ed. by Artur Żmijewski (Krakow: Kronika, 2010), pp. 25-33. 
After the historical avant-garde, perhaps the movement most closely associated with the ambition to 
'transform reality' was the Situationists. Although the connection is not elaborated in any great detail, 
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although whereas for the former it represented an ideal to be aspired to, for the latter its 
ideologically reinforced credibility needed to be questioned. Above all else however, it 
is an exploration of the paradox of ‘prescriptive freedom’ that unites the work of all 
three practitioners. All of the artworks discussed thus far construct a set of Symbolic 
constraints and relationships that determine to a greater or lesser extent how participants 
act. While Hansen and Kowalski deliberately chose to do this as little as possible, 
neutralising their own input in order to make room for processes of subjectvation to take 
place within their games, structures and pedagogical exercises, a number of critics have 
roundly criticised Żmijewski for doing the opposite. 
In an article in Frieze magazine, Nina Möntmann reductively opposes 
Żmijewski’s work to ‘genuinely participative’ art, writing that  
 
Despite the differences in the treatment of those involved, the vaguely defined 
 community in the projects of Alimpiev, Bartana and Żmijewski is ultimately united by 
 the defencelessness of the human individual at the mercy of a power structure set up to 
 control, discipline, or destroy them.219 
 
This passage highlights the moral tenor of many of the responses to Żmijewski’s work. 
In the last twenty years artworks that take models of collaboration and participation as 
their form have brought about the emergence of new critical frameworks underwritten 
by vague ideas about what it means to act ‘ethically’ as an artist.220 Much of this art 
theory and criticism effectively advocates the renunciation of one's authorial input as 
much as possible. To transpose it into Hansen’s terms, the more open the form, the 
more ethical the form. As you would expect, there are a number of writers who oppose 
the imposition of such an ethical framework on works of art. Claire Bishop, for 																																																																																																																																																																		
Hansen did claim that his work developed the ideas of the Situationist movement. Oskar Hansen, 
Towards Open Form,  (Frankfurt: Revolver, 2005), p. 203. His ambition to elevate the position of a 
building’s user to the position of co-author could further be related to the Situationist’s early concern with 
‘Unitary Urbanism’, which eschewed a narrowly conceived functionalism in order to integrate notions of 
play and exploration into the design and use of urban space. See Bradley J. Macdonald, ‘From the 
Spectacle to Unitary Urbanism: Reassessing Situationist Theory’, Rethinking Marxism, 8:2 (1995), 89-
111. 
219 Nina Möntmann ‘Community service’, Frieze, October 2006, pp. 37-40 (p. 39). To this judgment 
could be added that of Ken Johnson, who on the occasion of Żmijewski’s solo show at X Initiative in 
New York in 2010, described Żmijewski as a ‘puppet master who uses people less sophisticated than 
himself as marionettes in a game whose point they may not fully understand.’ Ken Johnson, ‘An Artist 
Turns People Into His Marionettes’, New York Times, 29 November 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/11/30/arts/design/30zmijewski.html> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
220 See for example Maria Lind, ‘Actualisation of Space: The Case of Oda Projesi’, in Contemporary Art: 
From Studio to Situation, ed. by Claire Doherty (London: Black Dog, 2004), pp. 109-121 and Grant 
Kester, Conversation Pieces: Community and Communication in Modern Art (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2004). 
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example, counts Żmijewski among a number of artists who ‘do not make the “correct” 
ethical choice, they do not embrace the Christian ideal of self-sacrifice; instead, they act 
on their desire without the incapacitating restrictions of guilt.’221 In another text Bishop 
draws inspiration from Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis to support this argument, and 
repeats an obstinate misreading of this seminar by focusing on the apparent 'maxim' 'do 
not give ground relative to your desire'.222 This misreading compels her to support 
artworks that supposedly manifest the desire of their author over and above any socio-
cultural restriction (problematically assuming both that these desires are legible to an 
observer in the first place, and that socio-cultural restrictions cannot themselves be 
taken as objects of desire). Furthermore, Bishops’ misreading has the secondary effect 
of subordinating aesthetics to ethics, as the figure of Antigone enters her argument not 
as an anamorphic image (as it did in my own reading of the seminar), but as an example 
to be followed.223  
Both the idea of ‘genuine participation’ that Möntmann’s argument rests upon, 
and the notion of an 'ethics of desire' in Bishop's work represent conceptual dead-ends. 
If one agrees that greater participation should warrant greater merit (a position that 
would be difficult to apply to other fields of creative production, such as theatre for 
example), then one is still left with the problem of defining ‘genuine participation’. If 
one follows Bishop's hasty injunction to throw off the shackles of social pressure and 
act on one’s desire alone (a formulation which misses the connection between the two) 
one risks elevating transgression to the status of an imperative. Instead of following 
either of these lines of approach, it is my contention that by drawing on the contextual 
background of Żmijewski’s work it might be possible to show that the crucial dynamic 
concerns not the issue of authorial renunciation, but rather the relationship between the 
																																																								
221 Claire Bishop, ‘The Social Turn: Collaboration and Its Discontents’, Artforum, February 2006, pp. 
179-185 (p. 183). The other artists Bishop places in this camp are Jeremy Deller, Phil Collins, and 
Carsten Höller. 
222 In fact, the wording of Lacan's phrase is slightly different. He writes that ‘from an analytical point of 
view, the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one’s desire’. Lacan, 
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given ground relative to her desire, rather than avoid giving ground on desire in the future. The tendency 
to extract a maxim from Lacan’s Ethics seminar parallels the tendency to reduce the figure of Antigone in 
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223 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (London: Verso, 
2012), p. 39. 
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types of Symbolic structures within the work — which I have characterised variously as 
constraints, rules of engagement, or simply games — and those in society at large.  
 
A Servant with Two Masters 
 
To better understand the relationship between Żmijewski’s work and those that 
influenced him it will be necessary to give a brief characterisation of the power 
relations, political tensions and social structures in Poland after the second world war. 
Without entirely reducing artworks to the historical context in which they were made, 
such an historical overview will help shed light on both the structural character of 
Żmijewski’s work, as well as the transgressive strategies he employs in the service of 
political aims. A secondary ambition will be to provide some historical examples for the 
concept of ‘the decline of the Symbolic’ elaborated in chapters 1 and 2. 
The so-called political ‘thaw’ in eastern Europe following Stalin’s death in 1953 
represented less the smooth transition to a liberal democracy than the beginning of three 
decades of social unrest, suppression and economic hardship. Successive autocratic 
leaders - Cyrankiewicz, Gomułka and Gierek - were ushered into power on the basis of 
reforms that were promised but never made, either for economic reasons or due to 
pressure from Moscow.224  
Given the authoritarianism that characterised this period of Polish history, an 
authoritarianism that the Solidarity movement would later challenge,225 it is surprising 
to note that artists in Poland were granted unparalleled freedom of expression under 
communist rule.226 The art-historian Piotr Piotrowski writes that the political thaw in the 
1950s ‘created a veritable explosion of Modern Art in Poland’ which became something 
of a destination for artists from all over the eastern block.227 From the 1950s onwards, 
Socialist Realism was slowly swept out of the public sphere, and was never enshrined 
as the official visual culture in the same way it was in the USSR. This apparent freedom 
continued throughout the '60s and '70s, during which time several artist-run galleries 
were funded by the regime, the most prominent of which was and still is the Foksal 																																																								
224  David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland Since 1968 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). 
225  Ibid., p. 2. 
226 Considerable restrictions were placed on artistic expression in other Eastern European countries, 
where artists were prohibited from deviating too far from the party aesthetic of Socialist Realism. Aside 
from Poland another exception is Yugoslavia, which existed in a different political grouping to those 
countries directly absorbed into the USSR. For more on this see Piotr Piotrowski, Art and Democracy in 
Post-Communist Europe (London: Reaktion Books, 2012).  
227 Ibid., p. 68. 
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gallery in Warsaw. The power the state wielded over the art-world during this period 
was therefore not as nakedly repressive as one might expect. Nevertheless it did come at 
some cost: financial as well as other mechanisms of control influenced the kind of art 
that was being produced and displayed. Autonomy was only granted to artists and 
galleries on the understanding that criticism of the regime would not be tolerated. When 
this tacit agreement was broken, the authorities were quick to take action, for example 
in 1968 when Kazimierz Dejmek’s production of Adam Mickiewicz’s play Dziady at 
the Polish Theatre in Warsaw was shelved for its supposed anti-socialist references. The 
censorship of the play prompted a student march, backed up by members of the Warsaw 
branch of the Writer’s Union, which in turn precipitated further repression of writers, 
intellectuals and students, some of whom chose to emigrate as a result.228  
Piotrowski describes the cultural policies adopted by the state during this period 
as ‘pseudo liberal’, insofar as they incorporated modern art into the same ideological 
state apparatus that once promoted Socialist Realism, only this time under the auspices 
of ‘freedom of expression’. Needless to say the state was not genuinely committed to 
fostering freedom of expression, but rather co-opting potential spaces for dissent. This 
strategy was made even more effective due to the Modernist discourse of autonomy that 
reigned in the Polish art scene at the time. This meant that even if galleries such as 
Foksal had been allowed to exhibit critical art, they might not have done so on account 
of their art-theoretical allegiances.229  
In the 1970s the official discourse in Poland underwent a series of mutations. 
The regime tried (and ultimately failed) to use consumerism to secure its legitimacy, an 
approach that fostered a rather uncritical embrace of consumerism by large sections of 
society.230 This failure of the government resulted in widespread economic crisis, and 
fanned the flames of opposition in the form of student groups, underground magazines 
and newspapers, as well as trade union movements. This was once again countered with 
surveillance, censorship, torture and killings on the part of the state. When the 
independent trade union Solidarity [Solidarność] picked up momentum in 1981 (then 
amassing 9 million members from its founding in 1980), the government responded 
with the imposition of martial law from 1981-3. Civil liberties were eroded, food was 																																																								
228  John M. Bates, ‘Adam Mickiewicz’, in Censorship: A World Encyclopedia, ed. by Derek Jones, 4 
vols (London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001), III, pp. 1585-1587 (p. 1587). 
229 As Piotrowski writes, the Foksal galley was one of a number of art spaces that 'were firmly inscribed 
into the discourse of autonomy developed in the 1950s. While they rejected the modernist construction of 
the image, its visuality and abstraction, they did not dispense with its self-contained independence vis-a-
vis the external reality.' Piotrowski, Art and Democracy p. 88. 
230 Piotr Piotrowski, In the Shadow of Yalta: Art and the Avant-Garde in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989 
(London: Reaktion Books, 2009), p. 352. 
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rationed, and political life was drastically restricted. These restrictions also extended to 
art institutions, and many galleries and exhibition spaces were temporarily closed.  
During this period, the power of the Catholic Church in Poland increased 
dramatically. Whereas in the '60s and '70s the Church had pragmatically avoided 
confrontation with the regime in return for lighter restrictions on religious matters, in 
the late '70s and early '80s it took an openly oppositional stance towards the communist 
party, and, along with the CIA, provided funds and equipment for the Solidarity 
movement.231 When John Paul II was elected as Pope in 1978 he drew huge crowds in 
his native Poland, and fully exploited his popularity to make inroads into the authority 
of the state. The links between the Solidarity movement and the Catholic Church are 
well known, and evident in the former organisation’s official iconography, which 
includes catholic elements, such as crosses and images of the Virgin Mary.232 Following 
the establishment of semi-free elections in Poland in 1989, and Solidarity’s subsequent 
ascendency to government, the links between the Church and the new state were 
galvanised into an axis of authority, and certain Catholic principles are to this day 
enshrined in the polish constitution.233 The link has been further highlighted in artworks 
such as Flag for The Third Republic of Poland (2001) by Grzegorz Klaman. In this 
simple iconographic work, Klaman redesigned the Polish flag to incorporate a black 
stripe alongside the usual red and white stripes, symbolising the influence of the 
Catholic Church on the state. The flag was exhibited on the front the Wyspa Gallery in 
Gdańsk, a city home to the historic shipyards that gave birth to Solidarity two decades 
before.  
If one agrees with Piotrowski that the cultural policies adopted by the 
communist regime were at best ‘pseudo liberal’, then a cursory glance at the cultural 
policies encouraged by the post-communist regime and the Catholic Church reveal a 
similar situation. Just as the communist regime funded galleries and exhibition spaces 
up until 1989, so too did the Catholic Church provide outlets for artistic expressions of 
dissent in the period during and shortly after Martial law. In the 1980s a series of 																																																								
231 Peter Hannaford and Charles D. Hobbs, Remembering Reagan (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 
1994), pp. 70-71. 
232 Around this time there was also pressure for artists to incorporate religious iconography into public 
sculptures. In an interview Grzegorz Kowalski recalls being awarded a commission by Solidarity to make 
a public sculpture in the town of Gdynia in 1981. According to Kowalski, the contract was eventually 
terminated because he refused to incorporate a cross into the design. He recalls a similar situation in 
Poznan for the artists Krystyn and Anna Jarnuszkiewicz. See Żmijewski, Trembling Bodies, p. 170. 
233 To take one example of this, there is a law in Poland that enforces the respect of ‘Christian values’ in 
radio and television programmes, which effectively gives the Church the right to ban broadcasts that it 
does not approve of. For more examples of the links between Church and state see: Andrzej Dominiczak, 
‘Church and State in Post-Communist Poland’, International Humanist News (2002) 
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‘church exhibitions’ were staged across Poland as a means to escape the system of state 
funded institutions and censorship (implicit or otherwise). Although these exhibitions 
have not been documented to anywhere near the extent that the state-financed 
exhibitions were in previous decades, Dorota Jarecka writes that ‘the trend grew to such 
a great scale that the ‘church exhibitions’ have become almost synonymous with the art 
of the decade.’234 
This early strategy of ideologically steering the visual culture of the emergent 
resistance movement has in recent years been supplanted by more explicit forms of 
censorship. To cite one of the most extreme cases, in 2001 Dorota Nieznalska was 
sentenced to 6 months community service for a fragment of her work Passion, which 
consisted of a Greek cross onto which a photograph of male genitalia had been attached. 
Although Nieznalska’s sentence was successfully appealed, it was on the grounds that it 
was not her intention to ‘offend religious sentiments’ in the first place, rather than 
because the right to cause such an offence should be protected by law. Another example 
of state censorship was the physical destruction of a sculpture by Maurizio Catalan, The 
Ninth Hour (1999) that depicts Pope John Paul II crumpled on the floor having been 
struck down by a meteor, which lies static on top of his legs.235 In this case the curator 
of the National Gallery, Anda Rottenberg, was eventually forced to resign in a 
campaign led by the two politicians, Halina Nowina-Konopka and Witold Tomczak, 
who used their parliamentary immunity to physically damage the piece on the grounds 
that a 'civil servant of Jewish origin should not be spending the Roman Catholic 
majority's money on disgusting works of art.'236 Konopka and Tomczak were eventually 
joined by 90 other members of parliament in signing a less openly racist letter that 
eventually caused Rottenberg to resign. 
This brief history of the shifting power dynamics of Polish history after WWII 
shows that while the transition from communism brought with it many significant 
changes to people’s lives, there is nevertheless a significant line of continuity in the way 
the production and display of artworks has been controlled from the 1960s to the 																																																								
234 Two examples of church exhibition are ‘The Sign of the Cross’ (1983) and ‘The Apocalypse – 
A Light in the Darkness’ (1984). For further details see Dorota Jarecka, ‘Janusz Bogucki, the Polish 
Szeemann?’, in Rejected heritage: Polish Art of the 1980s, ed. by Karol Sienkiewicz (Warsaw: Museum 
of Modern Art Warsaw, 2011), pp. 8-31. 
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Bang Larsen, Nicolaus Schafhausen (New York: Lukas & Sternberg, 2005), pp. 187-193. For more 
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	 100	
present day. To speak of the circulation of power more generally, the authority wielded 
by both the communist state and the Catholic backed government could be described as 
rigidly hierarchical, and when ideological state apparatus fail, they have both been 
quick to use more nakedly repressive means such as censorship and punitive measures. 
Just as similar conditions underpinned the transgressive strategies of the artists 
discussed in chapters 1 and 2, so too did the socio-cultural milieu of coercion and 
censorship contribute to an artistic culture of transgression among the critical art 
movement in Poland.  
 
The Transition to Capitalism and the Decline in Symbolic Efficiency 
 
Whilst I have tried to show the continuity between the kind of control the state exerted 
on the art world before and after ‘the autumn of nations’ in 1989, there has been a less 
continuous shift in Polish culture that plays out in the work of Żmijewski. Here the 
ambition is to demonstrate that the dramatic shift that occurred in Polish society as a 
result of the rapid transformation from communism to market capitalism had significant 
effects on the Symbolic order itself, and that these effects shed light on both the 
transgressive and game-like character of Żmijewski's work. 
In contrast to the dominant narrative of a ‘political thaw’, the transition from 
communism to capitalism in Poland was so fast that it can be more appropriately 
described as ‘political sublimation’ in the sense of ice being transformed directly into 
gas. As Jane Hardy elaborates in Poland’s New Capitalism, the ‘shock therapy’ 
administered in 1990 comprised a raft of policies that were put in place almost 
overnight, as massive government cuts were levied and high interest rates were set.237 In 
a narrative reminiscent of the economic experiments in South America, Hardy writes 
that ‘In 1990 neoliberal economists saw CEE [Central and Eastern Europe] as a 
laboratory in which they could experiment with the implantation of ‘capitalism in the 
raw’ through market driven policies.’238 ‘History, society and politics were viewed as 
impediments to the design of the transformation agenda by those who knew best.’239 
The economic aspects of this transformation fall outside the scope of this chapter and 
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238 Ibid., p. 31. 
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have been covered in detail elsewhere.240 What is more significant to address is the 
socio-cultural effect that the transition brought about. 
The art critic and curator Joanna Mytokowska has written that the economic 
transformation of Poland post 1989 was so rapid that ‘language failed to keep pace with 
[it]. The exhaustion of language, the wearing away of public discourse, is doubtless a 
measure of the crisis of social communication.’ Under these circumstances, according to 
Mytokowska ‘A gap emerged between a hastily and superficially imported liberal 
discourse supposed to explain the world, and native traditions struggling with memory 
and a description of new identity.’ 241    
The suggestion of a gap or caesura in public discourse is significant in the 
context of the discussion of the decline of the Symbolic. The idea that language can be 
hollowed out, gradually losing its power to latch onto the Real is an idea that has found 
expression in a number of recent works of psychoanalytically inflected critical theory. 
The concept of ‘Symbolic efficiency’ proposed by Slavoj Žižek seems to possess some 
descriptive power here. Žižek argues that Symbolic efficiency ‘concerns the point at 
which, when the Other of the symbolic institution confronts me with the choice of 
‘Whom do you believe, my word or your eyes?’, I choose the Other’s word without 
hesitation, dismissing the factual testimony of my eyes’.242 Put otherwise, Symbolic 
efficiency amounts to what might be called trust in a signifier’s power to describe 
reality, which could be at odds with empirical facts. Here ‘institutional authority’ should 
be thought of in an expanded sense to account not only for institutionally sanctioned 
roles such as those of judge, CEO, or professor, but also any Symbolic role or function 
that is socially agreed and has performative effects. Recalling the work of Philip 
Zimbardo, it could be said that the Stanford prison experiment was precisely a test of 
such Symbolic efficiency, in that the roles accorded to prisoners and guards validated 
behaviour that would normally appear excessive. Following Lacan, Žižek claims that 
referential stability has been eroded in recent years: ‘The key to today's universe of 
simulacra, in which the Real is less and less distinguishable from its imaginary 
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simulation, lies in the retreat of “symbolic efficiency”’.243 The erosion of Symbolic trust 
has for Žižek given rise to a range of psycho-symbolic phenomena such as widespread 
cynicism and a fragmentation of the social body. For Žižek and others this comes as a 
direct result of the disappearance of ‘the Big Other’, which I have already described in 
Lacan’s terms as a pluralisation of the Name-of-the-Father in chapter one.244  
 Another author of popular critical theory, Franco "Bifo" Berardi, has couched the 
debate in different terms, but makes essentially the same point as Žižek. In The 
Uprising: On Poetry and Finance, Berardi looks at the effects financial capital has had 
on the way language is used and conceptualised. He writes that ‘Financial parthogenesis 
sucks down and dries up every social and linguistic potency, dissolving the products of 
human activity, especially of collective semiotic activity.’245 Here one might be tempted 
to ask why financial capitalism in particular has had this effect, rather than capitalism in 
general. The answer for Berardi is that with finance capital, accumulation ‘no longer 
passes through the production of goods, but goes straight to its monetary goal, 
extracting value from the pure circulation of money, from the virtualization of life and 
intelligence’.246 Finance capital, as one aspect of what Berardi and others have called 
‘semio-capitalism’ automatises language, which is now able to operate irrespective of 
corporeal investment.247 Once again, the result of this process is a general crisis in 
referentiality, whereby ‘the ontological guarantee of meaning based on the referential 
status of the signifier has broken apart.’248  
As could be expected from two authors known for polemical and at times 
haphazard argumentation, neither Žižek nor Berardi’s ideas can be accepted 
uncritically. The latter’s prescriptive argument — in short, that it is up to poetry to 
reinvest language with sensuous potential — throws up a range of questions, not least of 
all concerning the central link that Berardi sets up between dereferentialisation in 
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Simbolico Della Madre (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1991). 
248 Ibid., p. 27. 
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Symbolist poetry, and the crisis in referentiallity caused by financial capitalism.249 
Nevertheless, the central idea of the referential stability of the Symbolic in respect to the 
Real being weakened in response to particular mutations in global capitalism, would 
seem to possess some descriptive potential in the context of Poland post 1989.  
It could be said that during the communist years Symbolic efficiency was 
anchored by the regime. Positions of public office were institutionally sanctioned by a 
central authority and cultural and economic activity was closely monitored for deviation 
from pre-defined norms. Even when the Symbolic guarantee the regime provided 
seemed under threat in the 1970s and '80s, the fact that sections of the population were 
rebelling against this authority shows that they still had trust in its Symbolic efficiency. 
When the Solidarity movement shifted the emphasis towards building a counter-
structure with the slogan ‘Don’t tear down the institutions, build your own’, it was not 
long before the movement found a new guarantee for their counter-institutions in the 
form of Catholic Nationalism.250 The church exhibitions described above could be 
described as a series of testbeds aimed at adding iconographic flesh to the bones of this 
new Symbolic regime. For many, the twilight of communism in Poland was a period 
when the direction of psychic investment shifted from the state to the Church, whose 
authority then underpinned the incoming government.251 In this scenario, it would seem 
that a loss of Symbolic efficiency did not occur — that ‘guarantees’ for referentiality 
were provided both before and after the fall of communism. Nevertheless, the shift from 
one Symbolic guarantee to another exposed the contingency of both. The fact that the 
official discourse could change so rapidly exposed the superficiality of both the defunct 
Symbolic universe of authoritarian rule and the incumbent ideology of Catholic 
nationalism. 
While many citizens were quick to pledge their allegiance to the new Symbolic 
authority, the group of artists of which Żmijewski was a part positioned their work 
precisely in the rift that had been exposed. To use Mytokowska’s words, Żmijewski’s 
work occupies the place of ‘the deficiencies of our dominant ways of naming things’.252 
In the next section it will become clear how this applies to the three works by 
Żmijewski discussed in the introduction.  																																																								
249 Berardi claims that symbolist poetry prefigured the dereferentialisation of finance capital. This pre-
figuration seems directly at odds with the task Berardi then sets poetry.  
250 Tina Rosenberg, ‘Revolution U’, Foreign Policy (February 16 2011), <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2011/02/16/revolution_u?page=full> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
251 This shift is also reminiscent of the pact established between the Reagan administration and the 
Christian right in the U.S., and more recently the alliance between Putin and the Orthodox Church.  
252 Joanna Mytkowska, ‘Too true scenarios’, p. 12.  
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Three Games 
 
When placed against the backdrop described in the last section Żmijewski’s work 
acquires added significance. It is worth returning to each of the three pieces discussed in 
the introduction before drawing conclusions. 
How exactly does The Game of Tag occupy a gap in the functioning of public 
discourse? The overt target of Żmijewski’s provocation seems to be a particular 
discursive approach to the Holocaust. This approach can be characterised by two things: 
solemnity and non-representation. Żmijewski’s challenge to solemnity is clear, and the 
glee the participants show while playing the game of tag can easily be taken as a mark 
of disrespect. The issue of non-representation requires more explanation. A painting by 
Luc Tuymans, Still Life (2002) serves a more recent example of a ‘correct’ non-
representational approach to tragedy. When invited to make a painting in response to 
the attacks of September the 11th, Tuymans responded by exhibiting a still life of some 
fruit and a jug of water measuring some five metres in diameter. In doing so he chose to 
represent the limits of representation itself, as if to ask 'how can art deal with subject 
matter this traumatic?' For many, the ‘correct’ answer to this question is that it cannot.253 
It is declared impossible for art to represent the enormity of tragedies such as September 
the 11th or the Holocaust.254  
And yet when compared with other examples such as the T.V mini-series 
Holocaust, which was criticised for its trivialising fictional accounts and dramatic 
reconstructions of camp prisoners meeting their death, The Game of Tag does not 
appear directly representational.255 The viewer only learns of the intended subject matter 
before they see the film (in the press, or through word of mouth) or as the credits role. 
Nevertheless this information recodes all that has just been seen, and the simple 
combination of naked bodies and a gas chamber creates a representative nexus that is 																																																								
253  Such answers often draw inspiration from Theodor Adorno’s frequently quoted remark that ‘to write 
poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’. When placed in context, Adorno’s claim is not in fact an injunction 
against writing poetry (or creating art) in response to historical traumas such as Auschwitz, but an 
injunction to create in spite of the inevitable failure of the resulting creation, to persist in failing. Theodor 
W. Adorno, ‘Cultural Criticism and Society’, in Prisms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), pp. 17 – 34 
(p. 34).  
254 The paragon of a ‘sensitive’ non-representational artwork that deals with the Holocaust is Claude 
Lanzmann’s Shoah (1985), a nine-hour documentary consisting largely of interviews with camp 
survivors, which eschewed dramatic reconstructions and stock footage.  
255 The Holocaust mini-series was criticised by Holocaust survivors, among others. See Elie Wiesel, 
‘Trivializing the Holocaust: Semi-Fact and Semi-Fiction’, The New York Times, 16 April 1978, p. 75. 
For a discussion of non-representation as it relates to the mini-series as well the film Shoah see Jacques 
Rancière, ‘The Ethical Turn of Aesthetics and Politics’, in Social and Critical Theory, Volume 5: 
Recognition, Work, Politics: New Directions in French Critical Theory, ed. by Jean-Philippe Deranty, 
Danielle Petherbridge, John Rundell and Robert Sinnerbrink (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007).  
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deemed offensive both because it simultaneously steps too close to the original events, 
and too far from them. Herein lies the difficulty of the work: it dissolves the bond 
between non-representation and solemnity. The paradigm of non-representation is 
considered appropriate only insofar as it anchors art to a primordial trauma, and in so 
doing preserves this space as one of mourning and loss. By effectively playing in a 
place of death, Żmijewski wants to exorcise this trauma, positioning the work as 
‘therapeutic’ (an ambition that manifests itself in an entirely different way from the 
therapeutic intentions of the Viennese Actionists discussed in chapter 1). In doing so 
Żmijewski tries to deviate from the pre-established norm of what a work of art that 
deals with the Holocaust should do.  
Returning to the issue of Symbolic efficiency, it could be argued that the very 
link between non-representation and solemnity is founded upon the stability of language 
(broadly understood). The effect of Tuyman’s painting is derived less from what it 
shows than from its Symbolic position in relation to the subject it deals with. Unless the 
viewer knows the back-story to the painting they might take it at face value, as a rather 
large still life painted in muted colours, and nothing more. The Game of Tag uses a 
similar technique of socio-symbolic framing by means of the text at the end of the film, 
but in this case one cannot even be sure if the artist is telling the truth. Even if it is 
conceded that the performance probably took place in the way it is claimed, the work 
then becomes a meta-commentary on the ‘correct’ Symbolic means of dealing with the 
Holocaust, rather than genuinely commemorative. This again can be attributed to a 
certain loosening of the effects of language, akin to questioning whether or not a funeral 
is in fact the most appropriate way to mark somebody’s death, rather than accepting it 
as an unquestionable Symbolic marker anchored by tradition.256  
Of the three artworks introduced at the beginning of the chapter, Them is 
perhaps the least obviously transgressive. In a narrow sense, it could be seen as 
transgressing the prohibition set by Żmijewski’s former teacher Kowaslki in his 
pedagogic activity Common Space, Individual Space. And yet this meaning is beyond 
the reach of anyone who doesn’t know the art-historical precedent to the work. Rather, 
the central provocation of Them is once again directed towards a particular discursive 																																																								
256 There are a number of other Polish artworks that demonstrate a similar approach the Holocaust as a 
subject. See for example Zbigniew Libera’s ‘Lego concentration camp’ (mentioned above) or his 
‘Positives’ (2002-3), a set of photographs that restaged historically significant works of photojournalism. 
For example Positives: Residents (2002), which shows a group of people wearing dressing gowns and 
prison clothing smiling behind a barbed wire fence, was based on a photograph of Auschwitz survivors 
liberated by the Red Army in 1945. Żmijewski’s own work 80064 (2004) also caused some controversy 
in its approach to the subject. In this piece he cajoles an elderly Auschwitz survivor to restore the camp 
number tattooed on his forearm. 
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construction, in this case a liberal-humanist construction founded on consensus and 
harmony or the democratic ideal of respectful debate. This is a challenge that Żmijewski 
has manifested with other works. For The Singing Lesson II (2002) for example, a work 
redolent with associations to reality TV, Żmijewski recruited a group of severely 
hearing impaired teenagers and trained them to sing a Bach cantata in the church in 
Leipzig where Bach himself is buried.257 In both of these pieces, a confrontation is 
staged that challenges consensus. In a culture where classical music is promoted as an 
unquestionable good for everyone, how do those who cannot participate live up to this 
ideal? Żmijewski points to the irresolvable antagonisms in society, highlighting a 
situation in which mainstream discourses cannot rule over everyone without an 
irresolvable excess emerging. Them dramatises the violence that this excess generates.  
It also bears a particular resemblance to a series of recent events in Warsaw. On 
November 11th 2013 a large public sculpture of a rainbow by Julita Wójcik was burnt 
down for the fourth time since its installation in June 2012. The rainbow, which was 
intended as a general symbol of tolerance, was made of artificial flowers and situated 
near a large catholic church in central Warsaw. Taken as a symbol of homosexuality, 
the sculpture was last burnt down during a march of the far right on Polish 
Independence Day, which itself was fragmented into 11 separate marches with different 
routes and agendas. A few days later around 200 people visited the square to place their 
own flowers among the charred remains.258 This turn of events is further testament to 
the fragmentation of Polish political life, with symbols serving as weapons in a proxy 
war for the power to describe reality. The fact that the meaning of the symbol at the 
heart of the episode was itself the subject of disagreement, its indexical link to God in 
the myth of Noah seemingly forgotten by many protesters on the Christian right, is 
further testament to the erosion of Symbolic efficiency.259  
The third work by Żmijewski discussed in this chapter, Repetition, seeks to 
challenge the hegemony of scientific knowledge. The alternative ending to the 
experiment highlights the contingency of the knowledge produced by the original. As 
Piotrowski writes, in this experiment, ‘one could say that Żmijewski not only 																																																								
257 In the first installment of the project, Żmijewski enlisted hearing impaired teenagers to sing a 
fragment of the ‘Kyrie’ from Maklakiewicz's Polish Mass, written in 1944. The irony of this choice is 
made manifest when among the cacophony of voices, Polish-speaking audiences are able to hear the 
lyrics ‘our voice rises to you and erupts as the sea roars from the deep abyss. O Christ, hear us! O Christ, 
listen to us!’ 
258 L. N., ‘Burning the Rainbow’, The Economist, November 18 2013 <http://www.economist.com/blogs/ 
easternapproaches/2013/11/poland> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
259 For more on the symbolism of the rainbow see Raymond L. Lee and Alistair B. Fraser, The Rainbow 
Bridge: Rainbows in Art, Myth, and Science (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2001). 
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challenged Zimbardo, but also created a completely different vision of human nature.’260 
In this respect Repetition is reminiscent of an early soviet film by Vsevolod Pudovkin 
entitled Mechanics of the Brain (1926). Pudovkin’s film is ostensibly a documentary on 
Ivan Pavlov’s now infamous reflexology experiments using dogs. In addition to the 
educational content of the film, there was an overt ideological intent to its production, to 
such an extent that alternative endings to the film were made for Russian and American 
audiences. At the end of the Russian film a short section about human development 
shows a group of children working together to retrieve a quoit from a hook on a wall. 
This serves as a proclamation on the virtues of co-operation, where the American 
version ends some 20 minutes earlier. 261  Nevertheless, whereas audiences for 
Pudovkin’s film would only have had access to one version, probably ignorant to the 
fact that another version even existed, by choosing such a famous experiment, 
Żmijewski’s reworking exposes both endings as contingent. This moment of exposure 
between one ending and another mirrors the Symbolic deficiency that momentarily 
appeared when one regime was replaced by another in 1980s Poland. When read 
alongside pieces such as Them, it is clear that the ‘alternate ending’ that occurs in 
Repetition is not necessarily one that Zmiewski supports. In his own words, the target of 
the film is a certain ‘cognitive fundamentalism’.262 The fact that the Symbolic roles 
accorded to the prisoners no longer held as they did in the original experiment, 
collapsing into an act of cooperation that resulted in a premature ending, is further 
suggestive of a decline of Symbolic efficiency. Ultimately this is the only conclusion 
that can be drawn. Once again, the work questions the ability of language, visual or 
otherwise, to describe reality rather than offering a theory of human nature in the 
manner of Zimbardo.  
 
Viruses, Algorithms, Programmes 
 
The final section of this chapter will be used to connect the game-like character of the 
works discussed back to the issue of transgression. This connection can be discerned in 
Żmijewski’s programmatic essay The Applied Social Arts, where he sets out a series of 
metaphors concerning the impact art has on society at large.263 																																																								
260 Piotrowski, Art and Democracy p. 102. 
261 This point was made by Anke Henning: at an event at Goldsmiths College, University of London 
entitled “Metaphor of Violence:  Revisiting Pudovkin's The Mechanics of the Brain”, 1st December 2011. 
See also Amy Sargeant, Classic Films of the Soviet Avant-Garde (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000). 
262 Żmijewski, Trembling Bodies, p. 29. 
263 Żmijewski, ‘The Applied Social Arts’, pp. 25-33. 
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The main argument of Żmijewski’s essay is that artworks should produce 
knowledge rather than simply ask questions, a position repeated in press conferences 
accompanying the Berlin Biennial in 2012, which he curated. Speaking of his own work 
elsewhere, Żmijewski proposes that ‘an image can serve as an argument in a debate’.264 
At face value, this claim represents little more than a re-iteration of the historical avant-
garde’s position of heteronomy.265 And yet when placed against the backdrop of recent 
Polish art history, the emphasis on application and engagement reverse the conditions 
by which a certain art-theoretical discourse of autonomy oiled the ideological cogs of 
the state. In another sense, the emphasis on arguments, debates, text and speech in 
Żmijewski’s work can be seen as an effort to pin down meaning against a backdrop in 
which this has become increasingly difficult.  
Developing this approach, The Applied Social Arts is an attempt to think through 
the various means by which artworks actively shape reality. Żmijewski lists some of the 
social consequences art has had in recent years. One of his claims is that art has 
contributed to a situation whereby ‘Transgression has […] become a valid political 
strategy’. 266  This point should be understood in a very specific sense. It is not 
Żmijewski’s claim that transgression has become a valid political strategy within art, but 
rather that transgressive strategies have moved beyond the boundaries of art and found 
their way into mainstream politics. Perhaps confusing the matter, Żmijewski provides 
an example in which strategies associated with transgression effectively ‘return to 
sender’, moving back from mainstream politics into the art world. Referring to the 
exhibition of Maurizio Catalan’s sculpture The Ninth Hour (discussed above), 
Żmijewski claims that the right-wing politicians who attempted to destroy the sculpture, 
Tomczak and Nowina-Konopka, ‘simply responded “in kind”, using the language of 
gestures and visual action, the language of performance.’267 In the same way that 
Żmijewski used the 'free' space of art to his advantage in repeating Zimbardo’s 
experiment, so too did these politicians use their parliamentary immunity to effectively 
break the law. Furthermore, they broke a longstanding taboo associated with gallery 																																																								
264 Ibid., p. 20.  
265  Here the term ‘heteronomy’ should not be understood in the passive sense Bourdieu gives it, to 
describe a condition in which art is wholly determined by outside forces. Instead I am using the term to 
describe a situation where artworks are both conditioned by external forces and exercise their capacity for 
intervention in society. See Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Field of Cultural Production’, in The Field of Cultural 
Production, ed. by Randal Johnson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), pp. 29-71. For a detailed discussion 
of the concept of heteronomy see Gail Day, ‘The Fear of Heteronomy’, Third Text, 23: 4 (2009), 393–
406. 
266 Żmijewski, Trembling Bodies, p. 26. 
267 Ibid., p. 26. The opposition to transgressive or controversial works of art by popularist politicians is 
reminiscent of the part played by the Austrian Freedom Party in respect to Nitsch's work, as briefly 
discussed in chapter 1. In both cases the use of taxpayer money was placed at the centre of the debate.  
	 109	
spaces, just as artists themselves have continually sought to break this taboo in one way 
or another under the banner of institutional critique. For Żmijewski, the episode serves 
as a concrete example of art actively shaping modes of behaviour, introducing strategies 
and methodologies that spread beyond the boundaries of the art world. 
Within the discourse surrounding critical art in Poland, it is not uncommon to 
find the idea that art spreads and exerts influence on other fields of cultural activity in a 
way analogous to a virus spreading through a body.268 In The Applied Social Arts, 
Żmijewski is critical of this familiar immunological metaphor: ‘Art, it claims, produces 
artefacts: social and cultural events that “infect” various parts of the social system just 
like viruses infect an organism. They “damage” or “alter” it. The infected system must 
change: heal or be cured.’269 In opposition to this, Żmijewski proposes that a more 
appropriate term would be 'algorithm', writing that  
 
Algorithms imply something operational and positive, a mode of purposeful action […]. 
I am not proposing that we artificially replace one term with another, but that we 
change the meanings of language. One that would allow us to consider the possibility of 
impact, to see art as a “device that produces impact”. As guiding the system from a 
certain initial state to a desired final state.270  
 
The opposition here is underdeveloped, and it would seem that Żmijewski’s 
understanding of algorithms doesn’t extend much further than the Wikipedia definition 
he quotes.271 Nevertheless, the use of the term is indicative of a certain cultural 
atmospherics of cybernetics already discernible in the work of Oskar Hansen and the 
generation of artists he trained at the Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw. At its most 
basic, an algorithm is a set of instructions designed to complete a predefined task or 
achieve a finite outcome. While essentially this set of instructions constitutes an abstract 
and internally consistent whole, existing independently of the 'hardware' for which it is 
designed, as Andrew Goffey points out, algorithms also have a fundamentally 
pragmatic dimension: ‘Algorithms act, but they do so as part of an ill-defined network 
of actions upon actions, part of a complex of power-knowledge relations, in which 																																																								
268 According to Piotrowski, the critical art of the 1990s ‘was supposed to function as a virus by 
interrupting normal functioning of society and as such was supposed to have political significance’, Art 
and Democracy, p. 101. 
269 Żmijewski, Trembling Bodies, p. 30. 
270 Ibid., p. 30. 
271 In fact, the very distinction between algorithms and viruses has been put into question with a great 
deal of work coming out of 'new cybernetics', which frequently draws tools and conceptual models from 
biology. 
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unintended consequences, like the side effects of a program’s behaviour, can become 
critically important.’272 Similarly, while many of Żmijewski's performances can be 
distilled into a set of abstract rules of engagement that exist independently of the people 
that follow them, to do so fundamentally misses the pragmatic effects of their 
implementation. These pragmatic effects are central to the works themselves, and for 
this reason, together with the fact that more than one set of rules is often at play, it 
might be more appropriate to speak of these works as 'programmes' rather than 
algorithms.273 While these programmes create a set of finite outcomes within the 
artworks themselves, (for example destruction in the case of Them, or a cooperative 
resolution in the case of Repetition), it becomes more difficult to determine the outcome 
of such artworks when they are ‘released’ into society at large.  
If Żmijewski's work can be characterised in this way, as having a programmatic 
dimension above and beyond the singular, finite algorithmic function claimed above, it 
is interesting to consider the terrain upon which these programmes operate. In a book of 
dialogues with Claire Parnet, Deleuze discusses the literature of Kleist and Kafka as 
creating 'programmes for life'. As he explains: 'Programmes are not manifestos […], but 
means of providing reference points for an experiment which exceeds our capacities to 
foresee.274 Can Żmijewski’s work be cast in similar light, as creating ‘programmes for 
life’? 
Interpreting it in this way might be seen to sit awkwardly with the work’s 
capacity for negation and critique. And yet the artist himself attests to the ‘operational 
and positive’ power of art, a description that presumably covers his own work as well as 
others'. It is my contention that the critical and programmatic aspects of his works are 
not in fact mutually exclusive. In its critical dimension, Żmijewski’s work displays a 
transgressive impulse to challenge socio-cultural norms, whether this concerns the 
cultural hegemony of scientific discourse, or the ‘correct’ means of commemorating the 
																																																								
272 Andrew Goffey, ‘Algorithm’, in Software Studies: A Lexicon, ed. by Matthew Fuller (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2008), p. 19. 
273 The difference between the two is explained by Steve Goodman: 'Whereas a computer program is the 
concretization or implementation of an assemblage of algorithms, the algorithm itself can be termed an 
abstract machine, a diagrammatic method that is programming language independent.' Steve Goodman, 
‘Sonic Algorithm’, in Software Studies: A Lexicon, ed. by Matthew Fuller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2008), p. 229. 
274 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II (New York, Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 48. 
It would be interesting to connect the notion of ‘programmes for life’ to the work of Pierre Hadot, a 
French historian of philosophy who influenced the work of Michel Foucault among others. Hadot argued 
that ancient philosophy should primarily be understood as providing a number of ‘spiritual exercises’ that 
modified the lives of those that practiced them, rather than as a systematic body of knowledge. See Pierre 
Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. by Arnold I. 
Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).  
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Holocaust. In its programmatic dimension, the work provides insight into the way in 
which ‘life’ is continually entrapped within Symbolic matrices that encourage it to 
unfold along particular pathways — pathways that frequently come into conflict with 
each other in his work. In short, the programmatic dimension of Żmijewski’s work 
provides insight into the constitution of the self within conflict. In doing so, it highlights 
the ways in which life is always already ‘programmed’ by socio-cultural norms, and by 
placing these norms into conflict with one another the contingency of each is exposed. 
The three artworks described at the beginning of this chapter are at the cusp of being 
transgressive, representing less the dialectical challenge to an existing set of social 
prohibitions, than the modelling and counter-modelling of a set of relations between 
people.  
The ultimate effect seems to be critical insofar as it aims at the destruction of 
automatically formulated moral and political judgments, and programmatic in so far as 
it incubates new socio-symbolic arrangements, first within tightly controlled 
microcosms, which are then injected into a wider socio-political landscape. The 
programmatic aspect should not be understood in the sense that it provides a manifesto 
or a plan of action. To borrow a phrase from Victor Goldschmitt, the aim is to form, 
rather than inform.275 Further still, when the critical and programmatic aspects of 
Żmijewski’s work are thought through in combination, the aim becomes to unform 
forms, and in the process clear the way for new forms to emerge.  
  
																																																								
275 Victor Goldschmitt, Les Dialogues de Platon: Structure et Methode Dialectique (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1963), p. 162. 
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Part 2 
After Transgression 
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Chapter 4 
Towards an Ethics of the Sinthome 
 
 
Between his excursions into knot theory and selected readings of James Joyce, the word 
‘ethics’ appears nowhere in Lacan’s 23rd seminar. And yet it is precisely an ethics that 
Lacan seems to be elaborating over this period of his work. An ethical theory that can 
be derived from the ‘late’ Lacan deals less with the subject of transgression and more 
with the effects an artwork can have on the subjectivity of its creator. By following this 
path forward, I intend to show, Lacan’s work can lead us towards a new paradigm for 
the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, beyond transgression.  
In part 1 the rise and fall of a certain ‘transgressive moment’ in visual art was 
described and analysed. Without passing judgment on transgression per se it was argued 
that the conditions for its critical force have passed, at least in the socio-cultural 
contexts discussed. It is the ambition of this chapter to develop the conceptual 
scaffolding for an ethico-aesthetic paradigm ‘after’ transgression. If the precondition for 
transgression is a strong Symbolic order, a post-transgressive paradigm for the 
relationship between ethics and aesthetics, by contrast, must take a weak Symbolic as its 
initial point of departure.  
In the first section of this chapter, I will look at one of the psychic consequences 
of a weak Symbolic order by reflecting on the concept of ‘ordinary psychosis’. 
Developed by a number of clinical theorists associated with the World Association of 
Psychoanalysis, the concept of ordinary psychosis emerged in the 1990s, a decade after 
Lacan’s death. Leading into a discussion of Seminar XXIII with a concept that was 
developed almost 20 years after this seminar was delivered may seem like a strange 
temporal reversal. As will become clear as the chapter develops, this break with 
chronological sequence can be justified on the basis of the logical sequence it makes 
possible. The concept of ordinary psychosis, is, after all, developed using resources 
from Lacan’s late work, and is intimately bound up with the pluralisation of the Name-
of-the-Father. Taking up this concept and using it to provide a logical backdrop to 
Seminar XXIII will cast both bodies of theory in a clearer light.   
While the concept of ordinary psychosis extends the discussion of the decline of 
the Symbolic spread over chapters 1-3, the primary focus of this chapter is Lacan’s late 
concept of the sinthome. Just as Lacan's reading of Antigone and his interest in 
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anamorphosis left their mark on the kind of ethics elaborated in Seminar VII, so too did 
his late preoccupation with Joyce result in an ethico-aesthetic theory that at times almost 
ventriloquises the author, rendering any straightforward interpretation difficult. Despite 
this difficulty, Seminar XXIII rewards a close reading, and represents a decisive shift in 
Lacanian theory along the axis of creativity. The concept of the sinthome that lies at its 
heart names a subjective ‘construction’ that transforms the subject, and in so far as 
artistic production is involved in this process, it strikes at the core of the relationship 
between ethics and aesthetics.  
For all the relevance and theoretical novelty of Seminar XXIII, Lacan’s 
formulations in this seminar do, however, pose problems other than those associated 
with impenetrability. As has already been flagged up in the general introduction to this 
thesis, Lacan’s concept of the sinthome describes a subjective construction that remains 
curiously a-social. What could be called the ‘sinthomatic function’ of an artwork — its 
capacity to bring about a radical process of singularisation — would seem, in Lacan’s 
analysis, to be restricted to the artwork’s creator. For Lacan, the sinthome is beyond 
signification, accompanied by a jouissance he calls ‘opaque’. It is in the endeavor to 
explore this ‘beyond’ that Guattari’s work becomes useful. His wide-ranging 
discussions of the role of ‘a-signifying’ semiotics (partly inspired by the work of the 
Danish linguist Lois Hjelmslev) involve authors, artworks and audiences in processes of 
‘co-creation’ (an argument partly inspired by the aesthetics of Mikhail Bakhtin). As 
such, they can be used to overcome the conceptual problems of Lacan’s late work. By 
making a ‘guattarian graft’ onto Lacan’s work in the second half of this chapter, the aim 
is to generate a set of resources pragmatically geared towards the discussion of artworks 
in chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Ordinary Psychosis 
 
Formulated on the basis of Lacan’s late work, the working category of ‘ordinary 
psychosis’ was first developed by Jacques-Alain Miller to inaugurate a research 
programme, rather than establish a new nosological classification.276 In order to position 
this concept as the logical backdrop to Seminar XXIII, it will first be necessary to 																																																								
276  The term emerged from a series of conferences that took place in Angers, Arcachon and Antibbes 
between 1996 and 1998. Extracts from the second event have been published as Jacques-Alain Miller and 
others, ‘The conversation of Arcachon (extracts)’, Psychoanalytical Notebooks, 26 (2013), 61-81. An 
extensive clinical discussion of the concept has also recently been published in Jonathan D. Redmond, 
Ordinary Psychosis and the Body: A Contemporary Lacanian Approach (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014). 
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explain the classical Lacanian view on psychosis. Firstly, it should be recalled that one 
of the defining characteristics of psychosis, at least in Lacan’s early work, is a very 
specific attitude towards the Name-of-the-Father. Lacan labeled this attitude 
'foreclosure', which is a concept derived from Freud’s German term verwerfung.  
Verwerfung is used by Freud to mean a range of different things, from ‘a fairly 
loose sense of refusal’ to outright condemnation, and remains translated in the standard 
edition as ‘repudiation’.277 Among the many shades of possible meaning, Lacan zones in 
on just one, found in ‘The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence’ where Freud talks about a 
‘more energetic and successful form of defence’ than repression.278 What distinguishes 
foreclosure from repression is that with the latter the excluded element is buried in the 
unconscious, while with the former it is expelled from the psychic apparatus altogether. 
According to Freud, ‘the ego rejects the incompatible idea together with its affect and 
behaves as if the idea had never occurred to the ego at all.’279 With repression, on the 
other hand, the affect is simply displaced onto other signifiers, while the ‘idea’ is locked 
away in the unconscious, destined to return again as a symptom. 
The link between foreclosure and psychosis can be illustrated with brief 
reference to the paradigmatic case of Schreber, whose Memoirs of my Nervous Illness 
served as a crucial reference point for Freud’s theory of psychosis.280 In reading Freud 
alongside Schreber, Lacan comes to the conclusion that the latter’s psychic problems 
can be attributed to an early foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. As a result, there 
was a hole at the centre of Schreber’s Symbolic universe where the Name-of-the-Father 
was missing. According to Lacan, this did not cause any problems for him to begin 
with, and Schreber was able to find success in his profession and lead a relatively 
‘normal’ family life.281 His psychosis at this stage could therefore be characterised as 
‘untriggered’. It was only when Schreber was promoted to a position of authority as one 
of Germany’s top judges that psychological problems started to occur. At this instant 
Schreber encounters the Name-of-the-Father insofar as there is the implicit assumption 
that his job requires him to act in a classically authoritarian way. For Lacan, this 
amounts to an ‘encounter, collision, with an inadmissible signifier [which] has to be 																																																								
277 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 
2006), p. 166. 
278 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey, Vol. 3 (London: The Hogarth Press, 
1962), pp. 45-61 (p. 58).  
279 Ibid. 
280  Daniel Paul Schreber, Memoirs of my Nervous Illness (New York: NYRB, 2000). 
281  Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book III: The Psychoses. 1955-1956, ed. by Jacques-
Alain Miller (New York: Norton, 1993).  
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reconstituted’.282 The reconstitution for Schreber involved delusions of a persecutory 
God, a particularly common trope in psychotic delusions.  
Following on from this analysis, which is still rooted in Lacan’s early work, it is 
necessary to ask how the Lacanian theory of psychosis responds to the decline of the 
Symbolic, which has as one of its characteristics a pluralisation of the Name-of-the-
Father. If the power of the Name-of-the-Father to organise psychic life has been 
diminished, as was suggested in chapter 1, then this has effects that make themselves 
known in the clinic. The category of ‘ordinary psychosis’ can be seen, in part, as an 
effort to account for these effects. The result is a blurring of the boundary separating 
neurosis and psychosis, and a move away from a theory in which the former serves as a 
'wallpaper' against which extraordinary cases of psychosis periodically emerge. To go 
further still, Jacques-Alain Miller has argued that one of the theoretical consequences of 
ordinary psychosis is a ‘generalisation of psychosis’, with the implication that there has 
been an accompanying generalisation of the mechanism of foreclosure.283 This follows 
from Lacan’s late perspective according to which ‘everyone is mad’.284  
Despite this turn in Lacan’s work and the subsequent clinical theory it has 
inspired, it is important to stress that the link between the concept of ordinary psychosis 
and wider social change is the subject of some debate. There are some analytic theorists, 
such as Éric Laurent, who describe ordinary psychosis as ‘what the psychotic subject is 
when the psychosis has not been triggered.’285 For others, such as Marie-Hélène 
Brousse, the idea cannot be accounted for on the basis of existing concepts used to 
describe psychosis (such as ‘triggered’ or ‘untriggered’). Ordinary psychosis is 
fundamentally different at the level of its relationship to society. It is ‘both clinical and 
political — in the sense of the development of the dominant modalities of the social 
bond.’286 It should be clear that my own summary foregrounds these political aspects, 
and in so doing positions the emergence of ordinary psychosis as a symptom of the 
decline of the Symbolic.287 																																																								
282 Ibid., p. 321.  
283  Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Ordinary Psychosis Revisited’, Psychoanalytical Notebooks, 26 (2013), 33-51 
(p. 45).  
284 Lacan’s position in 1978, from an article recently translated into English as Jacques Lacan, ‘There are 
Four Discourses’, Culture / Clinic, 1 (2013), 1-3 (p. 1). The subtleties of this proposition are addressed in 
a number of articles in the same journal issue, most extensively in Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Everyone is 
Mad’, Culture / Clinic, 1 (2013), 17-42. 
285 Éric Laurent, ‘Psychosis, or a Radical Belief in the Symptom’, Hurly Burly: The International 
Lacanian Journal of Psychoanalysis, 8 (October 2012), 244-251 (p. 249). 
286 Marie-Hélène Brousse, ‘Ordinary Psychosis’, p. 25. 
287 For many readers the political dimensions of ordinary psychosis will evoke Deleuze and Guattari's 
reflections on the  deterritorialising force of capitalism in the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project. In 
Anti-Oedipus for example, they claim that capitalism works through an ‘axiomatic of decoded flows’ (p. 
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The concept of ordinary psychosis also belies a shift in the underlying logic used 
to theorise psychosis, as Brousse makes clear: ‘As long as you are functioning in that 
orientation of a complete set defined by the element that is an exception to that set, 
psychosis is extraordinary, but when you function in another logical model, psychosis is 
no longer extraordinary.’288  
The first logical model Brousse refers to can be derived from Cantorian set 
theory, according to which a set of any given elements can only be articulated on the 
basis of one element being excluded, which comes to serve as the boundary to the set. 
This is equivalent to saying that there cannot be a set of all sets — or, to use Lacan’s 
phrase, ‘there is no Other of the Other’ (written as A). In the theory of psychosis drawn 
from Lacan’s early work, the element excluded from the set is the Name-of-the-Father, 
and as I have said, its exclusion comes to define the category of psychosis as a whole. 
When the Name-of-the-Father is rendered unstable, sharply delineating ‘psychosis’ 
from other clinical categories immediately becomes problematic.289 
As I will show in the next section, it is topology that offers Lacanian 
psychoanalysis a second logical model, as Brousse implies. This model underpins what 
Jacques-Alain Miller and others have called ‘a differential clinic of psychosis’, 
providing a model that is less black and white, less reliant on breaks and ruptures, and 
more elastic, continuous and relational.290 Insofar as it makes room for the consideration 
of so-called ‘borderline’ cases of psychosis, the use of topology has a clear clinical 																																																																																																																																																																		
208), and more specifically ‘decoded flows of production in the form of money-capital, and the decoded 
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be transformed from a medium of psychic investment that solicits belief to a command mechanism that 
has pragmatic effects hints at an influence of cybernetics on Deleuze and Guattari’s thought. For a 
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See Think Again: Alain Badiou and The Future of Philosophy, ed. by Peter Hallward (London: 
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rationale. However, for the purposes of my own discussion it can also be used to think 
about wider processes of subjectivation that constitute a response to the decline of the 
Symbolic. In the next section I will elaborate on how topology comes into play in 
Seminar XXIII, before discussing Lacan’s reading of James Joyce, and the ethical 
moment his work reveals.  
 
Borromean Knots  
 
From the early 1950s through to the late 1970s classically hydraulic models of the 
psychic apparatus were gradually replaced by appeals to topology in Lacan's work. At 
first, figures such as the Mobius strip, the Klein bottle, the torus and the cross-cap are 
used to illustrate the structure of the subject in their relationship to language.291 From 
the early '70s onwards, Lacan increasingly turns his attention to knot theory, a particular 
branch of topology. In both knot theory and the topology of surfaces, distance, angle, 
size, and area are all irrelevant, the only things that count are relationships that 
withstand continuous deformation.292  
For Lacan, as in his discussions of the topology of surfaces, knot theory 
provides a resource for thinking through dynamic relationships in a non-metaphorical 
way. Knots do not simply demonstrate the changing structure of the subject, but rather 
‘monstrate’ the Real of this structure, which is like a ‘structure with grammar peeled off 
it’.293 As Lacan repeatedly stresses in Seminar XXIII, the knot is ‘forbidden to the 
imaginary’ and in no way does it 'constitute a model'.294 This is not the equivalent of 
saying that 'mathematics is ontology' (pace Badiou) because knots, just like the 
mathemes discussed in chapter 2, are in no way prior to the Symbolic as an ontological 
ground. Rather, at this stage in Lacan's work the Real can be seen as a product of the 
Symbolic and the Imaginary, and not a primordial sphere from which these two orders 
emerge. This much can be inferred from Lacan's comments in Seminar XXII when he 
																																																								
291 To take one example, just as the Torus’ centre of gravity lies outside of its volume, for Lacan the 
subject is fundamentally decentered. The subject is nowhere to be found within the confines of a 
biological body, it is rather an effect of the signification process. This point is encapsulated in the 
neologism ‘extimacy’ — showing that the most intimate kernel of the subject is in fact external to its 
biological body.  
292 A commonplace illustration of this can be seen in the homeomorphism between a coffee cup and 
donut in topology. 
293 Lacan: Topologically Speaking, ed. by Ellie Ragland and Dragan Milovanovic (New York: Other 
Press, 2004), p. xix. 
294 Lacan, Seminar XXIII, p. 22, p. 34 (9 December 1975). 
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posits that the Borromean knot is 'a writing that supports a Real [...] not only can the 
Real be supported by a writing but that there is no other tangible idea of the Real.'295 
In Seminar XXIII, Lacan focuses on one knot in particular, the three-ring 
Borromean knot (figure 9), which in mathematical terms is strictly speaking a chain.296 
The significant feature of the Borromean knot is that cutting one of the three rings 
causes the other two to come apart. No two rings are joined to each other without 
reference to a third. In Seminar XX Lacan labels the rings Imaginary, Symbolic and 
Real, thereby emphasising that the three orders are interdependent.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Three-Ring Borromean Chain 
 
As Pierre Skriabine notes, the three-ring Borromean knot already implies a fourth term, 
which is the knot itself.  
 
The common measure between the three resides in the possibility of their being knotted, 
knotted in a Borromean manner, and the knotting, the Borromean knot, is a fourth, new 
entity: it is the common measure a minima, in a way the perfect solution.297  
 
The tragic dimension at play in this period of Lacan’s work is that the ‘perfect solution’ 
is no longer readily available. On the path from the early to the late Lacan, from a 
univocal Name-of-the-Father to a plural, fragmented network of names, this ‘perfect 
solution’ could be placed squarely at the beginning, and even then it isn't so perfect. The 
fact that the knot no longer holds together with only three elements can be seen as a 
formal step away from Oedipal psychoanalysis. The progressive untying of the three 																																																								
295 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XXII: R. S. I. 1974-1975 (unpublished translation 
by Cormac Gallagher), p. 24 (17 December 1974). 
296 The Borromean knot has 3 elements. In mathematical theory a ‘knot’ can only have one.  
297 Pierre Skriabine, ‘The Clinic of the Borromean Knot’, in Lacan: Topologically Speaking, ed. by Ellie 
Ragland and Dragan Milovanovic (New York: Other Press, 2004) pp. 249-267., p. 253.  
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ring Borromean knot accounts, according to this view, for the condition of ‘ordinary 
psychosis’, where the inter-relations between language (the Symbolic), meaning and 
identity (the Imaginary) and their respective ability to latch on to the Real is rendered 
unstable. If a three-ring knot is no longer possible, if ordinary psychosis is to be 
avoided, then alternative subjective arrangements must be experimented with. For these 
arrangements to be post-oedipal, they must avoid reinstating the ready-made solution of 
the Name-of-the Father, while nevertheless affording a certain amount of consistency. 
It is for this reason that Lacan begins to introduce an explicit fourth element to 
the Borromean knot that acts as a repair, holding the other three rings together (figure 
10). This fourth element is given several names during the course of the seminar but 
perhaps most consistently it is called ‘the sinthome’ (abbreviated to Σ - the sum of all 
values).  In addition, when referring to Joyce, Lacan labels this fourth term simply ‘ego’ 
— a point that will be expanded on below.  
  
                Sinthome 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Sinthomatic Chain 
 
Before embarking on a discussion of Joyce it should be noted that opinion is divided on 
what exactly the Borromean knot represents for Lacan. Some secondary commentaries 
advance the idea that the knot accounts for habitual psychic structure, and that the 
fourth ring is a subjective imperative for all who wish to avoid ‘triggered’ psychosis. 
For others, this fourth ring emerges only in cases where the traditional Name-of-the-
Father failed to occur, it does not apply to those with neurotic or perverse clinical 
structure.  
The confusion is made worse when one reads secondary texts on Lacan’s work 
in which two opposed interpretations are put forward in the same book, (albeit by 
different authors):  
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Let us use the Lacanian term sinthome in the case of psychotics who produce works of 
art or at least signifying structures that protect them against the devastating effects of 
their madness by knotting the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary, with the help of a 
fourth consistency, the sinthome, that can be a work of art.298 
 
The sinthome — this symptom that knots together the real, the symbolic, and the 
imaginary — is the singular invention of the subject, and more especially so in 
psychosis, since it does not use the “standard” of the Name-of-the-Father.299 
 
In the first quote, Kaltenbeck implies that the concept of the sinthome does not apply to 
all subjects, unless they can be considered psychotic in the classical sense he uses the 
word, while in the second quote, Morel claims that it is a viable solution for any subject, 
including the non-psychotic — albeit a less singular, or less inventive solution.  
If the former position is adopted, it would amount to saying that the ideas put 
forward in this chapter only really apply to psychotic subjects, narrowly defined. To be 
clear, the fundamental wager here is that ‘ordinary psychosis’ does not simply mean 
that there are more subjects with psychotic structure today, triggered or untriggered. It 
means that the consequences of a decline of the Symbolic can be felt by every speaking 
being. Old existential accretions and prohibitions crumble under contemporary forms of 
capitalism, and this has significant psycho-social consequences. In the words of Roberto 
Harari, the final Lacan responds to this change in the social bond by elaborating a 
theory in which there is ‘an irreducible “psychotic” kernel in every individual, by means 
of which we are identified with our sinthome, the ever present modality of our 
jouissance.’300 
According to this position, beyond the classical theory of clinical structures, 
there is an irreducible ‘psychotic kernal’, which serves as a logical pre-condition for 
sinthomtic formations to arise. These formations can take many forms: the traditional 
‘Name-of-the-Father’ represents just one option among many (a deeply conservative 
option at that), and in the era of ‘generalised foreclosure’, this standard method is harder 
to cling on to than ever before. As a direct result of the decline in the Symbolic, subjects 
are increasingly required to construct their own non-oedipal solution to the problem of 
generalised foreclosure. This is neither a one-size-fits-all solution nor a solution that can 																																																								
298 Franz Kaltenbeck, ‘Sublimation and Symptom’, in Art: Sublimation or Symptom, ed. by Parveen 
Adams (New York: Karnac, 2003), pp. 103-122., p. 117, footnote 31.  
299 Genevieve Morel, ‘A Young Man without an Ego: A study on James Joyce and the Mirror Stage’, in 
Art: Sublimation or Symptom, ed. by Parveen Adams (New York: Karnac, 2003), pp. 123-146. p. 141. 
300 Roberto Harari, How James Joyce Made His Name: A Reading of the Final Lacan (New York: Other 
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be installed for time-immemorial. The sinthome, like the symptom before it, does not 
stop writing itself, to paraphrase Lacan.301 That is to say, it is a processual invention that 
mutates as it gains consistency.  
This is broadly in line with Lacan’s witz introduced in part 1: one can ‘do 
without the Name-of-the-Father […] provided one makes use of it.’302 ‘Making use’ of 
something is a constant activity. In some ways, this could be called the crucial ‘first 
principle’ of Lacan’s ethics of the sinthome. As a pragmatic principle, it implies that 
one should privilege ‘adoption’ over ‘adaptation’ and replace received authority with a 
kind of ‘know-how’ or savoir-faire. This conceptual move will become increasingly 
clear in the following discussion of Joyce, whose artistic creations are precisely what 
enable him to ‘make a name for himself’ in lieu of an existing Name-of-the-Father. 
 
Joyce the Sinthome 
 
Throughout Seminar XXIII, Lacan repeatedly asks himself ‘was Joyce Mad?’ (by which 
he means psychotic), nowhere to arrive at an answer.303 This, I would suggest, is 
because his individual diagnostic status is less important than what his work reveals 
about a general psychic condition. Seminar XXIII is not exclusively devoted to Joyce’s 
artistic work, and although it periodically slips in psychobiography, it is decisively not 
an ‘applied’ psychoanalysis. It is rather an attempt to pass through Joyce’s work as a 
means to comment on a new modulation of the social bond. Over the next few 
paragraphs I will also pass through Joyce as a means to elaborate on some of Lacan’s 
conceptual maneuvers in this seminar before extending them with the work of Félix 
Guattari. 
Lacan suggests that Joyce suffers disturbances ‘in relationship to his body. He 
expresses this by saying that it is like fruit skin.’304 The episode is taken from A Portrait 
of the Artist as a Young Man, in which Stephen Daedalus receives a beating from three 
of his classmates, Heron, Nash and Boland. Stephen is pinned to a barbed wire fence 
while the three boys beat him with a cane and a cabbage stump because he refuses to 
denounce the poet Byron, who the other boys think is a heretic. After the episode, Joyce 
writes that Stephen 
 																																																								
301 Lacan, Seminar XX, p. 59 (13 February 1973). 
302 Lacan, Seminar XXIII, p. 166 (13 April 1976).  
303 Lacan, Seminar XXIII, p. 109 (10 February 1976). 
304 Lacan, Seminar XXIII, p 180 (11 May 1976).  
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bore no malice now to those who had tormented him. He had not forgotten a whit of 
their cowardice and cruelty but the memory of it called forth no anger from him. All the 
descriptions of fierce love and hatred which he had met in books had seemed to him 
therefore unreal. Even that night as he stumbled homewards along Jones’s Road he had 
felt that some power was divesting him as a fruit is divested of its soft ripe peel.305  
 
As Stephen reflects on the episode, he remembers another, similar psychic disturbance 
that occurred some years earlier as he is walking through Clongowes school with his 
father, who wants to show him where he carved his name on a desk. Instead of his 
father’s inscription, Stephen sees the word ‘foetus’306 roughly engraved on a desk, and 
this brings about a dramatic dislocation that Joyce describes as follows: 
 
His very brain was sick and powerless. He could scarcely interpret the letters of the 
signboards of the shops. By his monstrous way of life he seemed to have put himself 
beyond the limits of reality. Nothing moved him or spoke to him from the real world 
unless he heard it in an echo of the infuriated cries within him. […] He could scarcely 
recognise his own thoughts, and repeated slowly to himself:  
 
- I am Stephen Dedalus. I am walking beside my father whose name is Simon Dedalus. 
We are in Cork, in Ireland. Cork is a city. Our room is in the Victoria Hotel. Victoria 
and Stephen and Simon. Simon and Stephen and Victoria. Names.307 
 
It was worth quoting Joyce at length because these passages indicate at least three key 
themes that bear further exploration: Imaginary identification (and the loss thereof), the 
Name-of-the-Father, and naming in general. While these issues are central to Joyce's 
work, here it is necessary to avoid eliding the author with his literary avatar, a mistake 
that Lacan himself makes in Seminar XXIII. Important differences exist between the 
two, and despite the autobiographical dimensions of The Portrait, the reader is 
nevertheless dealing with a distorted (self)representation of the author. 
Both of the episodes quoted above seem to bring about the same kind of 
disturbance, which can be broadly described as a loss of the ‘I’. Bearing in mind that for 																																																								
305 James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (London: Penguin, 1996), p. 93. 
306 See Luke Thurston, James Joyce and the Problem of Psychoanalysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), particularly chapter 6: ‘God’s Real Name’ for a commentary on the significance 
of the term ‘foetus’ in Joyce’s work.  
307 Joyce, Portrait of the Artist, pp. 104-5. Stephen's experience of disorientation in this passage has 
obvious relevance to the argument made in chapter 2, and the fact that he re-orientates himself by 
primarily Symbolic means (a list of proper names and geographical locations), further supports the claims 
made in the earlier chapter for the link between a decline in the Symbolic and a rise in disorientation. 
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Lacan, the Imaginary is inaugurated by the mirror stage, through which the infant first 
receives a sense of his or her body as a totality, it could be said that the image of the 
body as ‘soft ripe peel’ implies the undoing of the mirror stage, the shedding of the 
Imaginary identification that confers identity on the body. Given Joyce’s numerous 
references to the literature and philosophy of the ancient world, it would be surprising if 
the hidden point of reference here were not Lucretius. In book IV of The Nature of 
Things, Lucretius writes that ‘images are like a skin, or a film, peeled from the body’s 
surface, […] they fly this way and that across the air’.308 This ‘skin’ of sensory matter 
radiates from objects and gives a sense of their identity, without conveying the true 
‘being’ of an object per se — just as the mirror stage confers a psychosomatic identity 
on the subject for Lacan, without for that matter, encompassing the whole of their 
subjectivity. In both cases, this sensuous layer is a semblance, but one which 
nevertheless allows the subject to keep a foothold in ‘reality’. Lacan writes the problem 
of this loss of Imaginary consistency topologically as follows:  
 
          Slip  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Unlinked Three-Ring Chain 
 
Here the ‘slip’ causes the Imaginary ring to drift off while the Symbolic and the Real 
remain interlinked. In the first passage, the disturbance is accompanied by an inability 
to identify with descriptions of ‘love and hatred’ - a feeling that they are unreal. Stephen 
harbors no malice towards his attackers precisely because there is no sense of the self 
that would enable him to do so. The Imaginary, as locus of the ego, has drifted off, and 
taken love and hate with it.   
In the second passage, again the disturbance is related to the Imaginary — to an 
image of an unformed body, a foetus. This image is implicitly linked to the fact that 
Stephen’s father fails in doing what he set out to do when he entered the school, which 																																																								
308 Lucretius, The Way Things Are (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), p. 120.  
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is precisely to find his name. Stephen pulls himself back from the brink of a psychotic 
episode by clinging to names: to his name, his father’s name, and the name of the hotel 
and the city in which they are staying. Although names such as ‘Stephen’ or ‘London’ 
do have meanings (in this case ‘crown’ and ‘river too wide for a ford’ — amongst a 
series of other meanings), these rarely come into play in everyday language. In this 
context they serve more as signifiers-in-isolation that nominate their objects, than 
signifiers-in-combination that derive meaning from an entire web of signification (as in 
the classically Saussurian model of language).309 In this way the names invoked by 
Stephen straddle the Symbolic and the Real, pulling signifiers away from a fluid 
differential sphere of language and using them as anchoring points in the psychic 
economy. Naming in this passage therefore has a reparative function, coming into being 
in the place where the father’s name fails.310 Once again, this evokes Lacan’s call to ‘do 
without the Name-of-the-Father […] provided one makes use of it.’311 The repair that 
pulls Joyce back from the brink of psychic dissolution can be represented in a 
Borromean way as follows: 
  
                Joyce’s Ego 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Unlinked Three-Ring Chain with Repair 
 
As can be seen from this diagram, the repair comes to be where the initial slip occurred. 
For Lacan, who remained vehemently opposed to ‘ego psychology’ throughout his life, 																																																								
309 I have borrowed the terms ‘signifier-in-isolation’ and ‘signifier-in-combination’ from Tom Eyers, 
Lacan and the Concept of the Real (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Eyers makes the important 
point that 'the signifier- in- isolation and signifier-in-relation should be considered as potential ‘states’ for 
any signifier, rather than as different signifiers or fundamentally different modalities of signification.' (p. 
38). 
310 Lacan’s preoccupation with the issue of naming seems to have stemmed from his reading Saul Kripke, 
Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981) which is alluded to in Seminar XXI, p. 49 (11 
December 1973), and Seminar XXII, p. 44 (11 March 1975) Coining the term ‘ridged designators’, Kripke 
claimed that proper names refer to their object in a direct fashion, without having recourse to description.  
311 Jacques Lacan, Seminar XXIII, p. 166 (13 April 1976).  
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the label ‘Joyce’s ego’ on this diagram is counter-intuitive. Is Lacan really reversing his 
position and siding with those who claimed that a successful analysis strengthened the 
subject’s ego, at whatever cost? Two points reveal that this is decisively not the case. 
First of all, at the semantic level, throughout Lacan’s work the German term ‘Ich’ is 
rendered in French as ‘moi’. By using the Latinate form ‘ego’, Lacan is therefore 
pointing towards something other that the psychic mediator that Freud saw as the locus 
of reason.312 This much is clear from Joyce’s writings, which are some of the most 
unreasonable of the 20th century. Secondly, at a topological level, it can be seen that 
Joyce’s ego does not coincide exactly with the Imaginary; it is rather a new creation 
with its own character.313  
This highlights the other axis around which Seminar XXIII turns, artistic 
creation. Lacan describes Joyce as a ‘pure artificer […] a man of know-how.’314 He is a 
synthetic man, a ‘synth-homme’ with a prosthetic ego. What form of creation is Lacan 
advocating here? Roberto Harari argues that a distinction can be made between a 
‘creationism of the signifier’ in Lacan’s early work from another form of creativity 
based on ‘Symbolic nomination’: 
 
On one side there is the fiat Lux!, the act of naming something and founding it, making 
the Real emerge on the basis of the Symbolic; and on another, quite distinct side we 
have the invention of a name — both the proper name and the common noun — that 
attains its real through the abrogation of the identity authorized by the code.315  
 
Here Harari's claim that creative nomination can only function through 'an abrogation of 
the identity authorized by a code' once again brings to mind the concept of the 'signifier-
in-isolation'. However, while the latter involves a withdrawal of the signifier from the 
commonly agreed circuits of meaning, what Harari has in mind is closer to the 
neologisms invented by Joyce. Finnegans Wake in particular contains a proliferation of 																																																								
312 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Ego and the ID’, p. 25.  
313 Following on from this, it might be possible to topologically model the strengthening of the classical 
ego [moi] as a doubling of the Imaginary ring. Although it would be a digression to do so here, it may be 
possible to formalise this process with reference to the concept of ‘bing doubling’, inspired by the work 
of the mathematicians R. H. Bing and John Milnor. Milnor and Bing have shown that in a number of 
cases simply doubling the elements of a knot or chain can provide a stable link, even in cases (such as 
figure 11) when a link is trivial, or unlinked, in its prior state. Like the Joycean ego in figure 12, this 
addition would prevent the Imaginary ring from floating away and repair the fault that threatens psychic 
unity. However it would not do so through the creation of something new, but through a doubling, a 
strengthening of Imaginary defenses, petrifying the subject and possibly exacerbating their suffering. See 
John Milnor, ‘Link Groups’, Annals of Mathematics, 59:2, (1954), 177-196 (p. 184).  
314 Lacan, Seminar XXIII, p. 141 (9 March 1976). 
315 Harari, How James Joyce Made His Name, pp. 346-7. 
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strange idiolects containing literally thousands of new words. This act of invention has 
the effect of circumventing the authority that underpins recognised speech genres and 
renders them stable. As Harari points out, 'by foreclosing meaning that is congealed or 
frozen, I am able to engender new, unprecedented meanings'.316 In Joyce’s work as 
elsewhere such linguistic monsters are not immediately amenable to the understanding, 
leading one to assume that they work at the level of a ‘modality of jouissance’ more 
than a mode of communication.  
It is worth exploring this idea of a modality of jouissance in detail, because in 
many ways it holds the key to understanding a different ethical mode of relating to the 
Symbolic that Joyce’s work reveals. In Lacan’s late seminars there is a proliferation of 
different modes of jouissance, which have been explored in a range of secondary 
texts.317 Here I want to concentrate on just two: so-called ‘phallic’ jouissance and 
‘opaque’ jouissance.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Three-Ring Borromean Chain with Phallic Jouissance 
 
Phallic jouissance  (JΦ) is the jouissance that is recouped by the subject from the 
Symbolic. Lacan accordingly places it between the Symbolic and the Real on the 
Borromean knot (figure 13). While the traditional role of the Name-of-the Father is to 
separate a subject from the overwhelming jouissance of the Real, through this very act 
of separation it in effect creates a modality of jouissance. Here Freud's story of the man 
in the bakery quoted in chapter two once again comes to mind. In the same way that the 
man swaps a cake for a glass of liquor, neither of which he had paid for in the first 
place, if the subject is in the first place willing to give up something he doesn't have and 
'accept' Symbolic castration, the dividend he receives is phallic jouissance. Since this 																																																								
316 Ibid., p. 301.  
317 See Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Paradigms of Jouissance’, Lacanian Ink, 17 (2000), 8-47, or the final 
chapter of Lorenzo Chiesa, Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan (Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press, 2007). 
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form of jouissance is obtained by means of a submission to the Symbolic, it is always 
collectively negotiated and ideologically conditioned.  
Opaque jouissance, by contrast, represents an individual ‘subjectivation’ of 
jouissance that is not collectively negotiated in any usual way. Joyce’s achievement, 
according to Lacan, consists in creating for himself an idiosyncratic mode of jouissance 
that is not reliant on the Symbolic in general, and thus not primarily 'phallic' in 
character. Once again this implies that opaque jouissance is not reliant on the Name-of-
the-Father. Joyce in effect ‘makes a name for himself’ and his sinthome takes on the 
role of the Name-of-the-Father in a new, individualised way. Furthermore, opaque 
jouissance is opaque precisely because it excludes meaning. It is associated with the 
sinthome, which is to be distinguished from the symptom by virtue of the fact that it is 
not a message to be deciphered. Although Lacan does not identify where opaque 
jouissance is to be placed on the Borromean knot, it could perhaps be placed within the 
area demarcated by the sinthome in figure 10. 
Nevertheless, it does not seem that Lacan is claiming that ‘opaque jouissance’ 
bypasses the Other entirely. Joyce’s sinthome is ‘unsubscribed’ [désabonné] from the 
Other, implying a two-stage process: first a subscription, then an unsubscription.318 The 
subscription is progressively withdrawn by traversing the fundamental fantasy, which as 
Verhaeghe and Declercq point out, progressively strips the symptom of its Symbolic 
properties, eventually arriving at a kernel of non-sense that resists interpretation.319 
After these two stages, a third stage of re-inscription can begin. As in the example of 
Joyce, this installs a new, particularised Master-Signifier, in contrast to the 'off-the-
shelf' solution of the Name-of-the-Father. In Seminar XXIV, Lacan claims that art, as a 
representative of this secondary process of re-inscription, is ‘not pre-symbolic, but 
symbolic to the power of two’. 320 In other words, the ‘non-sense’ embodied in art 
emerges from within sense, rather than vice-versa.  
The theoretical position here seems problematic in several respects. The reading 
proposed by Verhaeghe and Declercq makes for a rather schematic ‘three-step’ process 
of analysis, and the necessity of passing though the Symbolic would seem to privilege a 
mode of inhabiting language that is always already skewed towards neurosis, with art as 																																																								
318 Jacques Lacan, Joyce the Sinthome (I) (unpublished translation by Aaron Benanav), p. 3. Available in 
French as: Jacques Lacan, ‘Joyce le Symptôme’, in Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan: Livre XXIII, Le 
Sinthome, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2005), pp.161-169. 
319 Paul Verhaeghe & Frédéric Declercq, ‘Lacan's analytical goal: “Le Sinthome” or the feminine way’, 
in Re-inventing the symptom: Essays on the Final Lacan, ed. by Luke Thurston (New York: The Other 
Press, 2002), pp. 59-83 (p. 67). 
320 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XXIV: L’insu que sait… 1976-1977  
(unpublished translation by Cormac Gallagher), p. 58 (18 January 1977). 
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a means to pass ‘beyond’ this neurosis. While it begs the question of psychotics, or 
those on the autistic spectrum, who sometimes never manage to inscribe themselves 
fully in the Symbolic, let alone ‘unsubscribe’ themselves afterwards, it could equally be 
said that these subjects have something of a head start in this process. This is the point 
that Phillip Dravers has made with regard to Joyce, whose probable psychosis — 
untriggered or otherwise — means for Dravers that there is no need for him to traverse 
his fantasy, but does introduce an added imperative to create for himself a particularised 
master signifier.321 
Secondly, although it is my assertion that Lacan discusses Joyce’s work in order 
to think about a general social and psychic condition, his discussion revolves around a 
closed relationship between an artist and his artwork. According to Lacan, the 
jouissance of the Joycean text is opaque. As he put it in the opening address to the 1975 
Joyce Symposium, ‘the symptom of Joyce is a symptom that does not concern you at all. 
It is the symptom insofar as there is no chance it will catch something of your 
unconscious.’322 This posits that inter-subjective forms of expression are necessarily 
based on signification, and anything beyond signification ‘does not concern you’. This 
once again demonstrates the need to account for inter-subjective forms beyond 
signification, or to put it in Joyce's words, the 'intermisunderstanding minds of the 
anticollaborators'.323 In the next section I will look at how Guattari’s work addresses 
some of these problems.  
 
A Guattarian Graft 
 
As a one-time student of Lacan’s, and a member of the École Freudienne up until his 
death in 1992, Félix Guattari was a theorist, analyst and activist well versed in Lacanian 
theory. This is very different from saying he was a ‘Lacanian theorist’; in his single-
authored works and collaborations with Deleuze, Guattari became increasingly critical 																																																								
321 Phillip Dravers, ‘In the Wake of Interpretation: “The Letter! The Litter!” or “Where in the Waste is 
the Wisdom”’, in Re-Inventing the Symptom: Essays on the Final Lacan, ed. by Luke Thurston (New 
York: Other Press, 2002), pp. 141-146. 
322 Jacques Lacan, Joyce the Sinthome I, p. 3. The impenetrability of Joyce's text has been noted by many 
commentators before Lacan, but perhaps the most relevant here is Jung, who in an unflattering review of 
Ulysses in 1932 compares Joyce to a worm: ‘If worms were gifted with literary powers they would write 
with the sympathetic nervous system for lack of a brain. I suspect that something of this kind has 
happened to Joyce, that here we have a case of visceral thinking with severe restrictions of cerebral 
activity and its confinement to the perceptual processes’, Carl Gustav Jung, ‘“Ulysses”: A Monologue’, in 
The Collected Works of C. G. Jung Volume 15: Spirit in Man, Art and Literature, ed. by Gerhard Adler 
and R. F. C. Hull (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 109-32 (p. 112). 
323 James Joyce, The Restored Finnegans Wake (London: Penguin Classics, 2012), p. 214. 
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of what he saw as the limitations of Lacanian psychoanalysis. His wide ranging critique 
revolved around three broad shortcomings of Lacanism: 1) the privileging of the 
traditional one-on-one couch setting at the expense of psychiatric institutions such as La 
Borde where Guattari worked; 2) the privileging of a model of the unconscious that was 
skewed towards neurosis, rather than psychosis324 (a perspective that led Guattari to coin 
the term schizoanalysis in opposition to psychoanalysis); 3) the reliance on structuralist 
(and especially Saussurian) linguistics, which led to a ‘signifier fetishism’ among 
Lacanian analysts and blinded them to the importance of a-signifying forms of 
expression.  
Perhaps as a result of these critiques it is unusual to find syntheses of Lacan and 
Guattari among the secondary literature on either author. Academic scholarship on 
Lacan usually seeks to place him on a trajectory that begins with Kant or Hegel and 
ends with his ‘natural inheritors’ such as Alain Badiou or Julia Kristeva, while ‘clinical’ 
Lacanian texts rarely make reference to any authors other than those Lacan himself 
cited, Guattari not being one of them. One of the few books to work through some of 
the complex links between Lacan and Guattari is Janell Watson’s Guattari’s 
Diagrammatic Thought. Watson exposes the submerged connections between the two 
thinkers, but her approach remains Guattari-centric, and some surprising claims about 
the increasingly structuralist character of Lacan’s work evidence a paucity of 
engagement with his later formulations.325 While it is not my intention to give a general 
overview of the complex entanglements between the two thinkers, I hope that in this 
section it will be possible to use Guattari to solve some of the problems in Lacan’s late 
work, while simultaneously making a few connective syntheses that overcome the 
sometimes exaggerated antagonism between them.   
Some of the key themes in Guattari’s oeuvre relate directly to the abiding 
concerns of this thesis. An expanded conception of subjectivity runs through all of his 
theoretical works, from an early collection of essays entitled Psychoanalysis and 
Transversality to later monographs such as Schizoanalyic Cartographies and 
Chaosmosis (a term that Guattari in fact borrows from Joyce). In these later works 																																																								
324 Work around the concept of ‘ordinary psychosis’ on the part of Lacanian theorists could be seen as a 
way of addressing this criticism.  
325 See Watson, Guattari’s Diagrammatic Thought. Watson writes that ‘In 1954-55 Lacan’s sign is much 
more playful, open and interesting than it will later seem, once his structuralism subjects it to the 
matheme and algebraic topology’ (p. 35), and elsewhere of ‘Lacan’s increasingly purified structuralism’. 
See Janell Watson, ‘Schizoanalysis as Metamodeling’, The Fibreculture Journal, 12 (2008) 
<http://twelve.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-077-schizoanalysis-as-metamodeling/> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
This runs counter to the widespread opinion that Lacan’s work becomes less structuralist as his attention 
turns from the Symbolic increasingly towards the Real. 
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much attention is given to what Guattari calls ‘ethico-aesthetics’, which is opposed to 
the reigning scientism (be it structuralist or logico-positivist) in psychoanalysis and 
culture at large. My aim in this section is firstly to give an account of Guattari’s attitude 
towards subjectivity, paying particular attention to the role of art in its production. This 
will lay the ground for a more focused look at his ‘general semiotics’, taking into 
account a-signifying forms as well as his critique of signifying semiotics. As I hope to 
demonstrate, this selective approach can be justified in Guattari’s own vocabulary as a 
form of ‘meta-modeling’, which is to say the construction of conceptual models drawn 
from different domains on the pragmatic basis of their utility in solving a problem.  
 
The Production of Subjectivity 
 
Guattari never forgets that the most important outcome of psychoanalytic treatment is 
change. This change is not figured as a one-off cure, in the same way that a medical 
cure might be, but rather as a processual opening up of possibilities for the subject — a 
work that never stops and that does not have a pre-determined outcome. In his hands 
subjectivity is always treated as something that can be produced, or worked ‘in the 
sense that one works iron’ rather than something static.326 In a turn of phrase that recalls 
Lacan’s description of Joyce, Guattari emphasises the ‘artificial and creative character 
of the production of subjectivity’ and the range of heterogeneous components that make 
up its composition.327 
Among the many components that Guattari maps are ‘individuals, groups and 
institutions’, ‘technological machines of information and communication’ as well as 
‘scriptural, vocal, musical or plastic discursivities’. 328  These components work in 
concert to form ‘universes of reference’ that interact with the subject in a constant and 
reciprocal manner.329 For Guattari, schizoanalysis is about the ‘co-management’ of the 
production of subjectivity, which could involve making all manner of subtle changes to 
the subject’s material and semiotic milieu. Guattari viewed institutions of all kinds as 
‘assemblages of subjectivation’ where such subtle changes could take place, for better 
or worse. For example, in the La Borde clinic where he worked most of his life, Guattari 
and his colleagues instituted ‘la Grille’ — a rotation system that required doctors, 
patients, and other staff to exchange tasks, thereby allowing frozen subjective positions 																																																								
326 Félix Guattari, Schizoanalytic Cartographies (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 20. 
327 Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 8. 
328 Ibid., p. 1, p. 4, p. 19. 
329 Ibid., p. 18. 
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to thaw and institutionally sanctioned power to circulate more freely.   
This practical example might suggest that for Guattari the subject is more or less 
equivalent to the ‘analysand’, ‘patient’ or ‘inmate’, depending on the setting. According 
to this position the task of the schizoanalyst would be to change the socio-psychic 
conditions under which individual humans lived. In fact, this position is quite wide of 
the mark of Guattari’s thought. Just as for Lacan, ‘the unconscious is the discourse of 
the Other’, for Guattari subjectivity was both infra- and supra-individual.330 It operates 
at the level of institutions and groups, as well as at the ‘molecular level’ of part-objects 
and pathic apprehension. In what follows I will describe some of the tributaries of 
subjectivity that Guattari discusses.   
To demonstrate the supra-individual level of subjectivity, it is enough to cite 
Guattari’s early opposition between ‘subject groups’ and ‘subjugated groups’, which 
was loosely based on Sartre’s distinction between ‘serial being’ and the ‘group in 
fusion’.331 A subjugated group finds the principle of its unity outside of itself, with each 
of its elements relating to one another through this external referent, whereas a subject 
group interiorises its principle of unity, steering it towards its own purposes. Although 
references to Sartre gradually disappear form Guattari’s work, echoes of this line of 
thought (as well as Marx) can be heard in Guattari’s rallying call to seize the ‘means of 
production of subjectivity.’332 Such a seizure might enable new group subjects to form 
along various paths of singularisation.  
One of the pre-personal elements in the production of subjectivity involves 
‘pathic apprehension’ that exists before, and then parallel to, the subject-object relation. 
In Schizoanalytic Cartographies, pathic categories are figured as ‘existential filters’ that 
organise the ‘primordial soup of the plane of immanence’.333 They constitute a kind of 
pre-conceptual apprehension of phenomena — a form of proto-subjectivity that is 
unrelated to ego or identificatory formations. To make this argument, Guattari draws on 
the distinction made by the German physician and philosopher Viktor von Weizsäcker 
between pathic categories and ontic categories. As the label implies, ‘ontic’ categories 
relate to being, and can include such relations as ‘time, space, numbers and causality’.334 
Von Weizsäcker links pathic categories to such modal verbs as ‘can’, ‘will’, and 
‘ought’, which embody processes that are undergone, expressing movement, desire, or 																																																								
330 Lacan, Écrits, p. 436. 
331 A distinction found in Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason: Volume 1 (London: Verso, 
2004). 
332 Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 13. 
333 Guattari, Schizoanalyic Cartographies, pp. 108-109. 
334 Ibid., p. 110.  
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obligation. Movement and response implies a minimal level of subjectivity for von 
Weizsäcker. This may be as simple as the reflex reaction in a Venus flytrap, or anything 
that changes in response to its environment. As von Weizsäcker points out, it is simply 
‘the dualism of perception and movement that implies the introduction of a subject in 
biology.’335 This level of pre-personal subjectivity should not be seen as a pre-condition 
to group subjectivity. A more global shift in subjective forms might feasibly change 
subjectivity at a pathic level. A change in the fly population as a result of human 
behavior might require Venus flytraps to react faster, or develop larger trigger hairs, and 
vice-versa.  
The specific role accorded to art in the production of subjectivity lies 
somewhere between these two poles. In Chaosmosis, Guattari describes art as having a 
catalytic function in the production of subjectivity.336 Artworks or parts of artworks are 
variously described as ‘vectors of subjectivation’ or ‘nuclei of differentiation’. 337 
Understood in its widest sense as creative output, art has the capacity to launch 
somebody or something on a new subjective trajectory. But how, exactly, does it fulfill 
such a lofty function? Guattari is clear that it is ‘not through representation, but through 
affective contamination. They [aesthetic assemblages] start to exist in you, in spite of 
you.’338 In the phrase ‘in you, in spite of you’ the reverberations of Lacanian theory can 
be felt.339 Elsewhere Guattari makes this link explicit, calling for an expansion of the 
psychoanalytic concept of the ‘part-object’ to account for all the channels that flow into 
the production of subjectivity, an ambition he sees Bakhtin’s work as partially 
realising.340 In what follows I will try to explain the significance of this move.  
The idea of a ‘part-object’ was given the most decisive weight by Melanie 
Klein, who placed it at the heart of the object-relations theory of psychoanalysis that she 
would help to develop. Nevertheless, the idea is present in Freud’s work as early as 
1913, when it is linked to psychosexual stages and the component drives.341 For Freud, 
																																																								
335 Viktor von Weizsäcker, Le Cycle de la Structure (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1958), p. 229 quoted in 
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336 Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 19. 
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338 Ibid., pp. 92-3. 
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340 Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 14. 
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part-objects are objects that occupy a position extraneous to the infant’s body, but 
which nevertheless play a role in his or her subjective development. The key examples 
are the breast (which satisfies the oral drive) and the feces (which satisfy the anal drive). 
These objects operate as points of alterity that give the subject libidinal pleasure. From a 
Kleinian point of view, the breast initially comes to serve as a stand-in for the ‘whole’ 
object of the mother, thereby acting as a bridge between the subject and his or her 
‘external’ world, in many ways enabling this distinction to be made in the first place. 
Some years later Lacan would shift the emphasis away from the breast as the 
preeminent part-object and expand the list to incorporate the gaze and the voice. The 
voice is linked to the so-called ‘invocatory drive’ and is particularly evident in 
psychosis, which can involve persecutory or commanding auditory hallucinations; while 
the gaze is linked to the scopic drive. The gaze has been well covered in the secondary 
literature, but in brief it could be characterised as the phenomenological possibility of 
being seen, even by an object such as a painting, which gives rise to all manner of 
affective states, the most obvious being shame. 
In this brief summary the concept of the partial-object has already started to 
loosen from its moorings. Whereas Freud’s original usage links the part-object to an 
instinctual dive — to eat, to shit — Lacan’s additions are more closely linked to desire, 
and eventually to the object of desire itself — object a — the place of which can 
feasibly be occupied by any object. Guattari wholeheartedly approves of this expanded 
part-object, calling for it to be followed up even further.342 The cost of not doing so 
would be to relegate such objects to ‘normative landmarks’ on a road to the generic 
subjective state of ‘oblative genality’.343 According to Guattari, whereas Kleinian and 
Lacanian analysts situated the partial object or transitional object at ‘the junction of a 
subjectivity and an alterity which are themselves partial and transitional […] they never 
removed it from a causalist, pulsional infrastructure: they never conferred it with the 
multivalent dimensions of an existential Territory or with a machinic creativity of 
boundless potential.’344 Guattari’s name for this new, expanded part-object is a ‘part-
enunciator’ and to add theoretical scaffolding to the concept he draws on the early work 																																																																																																																																																																		
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey, Vol. 12 (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1958), pp. 317-326 (p. 321). 
342 Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 14. Part-objects also play a decisive role in Anti-Oedipus, where they are 
conceived of as interruptions in the flows of libido. These interruptions are not overcome on the route to 
towards sexual maturity, as Klein’s work implies, but constitute the machinic components of the 
unconscious that can be engineered and modulated through schizoanalysis.  
343 Guattari, Schizoanalytic Cartographies p. 31. ‘Oblative genality’ was for Freud the ‘normal’ outcome 
of passing through all the stages of psycho-sexual development.  
344 Guattari, Chaosmosis p. 94.  
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of Mikhail Bakhtin.  
In Bakhtin’s early work the distinction between a material artifact and an 
aesthetic object is an important issue. This is no more the case than in the essay The 
Problem of Content, Material and Form in Verbal Art. 345 Here Bakhtin positions 
himself against the Formalism that dominated Russian art theory in the early 20th 
century, which sought to establish the primacy of the material in the interpretation and 
analysis of works of art, taking in such considerations as scale, texture, or shape. In 
contrast, Bakhtin insists that an aesthetic object is irreducible to its material 
composition: 
 
The aesthetic component […] is neither a concept, nor a word, nor a visual 
representation, but a distinctive aesthetic formation which is realized in poetry with the 
help of the word, and in the visual arts — with the help of visually apprehended 
material, but which does not coincide anywhere with any material combination.346 
 
On this basis, Bakhtin asks himself how aesthetic form, while necessarily dependent on 
material combinations, manages to spill over its material container to become ‘the form 
of content’.347 A straightforward psychologistic answer to this question might try to 
account for the aesthetic component of a work of art as a subjective projection of the 
human mind. For Bakhtin this is only partially what is going on. While in this essay, 
and in much of his work, he grants the spectator a decisively active role in the ‘co-
creation’ of a work of art, for Bakhtin an artwork’s significance cannot simply be put 
down to an aesthetic projection: 
 
In form I find myself, find my own productive, axiologically form-giving, activity, I feel 
intensely my own movement that is creating the object, and I do so not only in primary 
creation, not only during my own performance, but also during the contemplation of a 
work of art. I must to some extent experience myself as the creator of form, in order to 
actualize the artistically valid form as such.348  
 
This passage describes a process of aesthetic contemplation that gives the spectator a 
feeling of his or her own subjectivity joining with an object in a moment of ‘co-
creation’, which, in turn, reveals the aesthetic form that made this creative moment 																																																								
345 Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’. 
346 Ibid., p. 300.  
347 Ibid., p. 304.  
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possible. Modes of contemplation that do not pass through this circuit of creative 
contemplation are described as ‘cognitive’, rather than aesthetic thinking. Only through 
entering into the form as a co-creator, and by consciously experiencing this process, 
does aesthetic contemplation become possible. 
Before any of this can happen Bakhtin asserts that the work first of all needs to 
be detached from ‘the unity of nature and the unity of the ethical event of being’.349 This 
is not a typical autonomist argument, whereby only the artwork itself should be taken 
into consideration in the study or contemplation of art, because as Bakhtin makes clear, 
passing from a cognitive to an aesthetic mode of contemplation does not wipe the slate 
clean. Contextual information, biographical details of the artist, or knowledge about the 
object’s production may all be retained by the viewer, and may even comprise part of 
the newly detached aesthetic object itself. Isolation of the aesthetic form is what finally 
cleaves it from its material substrate, opening it to subjective input: ‘Isolation is […] the 
negative condition of the personal, subjective (not psychologically subjective) character 
of form; it allows the author creator to become a constitutive moment in form’350  
Bakhtin’s account of the extra-material dimensions of aesthetic objects chimes 
with the extra-material significance placed on part-objects in psychoanalysis. From a 
Kleinian perspective, a breast is not simply a body part or a potential source of 
nourishment; it plays an active role in the production of subjectivity. For Freud too, the 
excremental assemblage bound up with the anal drive gives the infant a sense of the 
boundaries of their own body, a sense that is in no way ‘given’ if they are looked at in 
isolation. Bakhtin’s achievement was not only to extend the notion of the part-object, 
but also to discuss it outside of any normative model of psychogenetic development or 
the circuits of the ‘component drives’. When passages from Bakhtin that speak of the 
artwork as ‘a segment of the unitary open event of being’ are considered, the potential 
for a Lacanian inflected interpretation becomes clear. Guattari makes this connection 
vivid and immediate, writing that aesthetic perception and artistic creation ‘detach and 
deterritorialise a segment of the real’ 351  effectuating a ‘complex ontological 
crystallization’352 in the spectator or the artist.  
To hazard a point of comparison between Bakhtin and the late Lacan, it is worth 
recalling the idea of ‘unsubscribing’ from the Other that the latter sees in Joyce, which 
is precisely a mode of isolating an aesthetic object from the general ‘cognitive’ circuits 																																																								
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of meaning (i.e. the Symbolic) and giving this object an existential weight in the 
subject's psychic life. In the case of Joyce this process of unsubscription was seen to 
inaugurate a counter movement of Symbolic reinscription by means of a particularised 
master signifier or sinthome. An important difference however can be seen in the fact 
that the sinthome as Lacan theorises it cannot be inter-subjective, whereas for Bakhtin 
and Guattari the aesthetic object or ‘part-enunciator’ sends subjective ripples through 
the author, the viewer and potentially their respective socio-symbolic milieus. This is 
one of the key points that warrants a turn to Guattari in this chapter.  
 
Cracking the A-Signifying Kernel  
 
As previously mentioned, a second crucial shortcoming of Lacan’s seminar on Joyce, 
and perhaps Lacanian psychoanalysis in general, is its insistence on ‘the primacy of the 
signifier’. Seminar XXIII is less dogmatic than earlier seminars in this respect, with its 
manifold diagrams and discussions of nomination and phonetics serving to pluralise the 
semiotic forms on offer.353 Nevertheless, among Lacanian theorists and in the majority 
of seminars this is clearly not the case. Guattari saw this shortcoming early on, and 
many of his collaborative or single-authored works contain wide-ranging critiques of 
‘signifier fetishism.’ This critique is bolstered by some serious and sustained attempts to 
think through an alternative semiotic model. It is in an essay entitled 'The Role of The 
Signifier in The Institution' that a compressed account of the ‘general semiotics’ that 
Guattari advocated in place of structuralist semiotics can be found.354 Before expanding 
on this, it will first be necessary to sketch the main points of Guattari’s critique of the 
linguistic underpinnings of Lacanian psychoanalysis.  
The first of Guattari’s criticisms involves the infamous ‘Saussurian bar’ between 
the signified and signifier. For Lacan this bar acts as a one-way street, with the signifier 																																																								
353 In fact it might be possible to trace a path away from signifying semiotics in Lacan’s late work. In 
Seminar XXI for example, Lacan uncharacteristically describes his elaboration of the link between two 
signifiers in his early Saussurian inflected essay ‘The Function and Field of Speech and Language in 
Psychoanalysis’ as ‘an error’. See Jacques Lacan, Seminar XXI: Les Non Dupes Errent (Unpublished 
translation by Cormac Gallagher), p. 50 (11 December 1973). An example of Lacan focusing on a-
signifying forms in Seminar XXIII (11 May 1976) can be seen in his appropriation of the argument of 
Clive Hart's Structure and Motif in Finnegans Wake (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
1962), which posits that Joyce's last book is underpinned by two interlocking forms — the sphere and the 
cross — which determine the form of the entire book without passing into signification. As one might 
expect, Lacan is quick to see in this form another way of writing the Borromean knot, in which the cross, 
when its points are extended to infinity, essentially serves the same function as two interlocking circles 
would, in effect containing the third circle by locking it into position.   
354  Félix Guattari, ‘The Role of the Signifier in the Institution’, in Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and 
Politics (London: Penguin, 1984), pp. 73-81.  
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perpetually acting on the signified in a non-reciprocal manner according to which ‘the 
word kills the thing’. For Guattari, this has the effect of petrifying the possibilities 
inherent in signified matter on one side of the bar, and establishing a veritable 
‘signifying ghetto’ on the other. 
Related to this critique is the claim that Lacan gave very little account of how 
signifiers come into being in the first place.355 The Lacanian signifier ‘lacks ontological 
heterogenesis’.356 As if to add grist to Guattari’s mill, Lacan was fond of quoting 
William Burroughs to the effect that ‘language is a virus from outer space’ — perhaps 
with the addendum that it destroys the possibility of finding out which galaxy it came 
from.357 For Guattari it is important to think about processes of semiotisation rather than 
any autonomous semiotic sphere: ‘the question is neither to abstract out from signified 
content, nor to confer on it a separate and autonomous ontological status, but to 
determine its conversions’.358  
A third rejoinder to Lacan concerns the relationship of signifying semiotics with 
capitalism, a line of analysis that has been taken up and developed by theorists such as 
Franco "Bifo" Berardi and Maurizio Lazzarato under the banner of 'Semiocapitalism'.359 
In fact, while certain passages from Guattari's work might suggest that capitalism 
derives a huge amount of power from 'despotic signifying machines', another prominent 
current in his thought (both individually and with Deleuze) emphasises the manifold 
ways in which capitalism uses a-signifying semiotics — perhaps most obviously in the 
financial sphere, where technical apparatus, trading algorithms, financial ratings etc. act 
directly on flows of material and the organisation of commodity chains without 
necessarily passing into signification.360 Whilst on the one hand Guattari makes a quasi-
economic claim that capitalism positions the signifier ‘profit’ as the general equivalent 
against which everything else is measured (a ‘transcendent enunciator’) his sensitivity 
to the increasingly sophisticated a-signifying apparatus of capitalism shows that 																																																								
355 This is not entirely true. As Watson points out in Guattari’s Diagrammatic thought, Lacan’s very 
early seminars give a cursory account of ‘sign-particles’ that serve as pre-signifcying semiotic units.  
356 Guattari, Chaosmosis, p.39. For many Lacanians this absence of the ontological genesis of the 
signifier would be seen as a consequence of there being ‘no meta-language’, it is a matter of ‘coming to 
terms with this lack’ rather than filling it in.  
357 William Burroughs, Naked Lunch (New York: Grove Press, 2004), p. 112. 
358 Guattari, Schizoanalytic Cartographies, p. 163. 
359 See for example Franco “Bifo” Berardi, The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy (New York: 
Semiotext(e), 2009), p. 21, and Maurizio Lazzarato, Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production 
of Subjectivity (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2014). This last book contains extended readings of Guattari's 
work and seeks to highlight its heightened relevance under contemporary forms of capitalism.  
360 As Guattari writes in Schizoanalytic Cartographies: ‘what is the reductionist bent of the signifier […] 
supported by? To my mind it is inseparable from the much more general curvature of capitalistic 
Universes in the direction of the entropy of the equivalence of significations.’ Guattari, Schizoanalytic 
Cartographies, p. 214. 
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something else is always going on beneath the surface.361 At best it could be said that 
capitalism is an economic system that operates in various semiotic domains at the same 
time, but that its operations on the terrain of signification are more easily apprehended 
than its a-signifying operations, and this has the effect of devaluing semiotic forms 
outside signification, a devaluation that Lacanian psychoanalysis was thought to 
compound. 
For Guattari psychotics are particularly disadvantaged by the devaluation of 
extra-linguistic forms of expression. 362  To develop a criticism made earlier, the 
structuralist emphasis on signifying forms is ill adapted to the analysis of those who 
make sense of the world in different ways. As such it requires some drastic 
modifications if it is to be used in what Guattari first called ‘institutional analysis’, and 
later schizoanalysis. It is in this context that the essay 'The Role of The Signifier in the 
Institution' should be placed; with its primary aim to pluralise the modes of 
semiotisation that psychoanalysis takes into account so as to render them operative in 
institutional settings with a high proportion of psychotic patients.  
In formulating part of his alternative ‘general semiotics’, in this essay Guattari 
replaces the usual references to Saussure and Jakobsen with terms drawn from the 
Danish linguist and semiotician Louis Hjelmslev.363 This is perhaps a surprising move, 
given the highly structuralist character of the latter’s work.364 From the 1930s onwards, 
Hjelmslev and his colleagues in the Copenhagen school sought to identify the algebraic 
structures and basic units common to all language, both actual and potential — an 
endeavor they called ‘glossmatics’.365 Despite his place in the history of structuralism, 
there are several reasons to make a ‘detour through Hjelmslev’ (as Guattari puts it in 
The Machinic Unconscious). These reasons will become clearer once some of 
Hjelmslev’s terms have been explained.   
The table which appears at the beginning of 'The Role of the Signifier in the 
Institution' (figure 14) uses several terms taken directly from Hjelmslev — matter, 
substance, form, expression, and content — which form a lattice overlaid by a series of 
																																																								
361  Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 104. 
362 Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 72. 
363 For a detailed discussion of Guattari’s work on semiotics see Gary Genosko, ‘Guattari’s 
Schizoanalytic Semiotics: Mixing Hjelmslev and Peirce’, in Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in 
Politics, Philosophy, and Culture, ed. by Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 175-190.  
364 Guattari was not the first cultural or critical theorist to turn to Hjelmslev. See for example Roland 
Barthes, Mythologies (Paris: Seuil, 1957). 
365 Hjelmslev called the basic units of language ‘glossimes’, taken from the Greek ‘glossa’ meaning 
tongue or language.  
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arrows to designate various kinds of semiotic manifestation.366 By examining this table 
in detail it will be easier to grasp the import of Hjelmslev’s work for Guattari. 
 
 
Figure 14: The Role of the Signifier in the Institution. 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental distinction for Hjelmslev is that between ‘expression’ 
and ‘content’, which Guattari plots onto the left hand side of his table. Some linguists 
have chosen to neatly map these categories onto Saussure’s distinction between signifier 
and signified, an association that is not without justification in Hjelmslev’s own work.367 
As one might expect, Guattari (this time with Deleuze) is quick to disagree with such 
interpretations, writing of the expression/content planes in A Thousand Plateaus that  
 
There is never conformity between the two, or from one to the other. There is always 
real independence and a real distinction; even to fit the forms together, and to determine 
the relations between them, requires a specific variable assemblage. None of these 																																																								
366 Both Gary Genesko and Janell Watson have made previous readings of this table that influence my 
own. See Gary Genesko, Félix Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction (London: Continuum, 2012); Watson, 
Guattari’s Diagrammatic Thought. 
367 See for example: Miriam Taverniers, ‘Hjelmslev's semiotic model of language: An exegesis’, 
Semiotica, 171 (2008), 367–394.  
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characteristics applies to the signifier-signified relation.368  
 
The idea of a ‘variable assemblage’ between content and expression highlights the fact 
that the boundary between them is not simply associative, but functional, working as an 
interface of conversion. 
The relationship between content and expression is figured as independent and 
yet structurally isomorphic. In other words, the planes have no correspondence with one 
another and yet the way in which they are organised is similar. Furthermore, while 
formally independent they in fact mutually presuppose one another: there is no such 
thing as an expression without content or an expressionless content. In Hjelmslev’s 
words: ‘They are defined only by their mutual solidarity, and neither of them can be 
identified otherwise. They are each defined only oppositively and relatively, as mutually 
opposed functives of one and the same function.’369 The fact that neither plane takes 
primacy over the other sets them apart from Saussure’s signifier/signified relation, and 
allows Hjelmslev to claim that it should be possible to find a way of analysing 
expression starting with content — a distinctly immanentist position that appeals to 
Deleuze and Guattari.370  
As well as the two planes of expression and content, Hjelmslev elaborated three 
further categories: matter (or purport), substance, and form. Hjelmslev described the 
first category as an ‘amorphous mass […] which is defined only by its external 
functions’, and in the Prolegomena purport is likened to sand that can be put into 
different molds. 371 Just as the same sand can be molded differently and yet the 
underlying matter remains the same, so too can the same purport be structured 
differently in different languages without the purport itself changing.372 As shown in 
figure 14, purport can exist on both the content and the expression planes. Content-
purport is akin to Kant’s noumenal reality, an unformed and undifferentiated realm of 
things-in-themselves, whereas expression-purport is figured as an amorphous sequence 
of sounds in verbal language (or potentially any material of expression before it is 
formally expressive). This description of purport as something amorphous and passive 
like sand again seems uncannily close to Saussure’s signified, which is perhaps why 																																																								
368 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 74. In the endnote given on this page, Deleuze and 
Guattari write categorically that ‘We consider Hjelmslev, despite his own reservations and vacillations, to 
be the only linguist to have actually broken with the signifier and the signified.’ Ibid., p. 574. 
369 Louis Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1963), p. 60. 
370 Ibid., p. 75.  
371 Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, pp. 50-51.  
372 Ibid., p. 52.  
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Guattari felt the need to make the difference explicit. In The Machinic Unconscious, he 
writes that ‘sense is by no means an “amorphous mass” […] waiting upon an external 
formalism that would come to animate it. […] [It] is manifested across a spatial, 
temporal, substantial, multidimensional, and deictic rhizome in the midst of which it 
operates every possible transmigration, every transmutation.’373 Even if this is not true 
for Hjelmslev, for Guattari matter is a fundamentally active and intensive realm of 
unrealised possibility. Of all the categories in the table it is perhaps the closest to the 
Lacanian Real, a realm of imminent causality that is outside of representation.   
Purport conjoins with form in order to make substance. Hjelmslev famously 
describes this relationship as follows:   
 
By virtue of the content-form and the expression-form, and only by virtue of them, exist 
respectively the content-substance and the expression-substance, which appear by the 
form’s being projected on to the purport, just as an open net casts its shadow down on 
an undivided surface.374  
 
As this quote implies, forms are like the strings of a net, held in place by each other in 
an expansive web of language. The net example reveals the set-mathematical 
foundations of glossmatics, according to which an undefined multiplicity is grouped 
into the semiological ‘set’ of a specific language or conceptual system. This is true on 
the content plane as well as the expression plane, and one could feasibly speak of a 
‘zoological set’ of animals (such as marsupials) as it pertains to content, as well as a 
‘signifying set’ of semaphore signals as they pertain to expression. In fact, forms cannot 
really be said to exist independently of this grouping function. Their existence 
fundamentally depends on being put into action, making and unmaking words and 
things out of unformed purport.  
The final category of substance is a little subtler, as implied by it being equated 
with the shadow of a net. It represents the bridge between form and purport necessary 
for meaning to arise. To take a concrete example, on the expression plane substance 
could be equated with phonetics. Phonetics is the very physical aspect of sound, as 
produced by a particular person or group of people — in short it is words as the ear 
hears them. Expression-form on the other hand could be equated with phonology. It is 																																																								
373 Félix Guattari, The Machinic Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 
2011), pp. 218- 219. The usual translation of purport is matière or sens in French. As a result in the 
Adkins translation of The Machinic Unconscious it has been rendered into English as ‘sense’, when it 
should perhaps have been left as matter.  
374 Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, p. 57. 
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the aspect of sound as systematised and ordered by language. One phoneme is opposed 
to another phoneme in an abstract structure of differentiation.375 Phonology is words as 
the brain hears them. Just as it is impossible to have phonology without phonetics, form 
without substance would result in empty and meaningless forms, and the converse is 
also true for substance. As Hjelmslev succinctly puts it: ‘purport provides the substance 
for a form’.376  
Now that the basic terms that Guattari borrows from Hjelmslev have been 
defined, it is possible to further unpack the meaning of the different semiotic and a-
semiotic manifestations that traverse the six squares of the table. The arrows on the 
table exist as passages of transformation, and the fact that some of them are double-
ended show that this is possible in both directions. Matter can be formalised into 
relatively stable structures, and forms can be rendered as inoperative as a broken sand-
bucket.  
For Guattari the small oval shaded grey represents the ‘signifying ghetto’ of the 
Lacanian Symbolic. Its centre of gravity is at the dividing line between the two axes of 
form-substance and expression-content, and it involves the formalisation of various 
types of substance, from linguistic expression to Morse code. Signifying semiologies 
can be further divided into ‘symbolic semiologies’ and ‘semiologies of signification’. 
The former employ such substances as gesture, mime, tattoos, insignia etc., while the 
latter are ‘centred upon a single signifying substance’ — linguistic expression. 377 All 
the semiotic forms in this sphere are ‘structured like a language’ and ‘other poly-
centered semiotic substances become dependent upon a single specific stratum of the 
signifier.’378 A recent artwork by Lawrence Abu Hamdan entitled Conflicted Phonemes 
(2012) provides a concrete example of this reduction at work. The piece highlights 
immigration authorities’ use of accent and language tests, which attempt to determine 
the validity of an asylum claim solely on the basis of whether the claimant’s accent 
matches the place they say they have come from. Once their claim has been rejected, the 
asylum seeker is unable to dispute the ruling. Made as an outcome of collaborative 
workshops with rejected claimants in Holland, one of the resulting diagrams (figure 15) 
shows just how plural and complex a person’s linguistic profile often is, resulting from 
all manner of personal encounters and material influences. This is intended to directly  																																																								
375 To recall the terms of an earlier argument, it could be said that expression form is therefore like Eyer's 
concept of the signifier-in-combination, insofar as it describes meaning generated ‘negatively’ through 
difference. 
376 Ibid., p. 52. 
377 Félix Guattari, ‘The Role of the Signifier’, p. 75. 
378 Ibid. 
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Figure 15: Lawrence Abu Hamden, Conflicted Phonemes (2013) digital print. © The artist 
 
contrast with the categorical link between accent and territory that the state seeks to 
establish, which has the effect of converting a-signifying forms (accent, intonation) into 
the all-important signifier of origin (e.g. Somalia). The raison d'être of Hamden’s maps 
is to offer the rejected/silenced asylum seeker an alternative and non-vocal mode of 
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contestation, thereby bringing about an ever so slight deterritorialisation of semiologies 
of signification to incorporate symbolic semiologies.379   
 Interpreters of Guattari’s work have observed that because signifying 
semiologies are placed outside of the ‘matter’ (purport) column of this table, it follows 
that semiologies of this kind are cut off from the Real.380 In fact I would argue that 
while figure 14 does lend support to this interpretation, it strikes me as paradoxical that 
there could be any semiology that did not in some way involve purport. Perhaps 
therefore it would be more accurate to say that signifying semiologies are only 
consciously cut off from purport, while unconsciously their nets still cast long shadows 
onto the underlying realm of active and intensive material. As Guattari himself argues, 
signification ‘seems to make all semiotics originate from the signifier.’381  
At the other extreme are a-semiotic encodings, which operate independently of 
substance, connecting purport with form directly. The most obvious example of this is 
DNA, but one could also speak of chemical compounds more generally, hormones, 
enzymes, psycho-active substances etc. Strictly speaking, such formalisations of 
material intensities are untranslatable, and yet Guattari does highlight the example of 
pharmacological substances being made to serve signifying semiologies, as well as the 
dictates of profit more generally. This becomes immediately clear when consideration is 
given to such endeavors as the ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ 
(DSM) produced regularly by the American Psychiatric Association, which sets out 
diagnostic criteria in neat arboreal arrangements that determine the eventual 
prescription of pharmaceutical drugs. Despite its adaptive function, there is nothing 
intrinsically repressive about Prozac (to take an arbitrary example) and there is nothing 
intrinsically semiotic about the way in which it connects with the human brain. As 
Guattari points out, ‘psycho-pharmacology could just as easily be directed to the 
constitution of a non-signifying semiotic’. 382  An additional feature of semiotic 
encodings is that they operate independently of the division between expression and 
content. To paraphrase Marshal McLuhan, it could be said that in such cases the matter 
is the message. DNA triggers all manner of complex sequences of cause and effect, but 																																																								
379 Lawrence Abu Hamden, ‘Conflicted Phonemes’ [exhibition hand-out] (London: Tate, 2013) As the 
exhibition literature points out, asylum seekers from Somalia are particularly vulnerable to the 
vicissitudes of this test, which often conveniently places their accents as originating from safe pockets of 
northern Somalia. For a country that has been in relative turmoil for the past 40 years, giving rise to 
numerous migration flows and population upheavals, putting such faith in the connection between voice 
and territory would seem like a strategic choice on the part of the authorities.  
380 See Watson, Guattari’s Diagrammatic Thought, p. 48. 
381 Ibid., my emphasis.  
382 Ibid., p. 79. 
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it does so independently of representation. For this reason a-semiotic forms are by 
definition untranslatable into signifying semiotics. Their instrumentalisation at the 
hands of the latter, which under capitalism ultimately results in their subjection to the 
dictates of profit (as the pharmaceutical example readily attests), constitutes more of an 
overcoding than a translation.  
Over and above such a-semiotic encodings, Guattari holds out the most hope for 
the third and final form of semiotic manifestation: ‘a-signifying semiotics’. Examples of 
these include musical notation, mathematics, and computer code. In each of these 
examples, signs and things have the capacity to connect directly, without recourse to 
representational paradigms. As Bruno Bosteels has put it, these forms are ‘flush with 
the real.’383 And yet just as a-semiotic encodings have the potential to be operated by 
signifying semiologies, so too can a-signifying semiotics influence signification. In a 
phrase that recalls Lacan’s description of art as ‘symbolic to the power of two’, Guattari 
describes this semiotic form as ‘post-signifying’.384 A-signifying semiotics ‘remain 
based on signifying semiotics, but no longer use them as anything but a tool, an 
instrument of semiotic de-territorialization’.385 In other words, a-signifying semiotics 
have the capacity to creatively retool signifying semiotics independently of subjective 
control. To borrow a term from Bakhtin, a-signifying semiotics ‘polophonise’ 
signifying semiotics, steering them away from any general equivalent and onto singular, 
and singularising paths. This is as true in visual art as it is in literature. A huge variety 
of a-signifying forms traverse the works of Joyce, large tracts of Ulysees were 
influenced by musical techniques and notation, and as mentioned above, for Clive Hart 
the entirety of Finnegans Wake is underpinned by the geometrical figure of an 
interlocking sphere and cross.386  
Elsewhere, Guattari calls a-semiotic forms ‘diagrammatic’. To grasp this point it 
is important to distance Guattari’s sense of the ‘diagram’ from its quotidian meaning. A 
graphic table such as figure 14 could serve a diagrammatic function or it could not. This 
is equally true of algorithms, or algebraic equations. What is important is not its visual 
‘diagrammatic’ appearance, but its generative properties. The purpose of diagrams is 
‘not to denote or to image the morphemes of an already constituted referent, but to 																																																								
383 Bruno Bosteels, ‘From Text to Territory: Félix Guattari’s Cartographies’, in Deleuze and Guattari: 
New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy, and Culture, ed. by Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 145-174 (p. 162). 
384 Guattari, ‘The Role of the Signifier', p. 75.  
385 Ibid. 
386 Zack Brown, Bloom's Old Sweet Song: Essays on Joyce and Music (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 1995); Clive Hart, Structure and Motif in Finnegans Wake. 
	 147	
produce them.’387 They do this by forging a reciprocal bridge between form and matter, 
short-circuiting representation, and in the process providing vectors for subjectivity. 
This expanded sense of the diagram also finds expression in Foucault’s Discipline and 
Punish, where he described the Panopticon as ‘the diagram of a mechanism of power 
reduced to its ideal form.’ 388  In Foucault’s work, diagrams are socio-politico 
technologies that regardless of their specific use actively shape ‘bodes in space’, for 
better or worse. With this in mind, is it possible to view Lacan’s topological figures in 
the first half of this chapter as ‘diagrams’ in Guattari’s sense? I would assert that 
Seminar XXIII contains a proliferation of diagrammatic components that point the way 
towards new subjective arrangements of RSI. If this seminar is read against the grain of 
some contemporary Lacanians, and the temptation to position the mathematical 
elements as the ontological ground upon which other theoretical elaborations rest is 
resisted, it is easier to see that topology, and the Borromean knot in particular, serves a 
highly creative and diagrammatic function in the production of subjectivity.  
 
Sidestepping the Steamroller 
 
While this chapter has engaged with fields as diverse as topology, literary studies, and 
semiotics, the resulting construction remains focused on problems relating to ethics and 
aesthetics. Looking back over the points elaborated above, it is now possible to see 
where Guattari and Lacan's late work converge as well as their mutual relevance in 
theorising a new ethico-aesthetic paradigm of art. This is a paradigm that pushes beyond 
the boundary play of transgression and prohibition and into a domain more overtly 
concerned with creativity and its ethico-aesthetic effects.  
To recapitulate, in the first half of this chapter I demonstrated that the ethical 
theory of the late Lacan has many characteristics: it is non-oedipal, because it does 
away with the Name-of-the-Father as an off-the-shelf solution to the problem of 
psychosis; pragmatic, because it involves a kind of 'know-how' attentive to social 
change; singular, because the processes of 'unsubsciption' and 'reinsciption' associated 
with the sinthome amount to a process of singularisation that circumvents the 																																																								
387 Guattari, Machinic Unconscious, p. 216.  
388 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 205. The concept of the 
diagram is pinpointed as a crucial dynamic in Foucault’s work in Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (London: 
Continuum, 1999). Another point of reference for Guattari’s concept of the diagrammatic is Charles 
Sanders Peirce, who pioneered the use of ‘existential graphs’ in, among other places, Charles Sanders 
Peirce, ‘Existential Graphs’, in The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. by Charles 
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, 8 vols  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958-1966), IV (1960), 
293-470 
	 148	
ideologically conditioned Symbolic sphere, and inventive, because the sinthome and its 
existential outgrowths are nowhere given or ready made.389 This last point is what 
makes Lacan's late work an aesthetic-ethics, not simply because it is elaborated by 
means of an engagement with the aesthetic productions of James Joyce, but because it 
foregrounds creativity and invention in the production of subjectivity, lending further 
meaning to the formulation that Lacan quotes on the first page of his Écrits: ‘style is the 
man himself’.390 
Despite the often-exaggerated antagonism between the two theorists, Guattari 
shares many of these characteristics of Lacan’s late work. It goes without saying that the 
former had a deeply held commitment to non-oedipal thought. This extends to all of 
Guattari's work, not least his reflections on the subject of ethics. Secondly, in Guattari's 
concept of metamodelling one finds a thoroughly pragmatic principle in which the task 
of the schizoanalytically inclined theorist or analyst is to produce cartographies of 
existing modeling systems (be they religious, artistic, or psychoanalytic) that show how 
they work. Without establishing general equivalents or over-coding existing models, the 
aim of meta-modeling is to preserve heterogeneity and simultaneously develop possible 
openings onto new subjective experiences in a pragmatic fashion. Such tools and 
techniques of the schizoanalyst are what safeguard the emergence of singularity (with 
invention as its handmaiden), which makes much of Guattari's work an ethico-aesthetic 
enterprise, as he himself made clear. For both Lacan and Guattari ethico-aesthetics 
represents a departure from the scientistic paradigms mired in regimes of linear 
causality.  
In summary, it could be said that both thinkers essentially elaborate an ethics of 
self-relation, if not an ethics of self-cultivation, where the 'self' is something that is not 
given once and for all, but requires construction — the particularities of which I have 
sought to elaborate in this chapter. In this respect they sit in a trajectory of ethical 
thought that stretches back to Epicurus and the Stoics in the Hellenistic tradition, 
through to Spinoza and Nietzsche in the modern period, and on to such 20th century 
thinkers as Bakhtin and Foucault. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to trace the 
various lines of influence in this grand historical lineage, but suffice it to say that all of 																																																								
389 Jacques-Alain Miller has repeatedly emphasised the pragmatic dimensions of Lacan’s late work, 
writing that during this period ‘the end of analysis is stripped of the pathos of the beyond, of 
transcendence, of the passage, and the accent is put on the changes in the regimes of jouissance that can 
be found in the cure’. Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Milanese Intuitions [1]’, Mental Online, 11 (2002), 9-16 
<http://www.lacancircle.net/MentalOnline11.pdf> [accessed 01/06/2015] (p. 15). 
390 Le style est l'homme meme. The quote is attributed to Comte Georges Louis Leclerc de Buffon. See 
Lacan, Écrits, p. 3. 
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these thinkers each in their own way consider ethics to constitute more than just a 
science of decision-making or apparatus of judgment. Ethics here is fundamentally 
concerned with self-transformation. As was established in the introduction, in this 
tradition the question 'how do I act?' is merely a subset of the broader question 'how 
might I live?', and this second question is answered not only with words and 
propositions, but with life itself, in all its creative and imaginative possibility.  
This brings the argument to a final characteristic of the ethics I have sought to 
develop in this chapter. As well as being an aesthetic ethics, it is also fundamentally an 
ethics of resistance, which is to say, a political ethics. Guattari’s work on the production 
of subjectivity should be opposed to what he sees as the 'steam roller' subjectivity of 
capitalism that both destroys old subjective arrangements and establishes new, 
homogenous arrangements in their place. His theorisation of art as the realm of ‘part-
enunciators’ and the uniquely inventive attempts to formulate a mixed semiotics are 
themselves attempts to provide ways of thinking about subjectivity outside of the 
tyranny of adaptation. This political dimension is implicit in Lacan’s late work on Joyce 
(if not all his work), and when viewed against the problem of a decline in the Symbolic 
it takes the form of an injunction to avoid the ready-made solutions capitalism has to 
offer. And yet it is Guattari who places most emphasis on the political stakes involved 
in the production of subjectivity. His preoccupation with transformations that occur on 
infra and supra-individual levels facilitate an escape from the terrain of bourgeois 
individuality, dovetailing with a political project of encouraging subjective 
differentiation.  
As a final point, it might be objected that if the ethics derived from Lacan and 
Guattari do indeed both share the broad characteristics listed above then it is not 
necessary to use both. I have already justified the 'Guattarian graft' as helpful for 
overcoming what might be called the 'anti-social' limits of Lacan's late work. While for 
Lacan the sinthome produces a singularity that is one step removed from the socius, 
singularity for Guattari is thoroughly contagious, using all manner of a-signifying 
forms. The task that now remains is to justify the effort exerted reconstructing Lacan's 
difficult and often fragmentary last theoretical enterprise. Lacan’s work is useful in 
several crucial respects. As well as providing something of a case study for the kind of 
ethico-aesthetic transformation at stake with his reading of Joyce, Lacan's late focus on 
topology, and in particular the topology of knots, is a unique attempt to diagram specific 
transformations in subjectivity. Topology is a mathematics of transformation, and the 
journey into the final work of Lacan demonstrated its utility in mapping ethical 
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transformations in the psychic economy of the subject. Following his work forward to 
the mid ‘70s also shows how much of his ethical theory has changed by this stage, 
revealing a movement away from the theme of transgression articulated in the late ‘50s 
and early ‘60s, which in turn facilitates reflection on the social changes that precipitate 
this shift. Finally, as I hope to show in the next two chapters, filtering Guattari’s ethico-
aesthetic paradigm through a topology of R.S.I allows the latter’s ethical injunction to 
continuously invent new subjective forms to be nuanced. Put otherwise, the subjective 
mutations that Guattari calls for are those that deterritorialise the present and throw out 
lines of flight towards a different future. By considering these lines in their Real, 
Symbolic and Imaginary aspects — and crucially how the three interrelate — it will be 
possible to avoid unqualified endorsements of novelty and consider how ‘the new’ 
remains entangled in different ways with that which it seeks to overcome.  
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Chapter 5 
Ethico-Aesthetic Repairs 
 
 
In Seminar XXIII Lacan refers to the sinthome as a ‘way of repairing’ that does not 
return the knot to its original state.391 Although the notion of repair plays an admittedly 
minor role Seminar XXIII (the word itself appearing just once), in this chapter I will 
attempt to isolate the concept and give it a set of new inflections. Insofar as the 
sinthome, on a topological level, does not simply designate a return to that which 
preceded the cutting of a knot, by extension it could be said that processes of repair do 
not seek to return an object to its former state of existence. As I hope to show in this 
chapter, this is fundamentally what distinguishes an act of reparation from an act of 
restoration. In the sense I use it here, ‘repair’ designates a creative response or additive 
process of recomposition, rather than a return to a previous state of condition.  
Despite the minor role it plays in Lacan’s late work, taking up and developing 
the concept of repair is not without justification when placed in the larger context of this 
thesis. If the ambition of part 2 is to trace the contours of an ethico-aesthetic paradigm 
that responds to the decline of the Symbolic, then this decline could be figured as a kind 
of breakage, and the response it triggers an act of repair. In the previous chapter the 
effects of this macro-historical change were isolated at the level of subjectivity, and the 
concept of ‘ordinary psychosis’ was discussed as directly resulting from a decline of the 
Symbolic. This clinical category could also be viewed as a form of breakage that calls 
for a reparative response. When viewed in this way, the concept of repair can be used to 
gather up a number of different strands of the argument made thus far, in the process 
providing an axis along which a post-transgressive ethico-aesthetic paradigm might be 
developed.   
In advancing the idea of a repair I am following the artist Kader Attia, who has 
progressively elaborated the concept in a number of recent exhibitions.392 Attia himself 
has defined repair as ‘reconstruction in an extended sense, and thus as a kind of tool 																																																								
391 Lacan, Seminar XXIII, p. 117 (17 February 1976). 
392 Among the exhibitions that have included references to the concept of repair are ‘Nature, another 
Culture repaired’, Middelheim Museum, Antwerp, Belgium (25 October 2014 – 29 March 2015); ‘Show 
Your Injuries’, Lehmann Maupin Gallery, New York, USA (8 November – 13 December 2014); 
‘Continuum of Repair: The Light of Jacob’s  Ladder’, Whitechapel Gallery, London, UK (26 November 
2013 – 23 November 2014); ‘Reparatur 5 Akte’, KW Institute for Contemporary Art, Berlin, Germany 
(26 May 2013 – 25 August 2013); ‘Documenta (13)’, Fridericianum Museum, Kassel, Germany (9 June 
2012 – 16 September 2012) 
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which can be applied to political, cultural and scientific topics to examine their various 
interactions’.393 This claim highlights the potentially broad scope of the concept, which 
extends beyond the range of practices that are usually described as reparative. It is the 
ambition of this chapter to further demonstrate this scope, pushing the concept of repair 
beyond Attia’s work and demonstrating its relevance to ethico-aesthetics.  
After the theoretical focus of the last chapter, the turn towards Attia’s work in 
this chapter may feel like a diversion from the main thrust of the argument. The aim 
however is to creatively extend the arguments made in chapter 4. Rather than providing 
a ‘case study’ that theory can be applied to, here the ambition is to pass through Attia’s 
work in much the same way Lacan passed through Joyce’s — inhabiting this work in 
order to expose the wider significance of the concept of repair. While the immediate 
terrain of this concept is primarily artistic in nature, I aim to show that it has wider 
cultural and theoretical significance. The argument will proceed from a close reading of 
a handful of Attia’s works before moving into more theoretical terrain, ultimately 
making a return journey to the abiding concern of part 2: the development of an ethico-
aesthetic paradigm focused on the production of subjectivity.  
 
Introduction to the Work of Kader Attia 
 
In 2006 Attia covered a beach on the island of Fuerteventura with mirrored tombstones 
reflecting the sea.394 As the closest of the Canary Islands to Africa, just 100km from the 
Moroccan border, Fuerteventura is a popular place of transit for refugees seeking to 
gain access to the EU. On a regular basis boatloads of migrants jump or swim ashore 
from modified fishing vessels and pick their way through tourist-lined beaches. In the 
year that Holy Land was installed on the island, it is claimed that Fuertaventura received 
2,000 migrants through illegal entry points.395 From time to time a body washes up on 
the shore, eventually finding its way into an unmarked grave in the local cemetery. The 
primary subject of Attia’s artwork is neither those who survive the journey nor those 
																																																								
393 Kader Attia cited in Ellen Blumenstein, ‘Kader Attia: Repair. 5 Acts. Four questions of the curator to 
the artist,’ in the leaflet for the exhibition at KW Institute for Contemporary Art (Berlin, 2013). 
394 The work has been installed in several locations since the 1st Canary Island Biennial. In 2007, in 
Saint-Tropez on the French Côte d’Azur as part of ‘Dialogues Méditerranéens’; in 2010 at the Galleria 
Continua, San Gimignano, Italy; in 2011 at the Galleria Continua, Le Moulin, France as part of the 
exhibition ‘Sphères 2011’, and in 2013 in Amsterdam, as part of the ARTZUID sculpture biennial. My 
discussion of the work refers only to its original citing in Fuerteventura.  
395 The exact figure is 2,269. Dirk Godenau, ‘Irregular Maritime Immigration in the Canary Islands: 
Externalization and Communautarisation in the Social Construction of Borders’, Journal of Immigrant & 
Refugee Studies, 12:2, (2014) 123-142 (p. 134) 
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who wash up on the beaches, but the thousands of missing dead, those swallowed by the 
sea without a trace. 
 
Figure 16: Kader Attia, Holy Land (2007), 45 mirrors. © The artist.  
 
The contrast between the island’s reputation for beach tourism and its notoriety as a 
destination for people smugglers is reflected in the shape of the mirrored forms that 
comprise Holy Land. As well as tombstones, the sculptures could equally evoke the 
form of surfboards half-buried in the sand — an image readily available on post-cards 
in one of the island’s shops. Further associations are set off when the form is considered 
in an architectural light. An entire history of cultural intermingling could be written 
about the pointed arch. The architectural historian K. A. C. Creswell went further than 
anyone in writing this history, and in the multivolume Early Muslim Architecture, he claims 
that the pointed arch, an iconic gothic form, in fact has its origins in the Holy Land to which 
Attia’s title refers.396 Looked at in this way, Fuerteventura’s position as a point of blockage 
for the migrants that wash up on its shores is marked with a symbol of another epoch when 
the borders between Europe and Africa were more porous.  																																																								
396 The pointed or gothic arch is said to originate from Syria in particular. K. A. C. Creswell, A Short 
Account of Early Muslim Architecture (London: Penguin Books, 1958). Another of the many historians to 
have made this claim is W. R. Lethaby, who in Medieval Art (London: Duckworth and Co., 1904), p. 8, 
writes that ‘It is not generally realised in how large a degree the Persian, Egypto-Sarecenic and Moorish 
forms are members of one common art with Gothic.’   
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A tension between blockage and exchange can also be read into the mirrored 
surface itself. As a communicational tool, mirrors played an important role in armed 
conflict throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and a device known as the heliograph 
formalised an ancient practice of sending signals by reflecting the sun’s rays.397 In this role 
the mirror serves a means to bridge distances with communication, facilitating exchange 
between two continents. But in the documentation photographs of Holy Land the mirrors 
instead stand like sentinels guarding the island, blocking the view of what they stand in 
front of. When dealing with mirrors the critical reflex might be to evoke Lacan’s concept of 
the mirror stage. Whereas the latter is associated with the inauguration of an (Imaginary) 
identity, consolidating the subject, the use of mirrors in Holy Land instead fragments. This 
is true both visually and in terms of the above meanings the work sets in motion. Positioned 
at different angles the mirrors splinter the sky into fragments and scatter the gaze along with 
it. The viewer who stands facing them is confronted with an image of themselves in pieces. 
This double fragmentation, of both vision and meaning, is an essential prerequisite to the 
work of repair.  
Holy Land also builds on a number of the themes present in Robert Smithson’s 
Incidents of Mirror Travel in the Yucatan, an essay-cum-travelogue that documents the 
artist’s sculptural interventions on the Mexican peninsula. At specific junctures in his 
travels Smithson stopped to place small square mirrors into the ground, or onto a trees. 
These mirrors were angled upwards, disclosing ‘an altitude so remote that bits of “place” 
were cast into the remote sky’.398 As the title of his essay suggests, the works are 
inextricably linked to various forms of travel, both spatial and temporal. While the 
sculptures may seem like stopping points on the journey, the use of mirrors in effect 
prevents these points from becoming stationary. Here ‘mirror travel’ does not simply 
describe a travel between mirrors, but a travel with the aid of mirrors, a travel through 
mirrors. This is also the case for Holy Land. While the mirrored arches mark a destination 
of sorts, symbolically punctuating a journey, this punctuation is an ellipses rather than a full 
stop, extending the migrant journey and causing it to double back on itself. Smithson titled 
his works on the Yucatan peninsula ‘mirror displacements’, asking rhetorically ‘when does 
a displacement become a misplacement?’399 One of the effects of Holy Land is to 
politicise this question, relating it to the lives and deaths of displaced people, who arrive 																																																								
397 David L. Woods, ‘Heliograph and Mirrors’, in Military Communications: From Ancient Times to the 
21st Century, ed. by Christopher Sterling (Oxford: Acu-Clio, 2008), pp. 208-211. Aside from their 
military use, heliographs have also been employed by everybody from forestry services and surveyors, 
and Woods writes that ‘in 1835 ‘a Royal navy captain at Gibraltar used a mirror from a common looking 
glass to converse with friends across the straight to Tangier’ (p. 209). 
398 Robert Smithson, ‘Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan’, in Robert Smithson: Collected 
Writings, ed. by Jack Flam (Berkley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 119-133, (p. 130). 
399 Ibid., p. 124. 
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in new lands only to find that for many they are in fact misplaced people — the prefix 
carrying the force of a judgment as to the 'correct' people to occupy a particualr place.  
Another work by Attia deals not with the traffic of people between continents 
but with the traffic of meaning. The Repair From Occident to Extra Occidental Cultures 
(figure 17) is a large installation comprising a series of second-hand anthropology 
books, wooden and marble sculptures, ‘metiso objects’ (extra-occidental objects that 
incorporate occidental elements) and trench art (objects made by soldiers during WW1 
from bullet cartridges and artillery shells). On a large wall a two-screen slide projection 
shuffles through a series of headshots of injured soldiers and a collection of African 
masks. The faces that appear are badly maimed. Often the same face is shown before 
and after surgical reconstruction. Misshapen noses, lips pulled askew; the black and 
white photographs capture the damage in a clinical, documentary fashion. As the initial 
shock of these images wears off attention shifts to the images adjacent, to the African 
masks. The two halves of the slide show slowly synchronise and it becomes clear that 
the masks too have undergone repairs — in exactly the same places as the faces. 
 
 
Figure 17: Kader Attia, The Repair From Occident to Extra-Occidental Cultures (2012), mixed media, 
installation view at Documenta 13, Fridericianum Museum, Kassel, Germany (9 June 2012 – 16 
September 2012). © The artist. 
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Between Holy land and The Repair there is a break, a shift in register. While the former 
bears witness to the unnamed, innumerable dead off the coast of Africa, the latter 
showcases survivors who would then go on to be documented and studied. On the one 
hand there is absence and loss, on the other there is a symbolic trace that serves as the 
basis for social reintegration and repair.  
And yet in many ways the first work is no less concerned with repair than the 
second. As Freud pointed out of his Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, monuments are 
more than simply blocks of stone, or emblems of power — they also serve as ‘mnemic 
symbols’.400 These mnemic symbols are often erected in response to crises, catastrophes 
and otherwise traumatic events that hitherto lacked Symbolic inscription. By 
symbolising an aspect of this experience, monuments allow for a group of people to 
both distance themselves from the trauma that affected them, and maintain a proximity 
to the events that generated it.401 In its dual role as a barrier to trauma and a proxy that 
allows for some form of contact with the past, the monument remains a curiously static 
form of repair that has little to do with the kinds of sinthomatic response discussed in 
the last chapter. In many ways Holy Land makes of the monument a dynamic form, 
reflecting life and its limitations back at a viewer rather than anchoring it in the past. 
This dynamism is pushed further in The Repair From Occident to Extra Occidental 
Cultures, which sets up a series of complex relationships between the various elements 
it contains.   
A further example that dramatises the difference between a static and dynamic 
approach to repair can be found in Attia’s country of birth, Algeria. The Monument to 
the Dead of the First World War (figure 18) in Algiers was commissioned by the 
French authorities in 1922. In response to a change of regime it was encased in concrete 
50 years later in such a way that left a gap between the original and its newly cast 
exterior.402 The original monument was created by Paul Landowski and carried overt 
symbols of friendship and alliance between France and Algeria. 403  In the period 
immediately following independence such friendship seemed undesirable, if not 																																																								
400 Sigmund Freud, ‘Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey, Vol. 11 (London: The Hogarth Press, 
1957), pp. 9-56 (p. 16).  
401 For an extended treatment of the place of monuments in Freud’s work See Peter Homans, The Ability 
to Mourn: Disillusionment and the Social Origins of Psychoanalysis (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1989), and chapter 10 in particular, ‘Framing the Argument with Freud's "Little Discourse" on 
Mourning and Monuments’. 
402 Work on the monument began in 1922 and finished in 1928.  
403 Paul Landowski (1875-1971) is perhaps best known for his Christ the Redeemer statue in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil. 
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impossible, and the mayor of Algiers asked the modernist painter M'hamed Issiakhem 
to ‘do something’ about the monument. Issiakhem's solution was neither to destroy 
Landowski's work, nor simply replace it, but to preserve it within the interior of his own 
sculpture and give the end product a new title: the Monument to the Martyrs. Recently a 
crack appeared in the front of Issiakhem's sculpture and its contents have threatened to 
emerge once again. The decision as to whether to remove the concrete casing altogether 
or smooth over the cracks has prompted a public discussion that centres on the past and 
its representation in a post-colonial context. 
 
 
 
The curious history of this monument highlights several features of the concept of 
repair that I would like to foreground in this chapter. The repairs carried out between 
objects and people can reveal a great deal about history’s lines of force. Landowki's 
monument was in the first place intended to repair the emotional damage inflicted by 
World War I, but 50 years later this repair was seen to mask the true nature of colonial 
relations between the two countries, and became a source of embarrassment for the 
nascent Algerian state. Issiakhem's response could be seen as a gesture that cleared the 
ground for another act of repair, leaving future generations the option to remove his 
sculpture, erase the original, or arrive at a hybrid mixture between the two — a 
Figure 18: Paul Landowski, Monument to the 
Dead of the First World War (1928), stone and 
reinforced concrete. © Association des Amis du 
Musée Landowski. 
Figure 19: M'hamed Issiakhem, Monument to the 
Martyrs (1962), Reinforced concrete applied to 
existing monument. 
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proposition the artist Amina Menia has recently put forward.404 In each case symbolic 
and material practices are subtly intertwined, but it is only the third solution that could 
be considered a repair in a more dynamic sense. This solution would orientate the 
sculpture to the future by means of an addition, rather than turn it towards the past by 
means of a renovation or restoration. The distinction between these three terms will be 
discussed in greater detail below.  
 
Space, Time, and the Repair 
 
 
Figure 20: Kader Attia, The Repair From Occident to Extra-Occidental Cultures (2012), film still. © The 
artist. 
 
First it is necessary to return to Attia’s work to further substantiate the claim that a 
repair can be dynamic and future facing. One of the first words that viewers might 
grope for when asked to describe the relationship between the two elements of the slide 
show in Attia’s installation would be ‘juxtaposition’. Theoretically, one might juxtapose 
any two items; all it requires is that they be positioned [poser] near or beside [iuxta] one 
another. A juxtaposition is a linear relationship in space. By contrast, the two 
collections of slides in Attia’s installation constitute packets of relations that connect 
with each other in time and space.  
What are the temporal resonances of the work? The anthropology books are 
vintage, dating back to the early half of the last century — the sort of books that Picasso 
might have used as source materials during his ‘African period’ from 1906-1909. As if 
in direct reference to the Western appropriation of African art during this period, Attia 
has bolted some of the books to the shelves, either closed or open at a specific page. 																																																								
404 A work by the artist Amina Menia, Enclosed (2012), uses this history of the monument as its point of 
departure, and includes a series of sketches of possible designs based on a range of suggestions that 
incorporate elements from both monuments. I am indebted to Menia for bringing the monument and its 
history to my attention.  
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This suggestive move could be interpreted as an over-zealous attempt to prevent the 
books (or their contents) from being pillaged. Such a defensive gesture would be at 
odds with the hybrid forms the exhibition plays with. While a great deal of Western art 
was ‘anthropophagic’, to borrow a term from Oswald de Andrade, the cultural 
cannibalisation of other cultures is not seen as something to be restricted in Attia’s 
work. It is rather a fundamental dynamic that inheres in all relationships. As de Andrade 
would have it, ‘Cannibalism alones unites us. Socially. Economically. Philosophically. 
The world’s single law.’405  The gesture of bolting the books closed is more likely a 
critique of such limits, implying a process of ‘fixing’ mobile cultural motifs into a 
specific place, or disavowing them altogether.  
Another example of this kind of disavowal is given in an essay by Serge 
Gruzinski on the exhibition hand out. He draws the reader’s attention to an Olmec mask 
‘repaired’ by the renaissance goldsmith, sculptor, draughtsman and musician Benvenuto 
Cellini, currently housed in the Palazzo Pitti in Florence. Olmec civilisation pre-dates 
renaissance art considerably, and yet as Gruzinski points out, the pre-history of the 
mask is all but erased. Its hybridity is hidden from sight and the mask is often 
considered to be a gloriously pure example of the renaissance arts. In both cases the 
temporal and spatial ‘origin’ of the artwork is relocated back to Europe, and the 
complex network of influences on the objects is violently erased.   
It is significant that both the anthropology books and the ‘trench art’ date back 
to a time period largely concurrent with the birth of modernity. The Great War was the 
first war in which technology played a pivotal role, and the broken faces [gueules 
cassées] are testament to this in two ways. In the first place, the injuries are the result of 
the great force of impact between men and machines. In this war injuries caused by 
shrapnel, grenades and high explosive shells predominated. In the second place, the 
rudimentary cosmetic surgery is evidence of new technology entering the domain of the 
medical sciences. Not only could wounds be sewn up, but metal plates could be 
inserted, glass eyes could be fitted, and synthetic elements could be introduced into the 
human body. The aim of these repairs, as much as possible, was to return the broken 
face to its original state, to a time before the war. At irregular intervals in the slide show 
the images give way to written messages such as ‘The modernist myth of perfection’, 
which partially connect back to the immaculate white marble busts on the shelves 
adjacent. All of this reminds a viewer that the birth of modernity is often figured as a 																																																								
405 Oswald de Andrade, ‘Cannibalist Manifesto’, in Latin American Literary Review, 19:38 (1991), 38-
47. In his celebrated manifesto Andrade uses cannibalism (anthropophagia) as a metaphor for the 
Brazilian assimilation of Western art.  
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great historical rupture, almost an atemporal event, without precedent in the art and 
culture that came before. As the Russian constructivists Rodchenko and Stepanova 
proclaimed at the start of the century: ‘The Future is our only Goal!’406  
These influences not only reintroduce time into an purportedly ‘atemporal’ 
moment in 20th century Western culture, they also reintroduce place and territory, and in 
particular the territories that get ignored. In all the emphasis placed on the ‘Western 
Front’ it is easy to forget that the Great War was also the first World War. France drew 
heavily on its colonies in South America, Asia, and especially Africa for manpower, 
and the South African Brigade, among many other forces, played a crucial role for the 
British armed forces. While European soldiers were the subject of extensive 
photographic and moving image documentation, which served as the material base for 
other less obviously material practices such as patriotism, charity and heroism, there are 
very few symbolic traces of the war dead from former colonies.407 Connecting the 
broken faces to the broken masks, it is almost as if the latter serve as a stand in for the 
former. The masks come to speak in the place of the absent photographic 
documentation of the injured and maimed colonial Soldiers during World War I, 
demanding equal symbolic inscription, and ultimately serving the ‘monumental’ 
function discussed above.  
This demand opens out onto the issue of the museum and the object’s place 
within it. The Repair prompts the viewer to consider the disparity between objects that 
are given pride of place and other objects that are buried deep in the archives (if they are 
archived at all). The Repaired masks and the ‘metise’ objects on display in Attia’s 
exhibition are examples of excluded items, comprising what Gregory Sholette calls 
‘dark matter’, which he characterises as a ‘shadow archive’ or ‘an unseen accretion of 
creativity’.408 The repaired masks are deemed impure by virtue of their visible temporal 
layering, the hybrid objects by virtue their territorial indeterminacy. By contrast, in 
museums all over the world it is common to see unrepaired stone statues — battered 
Greek marbles with missing limbs that are positioned as ‘pure’.409 Attia’s installation 																																																								
406 Rodchenko quoted in Aleksandr M. Rodchnko, Varia F. Stepanova: The Future is Our only Goal, ed. 
by Peter Noever, (Munich: Prestel, 1991), p. 7. 
407 A similar situation with African American Troops is described in Arthur E. Barbeau, The Unknown 
Soldiers (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1996). 
408 Gregory Sholette, Dark Matter: Art and Politics in the Age of Enterprise Culture (London, Pluto, 
2011), p. 45. See also Simon Sheikh, ‘Notes on Institutional Critique’, in Art and Contemporary Critical 
Practice 31, ed. by Gerald Raunig & Gene Ray (London: Mayfly, 2009), pp. 29-32. In a similar vein to 
Sholette, Sheikh writes that there are ‘expulsions at the very center of certain institutions’, p. 31. 
409 It has not always been considered best practice to leave ancient statues unrepaired. In the 19th Century 
it was common for missing parts to be replaced. When attitudes changed in the 20th Century a number of 
ancient statues were in effect ‘de-restored’ and later additions, however sensitive to the original, were 
	 161	
exposes the line of exclusion that separates these two classes of objects and relegates 
such hybrid or repaired objects to obscurity. In doing so he places monological cultural 
attitudes in dialogue with their outside, an outside which is co-constitutive of 
monological forms in the first place, insofar as the latter exist solely on the basis of a 
series of exclusions.  
Glancing back at the anthropology books, it becomes clear that they are all 
spatially indexed; if the titles don’t relate to specific nation states then they are linked to 
cultural groupings linked to territory. They cling to a notion of culture as something that 
can be cleanly categorised according to specific criteria. They are literally and 
figuratively bolted in place, while the metise objects are mobile, testament to an 
intercultural encounter, a bridge between two different spatio-temporal regimes. 
While this section began by isolating the temporal resonances of Attia’s 
installation, it should now be clear that these resonances are inextricably linked to 
spatial resonances, so that the term ‘spatio-temporal’ should be understood to denote a 
unbreakable bind between the two. The temporal rupture of modernity is often also 
spatially located in the West, and as post-colonial theorists such as Homi Bhabha have 
shown, this spatial positioning is in part what allows for the temporal narrative of 
rupture to be asserted in the first place.410 The past is always ‘over there’, while the 
future is ushered in by modernist innovations cultivated in the occident. In a smaller 
way, the various objects in Attia’s installation also express distinctive space-time 
relations. As an installation The Repair has a messy temporal and territorial make-up. 
Objects are shuttled back and forth between different times and places. Early 
anthropology books sit next to recently made wooden sculptures from Dhakar based on 
the photographs of soldiers wounded during World War one. The polished marble busts 
are also new but their aesthetic pre-dates the facial injuries whose repair they inspired. 
The traffic between these temporal and spatial co-ordinates runs in a number of 
different directions at the same time, and this traffic in itself amounts to a distinctive 
space-time relation, whereby disingenuous macro-historical claims are overrun with 																																																																																																																																																																		
removed. A curious by-product of this change can be found in the Ny Carlsberg Museum in Copenhagen, 
which holds a collection of replacement noses (or ‘nasothek’) that have one-by-one been removed from 
the statues in their collection. There are some contemporary examples such as ‘The Hope Hygieia’ (a 
marble sculpture discovered in 1797 at Ostia, Italy, currently held at the Los Angeles County Museum of 
Art in which the process of ‘de-restoration’ has itself been reversed. See History of Restoration of Ancient 
Stone Sculpturesi, ed. by Janet Burnett Grossman, Jerry Podany, and Marion True (Los Angeles: Getty 
Publications, 2003). 
410 Bhabha joins many others in critiquing the enlightenment myth of progress by pointing to its 
foundations in colonial oppression, but he also specifically addresses the subject of modernity, writing 
that ‘Without the post-colonial time-lag the discourse of modernity cannot, I believe, be written’ Homi K. 
Bhabha, The Location of Culture, p. 361. 
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smaller spatio-temporal relations. ‘Here’ and ‘there’, the future, the present and the past 
are linked in a way that allows for mutual contamination.  
As well as attempting its own admittedly partial ‘repair’ on the rift at the 
foundations of modernity, the installation attempts to infect a Western aesthetic ideal of 
‘perfection’ with a more hybrid sensibility. In both the metise objects and the repaired 
masks, the additions are not disavowed but celebrated. The bound fragments of pottery, 
patched up holes, and stapled hairline cracks embody a radically different aesthetic 
imperative to that of the Western ‘myth of modernity’, affirming the impure over the 
pure. The more one begins to consider the items on display the more one comes to 
recognise examples elsewhere. In Japanese ceramics for example, the practice of 
‘kintsugi’ [literally ‘golden join’], entailed the repair of broken pottery with a mixture 
of lacquer and powdered gold, celebrating the repair rather than disavowing it. Rooted 
in a tradition associated with wabi-sabi that elevated impermanence or decay to an 
aesthetic ideal, kinstsugi ceramics were most often employed during the tea ceremony, 
and the celebrated practitioner Furuta Oribe was said to deliberately damage objects 
which he considered ‘too perfect’ purely so that they could then be repaired using this 
method.411 In European art history, an association can be made to Duchamp’s The Bride 
Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (The Large Glass), which the artist worked on 
laboriously for almost 8 years, declaring it ‘definitively incomplete’ in 1923.412 At the 
most basic level of interpretation The Large Glass is an artwork about frustrated desire, 
depicting a machine with parts that neither fully connect nor appear to follow the same 
operating rules. When it was accidentally broken in transit in 1926 Duchamp’s response 
to the breakage was not to replace the broken panel but to sandwich the shards between 
two additional sheets of glass, thus further fragmenting the iconography that he had 
invented. In both examples breakage represents the integration of a contingent event 
into life history of the work. Even in the case of Oribe’s supposedly deliberate 
breakages there is an element of contingency at stake in the particular form the breakage 
takes. Here, as in Attia’s installation, an aesthetic of repair simultaneously embodies an 
ethic of repair. In the following sections, I want to bring this ethico-aesthetics into 
sharper relief, before connecting it back to some of the theoretical claims made in the 
last chapter, expanding them in the process.  
																																																								
411 Charly Iten, ‘Ceramics Mended with Lacquer – Fundamental Aesthetic Principles, Techniques and 
Artistic Concepts’, in Flickwerk: The Aesthetics of Mended Japanese Ceramics (Mu ̈nster: Museum fu ̈r 
Lackkunst, 2008), pp. 18-23. 
412 Jerrold E. Seigel, The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp: Desire, Liberation, and the Self in Modern 
Culture (Berkley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 106. 
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 Figure 21: 15th century Japanese bowl with 18th century porcelain yobitsugi [borrowed patch]. 
 
Defining Repair 
 
A consideration of Attia’s work has already touched on the concept of repair. It is now 
necessary to sharpen the meaning of this word and demonstrate its conceptual range. 
Cleaving the word from its semantic relations is the first step in this task.   
As I claimed in the opening paragraph, repair should be distinguished from 
restoration, but it should also be differentiated from renovation. The main difference 
lies in the material traces the repair leaves behind. Both renovations and restorations 
attempt to subtract themselves from an object and return it to its original state. They 
gravitate towards an ideal object located in the past, and consequently both restoration 
and renovation can be seen as mimetic practices. By contrast, practices of repair leave 
room for difference to emerge between an object’s prior state and its recomposition. 
This difference is always tempered by a necessary continuity with the prior object. The 
precise nature of this balance between difference and continuity will be addressed later 
in this section.  
The distinction between repair on the one hand, and renovation and restoration 
on the other can be seen in a recent example. In 2012 an elderly Spanish woman called 
Cecilia Gimenez attempted to restore a 19th century fresco of Jesus painted by Elias 
Garcia Martinez. As images of the restoration spread over the internet, BBC 
correspondent Christian Fraser memorably described ‘the once-dignified portrait’ as 
now resembling ‘a crayon sketch of a very hairy monkey in an ill-fitting tunic.’413 																																																								
413 Christian Fraser, ‘Spanish fresco restoration botched by amateur’ (23 August 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19349921> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
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Gimenez was attempting to return the painting to its former glory, which is the aim of 
restoration or renovation. Her effort was deemed unsuccessful precisely because the 
renovation remained visible; it did not subtract itself from the object. Instead of a 
mimetic return to an ideal same, what Gimenez produced was difference. Is it therefore 
possible to call it a repair?   
Here another semantic relation of the repair comes into play: the replacement. 
While a repair may bring forth a new, hybrid object, if it strays too far from the original 
it becomes a replacement. As Serge Gruzinski writes on the handout accompanying 
Attia’s installation at Documenta 13, repairing is the ‘will to keep all or part of the 
thing, thus ensuring a semblance of continuity.’414 A replacement is a substitution for 
what can no longer be repaired. Unlike the repair, the replacement and the substitution 
entail the destruction or withdrawal of the old object. The motto for replacement is thus 
‘out with the old, in with the new’. Replacement should however not be confused with 
the kinds of change discussed in the last chapter at the level of subjective 
transformation. The replacement is perfectly at home in a consumer culture that idolises 
the new and elevates creativity to a market-driven imperative. Built-in obsolescence and 
bi-monthly upgrades constantly ‘move things forward’, but the trajectory of this 
movement is always already pre-established by the dictates of profit. Only the concept 
of repair moves in the direction of change, as opposed to the endless reproduction of 
novelty. As Gruzzinski points out ‘DIY or reparation create an object never before seen, 
leading to new practices, manners, and beliefs’.415  
This throws up a seemingly contradictory aspect of the repair. It seems to 
encapsulate both change on the one hand, and continuity on the other. How is a balance 
between these two poles possible? There seem to be three options. 
Firstly, it might be possible to separate the object’s function from its outward 
appearance, subjecting one to change and leaving the other to continuity. For example, 
it could be said that ‘kintsugi’ pots retain their basic function as receptacles while 
changing in appearance. They therefore strike a balance between change and continuity. 
And yet if the notion of function is expanded to incorporate semiotic function, it could 
equally be said that with the example of the kintsugi pot, both the object’s function and 
its outward appearance have changed. As a result of the repair, a pot might carry a 
different symbolic function in a tea ceremony — a particular ritual space where the 
																																																								
414 Serge Gruzinski, ‘From Holy Land to Open Your Eyes’ [exhibition handout] (Paris: Black Jack 
éditions, 2012)  
415 Ibid. 
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symbolic function of objects is heightened.416 It may be used more or less often; it may 
be put on display as a curiosity item, or reserved for particular ceremonial functions. All 
this goes to show that ‘function’ and ‘appearance’ cannot be so neatly separated.  
It is therefore necessary to look for another way of balancing change and 
continuity as they relate to repair. A second option would be to innovate as regards the 
method of repair while maintaining aesthetic continuity. According to this model the 
object itself serves as a kind of proving stone for innovative methods of repair. Here art 
conservation or restoration could be cited as examples. These fields have increasingly 
begun to rely on innovative techniques in imaging software, laser technology and even 
the application of live bacteria to the surface of paintings in order to maintain aesthetic 
continuity.417 A repair of this order would not require the object’s function to be 
delineated from its appearance; both might be restored. Again, here a balance seems to 
have been struck, but on closer inspection this method of balancing change and 
continuity collapses back into a dynamic of renovation, for the aim is always to return 
the object to its ideal past condition.418  
Thirdly, it is possible to think about the repair as a process that involves both 
continuity and change. This seems to be the latent force of Attia’s installation. Each of 
the objects on display existed before the exhibition, and by bringing them together 
nothing has outwardly changed, and yet something is different. On the one hand the 
anthropology books, the sculptures, the metise objects, the trench art and the slide show 
are the same as they always were, and yet on the other hand bringing them together has 
caused them to change. In the last section it was claimed that this cumulative effect 
creates a new spatio-temporal arrangement that is irreducible to the range of individual 
spatial and temporal references belonging to the objects that constitute the work. 
Perhaps now it is possible to see that the larger spatio-temporal regime the work creates 
is characterised by a particular combination of change and continuity. This is not simply 
to say that the objects are physically the same while symbolically different (if such a 
																																																								
416  Charly Iten, ‘Ceramics Mended with Lacquer’. 
417  Sam Bagwell, ‘The Beauty of Science: New Technologies in Art Restoration’, Illumin: a Review of 
Engineering in Everyday Life, 15:3 (2004) <http://illumin.usc.edu/34/the-beauty-of-science-new-
technologies-in-art-restoration/> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
418 Here it is interesting to note that current best practice in the field of art-conservation dictates that 
careful records be kept of the exact materials used to make changes to the work. This is so that any 
attempt at restoration has the possibility of being reversed with the right material or equipment. Even the 
very attempts to restore the object should themselves be amenable to restoration, always with the ultimate 
aim of returning the object to its past state of being. Here time is ultimately reversible. See Barbara 
Appelbaum, ‘Criteria For Treatment: Reversibility’, Journal of the American Institute for Conservation, 
26:2 (1987), 65-73.  
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dichotomy can be made in the first place). Fundamentally they are the same and 
different. How is this possible? 
It is my contention that the concept of repair as elaborated in Attia’s installation 
embodies a change, but a change that is in continuity with a prior state of existence. 
This method of balancing change and continuity would seem to imply some sort of 
essence according to which a thing might develop. For example, a broken pot might still 
embody the essence of what it means to be a pot, despite having been repaired in such a 
way that renders it unusable. This way of balancing change and continuity suggests a 
mode of individuation, where the individual thing or person in question changes along a 
line of continuity. In fact it is not a conception of essence that most would recognise, for 
the change comes about not through the externalisation of an innate quality (a genetic 
model), but through a process of continual self-production in dialogue with the world in 
which this production takes place. A repair, I would argue, entails precisely this kind of 
balance between change and continuity, where the repair itself changes the object in 
question, while nevertheless remaining within the limits that define it. A repair enables 
an object to produce itself anew each time, without for that matter entirely abandoning 
its prior state of existence. If this conception of repair hinges upon a notion of an 
object’s essence, preventing, as I have claimed, the repair from becoming a 
replacement, then it is worth looking at the concept of essence in more detail, 
particularly as it relates to the two models mentioned above.419  
The genetic model could be allied with Aristotle’s concept of entelechy, which 
in Joe Sachs’ translation of the Physics is rendered as ‘being-at-work-staying-itself’.420 
As the translation suggests, entelechy involves an element of endurance, whereby the 
particular thing that endures is pre-established from the outset. What occurs over the 
lifespan of the thing’s existence is not so much a series of changes in dialogue with its 
surroundings, but rather the fulfilment of a purpose — just as the purpose of an acorn is 
assumed to be its development into an oak tree. From this perspective, each successive 
stage in the tree’s development can be considered a repair on its previous state of 
existence, progressively moving towards a pre-established end. In his essay Forms of 
Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel Bakhtin criticises the influence of the concept 
of entelechy on ancient forms of biography, claiming that it results in a narrative where 
																																																								
419  For a full and thorough treatment of the concept of essence as it relates to various philosophies of life 
see Eugene Thacker, After Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
420  Joe Sachs, Aristotle’s Physics: A Guided Study (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995), p. 
31.  
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‘Character itself does not grow, does not change, it is merely filled in.’421 Likewise, it 
could be said that whereas the concept of entelechy does offer a balance between 
change and continuity to a theorisation of repair, it does so at the cost of reducing 
transformation to the fulfillment of an essence within a narrow set of parameters 
established at the outset.  
There is a similar idea at play in Spinoza’s Ethics, where things are conceived as 
nothing more than endurances over time. They are singular modes of individuation that 
strive to continue to exist. This idea of striving to continue to exist is encapsulated in 
the term ‘conatus’. 422  Again this provides a principle that balances change and 
continuity. While for Aristotle entelechy implies the actualisation or endurance of a pre-
established essence, for Genevieve Lloyd, Spinoza shows that ‘a thing’s endeavor to 
persist in being becomes its very essence’; the two cannot be separated.423 This would 
seem to imply that it is not so much that an object endures by actualising (or 
externalising) an essence that is pre-established from the outset, but rather that this 
essence is the very same thing as the act of striving to continue to exist. In part III of the 
Ethics it is Spinoza’s claim that the essence of a thing is its conatus: ‘The striving by 
which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the 
thing’.424 Without the striving of an object to exist there can be no essence. Spinoza’s 
conception of conatus could be stretched to say that it is only through activity that a 
thing perseveres in its being, even if this activity involves little more than self-
maintenance (the activity of resisting external causes that would otherwise destroy a 
thing).425 A final point that distances this account from the teleological character of 
Aristotle’s concept of entelechy, whereby a thing moves towards the fulfillment of its 
original purpose, is that for Spinoza one of the characteristics of God or Nature is the 
radical absence of purpose, for within his work ‘Nature has no end set before it, and that 
all final causes are nothing but human fictions’.426  
																																																								
421  Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel: Notes Towards a Historical 
Poetics’, in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, ed. By Michael Holquist (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 84-258 (p. 141). 
422 Spinoza, Ethics, p.75: ‘Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being’. 
423  Genevieve Lloyd, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Spinoza and the Ethics (London: Routledge, 
1996), p. 9 [my emphasis]. 
424  Spinoza, Ethics, p. 75. 
425  This is more or less how Bakhtin glosses Aristotle’s concept of 'energia', where ‘the full existence, the 
essence of a man is realized not by his condition, but by his activity, his active force ("energy"). This 
"energy" manifests itself as the unfolding of his character in deeds and statements.’ Bakhtin, ‘Forms of 
Time’, p. 140.  
426  Spinoza, Ethics, p. 27. 
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To summarise, drawing on the Spinozian theory of conatus, it is finally possible 
to arrive at a definition of repair that seems adequate to Attia’s exhibition.427 It is 
distinct from the renovation or the restoration on the grounds that it does not aim to 
recapture an ideal; different from the replacement in that it keeps all or part of the thing 
in question, and transformative in the sense that it actualises the essence of an individual 
object — where essence does not imply a fixed and final ‘purpose’, but rather a 
principle of striving to exist.  
 
Sinthomatic Repairs 
 
Drawing on Spinoza allows the concept of repair to be connected to what might be 
called an ethics of self-cultivation, where conatus applies not simply to ‘things’ in the 
narrow sense of the word (i.e. objects), but to subjects as well. This focus in turn allows 
a bridge to be constructed between the concept of repair and the theoretical elaborations 
in the last chapter concerning the sinthome. As I claimed in the introduction, in some 
ways the bridge between these two concepts is provided by Lacan himself, when in 
Seminar XXIII he refers to the sinthome as a ‘way of repairing’.428 Following on from 
this, it is worth asking how exactly a sinthomatic repair functions in relationship to the 
various kinds of essence discussed above. As well as a glance back at Seminar XXIII, it 
is Guattari’s work that will facilitate an answer to this last question. 
For a repair to truly be a repair it must occur in response to a collapse, breakage, 
or crisis. In Lacan’s seminar on the sinthome he returns several times to points of crisis 
in the domain of subjectivity, finding examples in the work of Joyce where psychic 
coherence threatens to break down. As demonstrated in the last chapter, this collapse is 
figured topologically as a cut in one of the rings of the Borromean knot, which causes 
the other two rings to drift off. In both registers — the literary and the topological — 
the breakage or crisis in question does not unfold in a gradual or incremental way, but 
amounts to a sudden slip or triggering. Similarly, strictly speaking in the topology of 
knots a knot is either tied or untied, there is no middle point between the two.429 The 																																																								
427  Here it might be objected that the term conatus only really refers to humans, and cannot be 
appropriated for the analysis of an exhibition. In fact Spinoza says that every mode strives to exist, not 
just those modes that go by the name of humans. Spinoza, Ethics, p. 75.  
428  Lacan, Seminar XXIII, p. 117 (17 February 1976).  
429  It could be said that this constitutes an unproductive limitation to the topology of knots that 
mathematicians and philosophers such as Roberto Casati have sought to overcome. Casati makes a 
distinction between ‘topological knots’ and ‘ecological knots’, claiming that only the latter ‘are the result 
of transformations that take you from a situation in which there is no knot, to a situation in which there is 
a knot. You do not tie topological knots, because you cannot.’ The same could be said for transformations 
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idea of a sudden triggering is outlined very early on in Lacan’s work on psychosis using 
a revealing metaphor: that of a three-legged stool. As Lacan points out, not all stools 
have four legs, some function perfectly well with just three. Of this second category 
however there are stools that are designed to only have three legs, with each spaced 
evenly like the legs of a tripod, and those that are designed to have four legs, only that 
one of them is missing. This last type of stool can be perfectly stable so long as one sits 
on it in a particular way. But as soon as weight is shifted onto the place where the fourth 
leg is missing then its fault becomes apparent. This, again, reveals the site of an original 
breakage or absence (the missing leg) in need of repair. For Lacan, the fourth leg is a 
metaphor for the Name-of-the-Father, which in the case of psychosis is foreclosed. Just 
as a three-legged stool will stand up until the point at which weight is distributed in the 
wrong way, in many cases of psychosis the subject can function perfectly well without 
an operative Name-of the-Father. It is only when at ‘a certain crossroads of his 
biographical history, [he] is confronted by this lack that has always existed’ that a 
psychotic break or crises occurs.430 Such cases are what necessitate the elaboration of a 
repair: a makeshift fourth leg (or fourth ring of the Borromean knot), which operates as 
a creative addition that allows for a certain kind of stability. Just as there are various 
ways one might respond to the physical breakage of an object — through restoration, 
renovation, or replacement — so too there are various ways in which one might respond 
to such crises at the level of subjectivity.  
The general umbrella term that Lacan uses to describe processes of psychotic 
stabilisation or repair in Seminar XXIII is ‘suppletion’ [suppléance].431 In the range of 
clinical texts that draw on the concept, suppletion is sometimes used to describe 
phenomena that prevent psychotic triggerings from occurring in the first place, and 
sometimes processes of stabilisation that occur afterwards. In a number of cases it has 
even been elevated to the status of analytic goal for clinical work with psychotics.432 
																																																																																																																																																																		
associated with untying. Roberto Casati ‘Knowledge of Knots: Shapes in Action’, in Shapes 2.0: The 
Shapes of Things / Universal Logic, ed. by Mehul Bhatt, Stefano Borgo, Oliver Kutz, Paulo Santos (Rio 
de Janeiro: World Congress and School on Universal Logic, 2013), pp. 3-20 (p. 5). 
430  Lacan, Seminar III, p. 203 (18 April 1956). 
431  As well as having a specific meaning in Lacanian theory, the term ‘suppletion’ also carries 
significance in the field of linguistics. Here suppletion describes a process associated with irregular 
lexical items, where a word with a phonologically unrelated stem is somehow imported to fill a gap in the 
existing paradigm. The verb sequence ‘go-went’ is an example of just such a suppletion, where the stem 
of go is from west-germanic, and the suppletion ‘went’ is from proto-germanic. Instead of sweeping this 
meaning of suppletion to one side, it is worth retaining it, since it designates a process of repair at the 
micro-level of language, and again preserves the imprint of an intercultural counter.  
432  See for example Marie-Hélène Brousse, ‘Question de suppléance’, Ornicar?, 47 (1988), 65-73. 
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Given such a broad range, the concept of suppletion comes to describe a number of very 
different psychic ‘solutions’ to the problem of foreclosure. As Dany Nobus puts it,  
 
suppletions can be imaginary (in the form of identifications leading to the formation of 
a new ego), symbolic (through writing and fine art) or real (via so-called psychosomatic 
phenomena). In general they serve as limitations of the psychotic’s overwhelming 
intrusive enjoyment, enabling him to lead a relatively decent social life, whether before 
the psychosis has become manifest or after the actual outbreak.433 
 
Given this conceptual range, it would seem that the concept of the sinthome is but one 
modality of suppletion among many, which may also include processes of stabilisation 
that occur in the orders of the Imaginary and the Real. This is broadly in line with the 
theorisation of the sinthome offered in the last chapter. However, care should be taken 
not to follow Nobus too closely in his distinctions between different kinds of suppletion. 
Real suppletion would seem to represent a contradiction in terms, since for Lacan the 
Real is the order of instability, impasses, and logical paradoxes. At a purely conceptual 
level, it is therefore difficult to see how anything that remains within the order of the 
Real could offer a principle of stabalisation. A second problem arises when one 
considers that not all processes of stabilisation that occur ‘through writing and fine art’ 
are Symbolic, and if one follows Lacan’s work closely at this stage, it is clear that the 
concept of the sinthome is precisely an attempt to escape such reductive localisations. 
The topology of knots is marshaled by Lacan precisely to work out the relationships 
between the three orders, rather than offering up ways of bolstering one or other of them 
through analytic work. Fundamentally, the sinthome, as one kind of possible suppletion, 
consists in adding something new to the other three orders.434 In fact, it could be said 
that it is not even adequate to call sinthomatic suppletion a form of stabilisation, as the 
majority of Lacanian authors do, if this stabilisation is put in place as a preventative 
measure before any anticipated psychotic break.435  																																																								
433   Dany Nobus, Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 2000) 
p. 88. 
434  Here, once again, I find myself in agreement with Harari in his reading of Seminar XXIII, when he 
claims that ‘suppletion does not consist of a replacement, but the addition of something new. For instance, 
when I am attempting to sew, to repair a trefoil knot at a crossing-point where a “slip” has occurred, I 
cannot avoid doing so by adding to it, so I invent, I use artifice (or rather “I artifice,” understood as a 
transitive verb. This, to be sure, is quite different than supporting the Name-of-the-Father through a love 
that is unconditional, eternal, and in this sense paralyzing in its closing-down of horizons’. Harari, How 
James Joyce Made His Name, p. 305. 
435  See for example Jonathan D. Redmond, ‘Contemporary perspectives on Lacanian theories of 
psychosis’, Frontiers in Psychology, 4 (2013) <http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2013. 
00350/full> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
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One of the major arguments in this thesis is that just such points of collapse, 
breakage, or crises at the level of the subject occur at a larger social level in the form of 
the decline of the Symbolic, and, moreover, that there is a relationship of reciprocal 
causality between the two. As well as individual cases it has been argued that a 
generalised foreclosure has brought about a more widespread socio-psychic change 
associated with the decline of the Symbolic. One major difference between these scales 
of operation, however, is the way in which such crises occur. While a psychotic break 
or crisis may occur quickly and dramatically for an individual psychotic subject, at the 
level of the social such crises are not so quick to take place. The decline of the 
Symbolic describes a set of phenomena that slowly corrode psycho-symbolic territories, 
rather than destroy them overnight. If the term supppletion is used here to describe 
preventative measures, then this automatically disqualifies its use in the social sphere, 
insofar as the breakages that occur at this level are incremental, and it would be 
impossible to isolate a single trigger point that one could somehow stave off. It is only 
by articulating the concept as a dynamic response to a crises or breakage that it can be 
positioned as multi-scaler — that is, operative at the level of both individual subjects 
and social groupings.  
As I have said not all suppletions are sinthomatic. In the discussion of Attia’s 
work it was likewise claimed that not all responses to a breakage or crisis constitute 
repairs. Over the last two sections a series of terms relating to these two groups have 
been elaborated. Lacanian clinical theory has offered up three types of suppletion: 1) 
Imaginary, 2) Symbolic and 3) sinthomatic, while a discussion of Attia’s work 
generated three different kinds of response to a crisis or breakage: 1) 
restoration/renovation 2) replacement and 3) repair. In the final paragraphs of this 
section I aim to show that the various forms of suppletion traced out in Lacan’s late 
work can be roughly translated into the terms drawn from Attia’s work. An attempt to 
reconcile these different concepts will both extend the concept of the sinthome 
elaborated in the last chapter, and demonstrate that it can be used to discuss wider 
ethico-aesthetic mechanisms of subjectivation. 
Given that the Imaginary is the domain of wholeness and consistency for Lacan, 
then a restoration or a renovation amounts to an Imaginary suppletion. Renovations 
disavow faults and breakages, covering them over or pretending they do not exist. In the 
terms of the last chapter, this amounts to an attempt to resurrect the traditional Name-
of-the-Father on the basis that it once allowed things to hang together. In this way 
renovations and restorations cling to an ideal, often temporally located in the past. This 
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might involve totalising delusions at the level of individual psychotic subjects based on 
their personal history, or myths associated with perfection and racial purity at a more 
general social level. Today, in indirect response to the decline of the Symbolic, it is 
possible to see Imaginary suppletions in the form of nationalist political agendas that 
cling to myths of pure nationhood rooted in the past. These agendas in effect seek to 
renovate or restore a social body to an ideal and imagined former state, which in many 
cases never existed in the first place.  
A second tendency can be seen in the figure of the replacement, which can be 
aligned with Symbolic suppletion insofar as it involves a kind of metaphoric 
substitution of one thing for another. At the level of individual subjects, Symbolic 
suppletions are not only associated with ‘writing and fine art’, as Nobus suggests, but 
with signification in general. Replacement is equal to Symbolic suppletion only insofar 
as this suppletion entails the destruction and overcoding of the Symbolic sphere that 
pre-exists it. Such attempts at Symbolic overcoding could be equated with ‘the 
modernist myth of perfection’ referred to the slide show component of Attia’s 
installation. As will further be demonstrated in the next chapter, myths can have a 
stabilising function in respect to social forms. Attia makes a conjunction between the 
myth of perfection and modernity, which placed faith in the establishment of new 
Symbolic forms at the expense of those that it sought to replace. As I have already 
argued, this myth is both spatially and temporally indexed, and often the past that these 
new Symbolic forms overcode is located in non-western cultures. The replacements that 
Symbolic suppletions represent have a stabalising effect insofar as they project an 
image into the future. This can be seen in more general political terms, according to 
which an anticipated future event (be it a revolutionary break or a triumph of 
technological innovation) can have a stabalising effect on the present. The event in 
question is often pinned to the master signifier of progress, and this has the secondary 
effect of overcoding the messy and maligned elements of the Symbolic that offer 
embarrassing contradictions.  
If Imaginary suppletions can be equated with renovations insofar as they cling to 
an idealised past, and Symbolic suppletions related to replacements on the basis that 
they project faith into the future, then how might sinthomatic suppletions be linked to 
the concept of repair? One possible way of answering this question is to pick up some 
of the conceptual resources of the last chapter and consider their mutual attitude towards 
semiotic heterogeneity. Sinthomatic suppletions are not restricted to the Symbolic; they 
traverse all manner of signifying and a-signifying forms. As I will argue in greater 
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detail in the next section, this act of traversal is what allows a sinthomatic suppletion to 
persevere in its own being, rather than change into something else. This self-
maintaining activity has a stabalising effect, yet unlike the two other forms of 
suppletion discussed above, it is not static; it welcomes difference. In a way that recalls 
Spinoza’s theory of conatus, it is the activity of traversing numerous semiotic strata that 
allows a thing to persevere in the preservation of its own essence. For this reason a 
sinthomatic suppletion could be placed between the Symbolic (as the domain of sense), 
the Real (as a domain of non-sense), and even the Imaginary (as the domain of 
consistency), while being irreducible to any one of them. By turning once again to the 
work of Guattari, it will be possible to see how this process has an effect on the 
production of subjectivity.  
 
The Existential Pragmatics of Repair 
 
This chapter began with a discussion of a particular work of art, which led the concept 
of repair to be brought into sharper relief. Over the sections that followed this 
discussion, the concept has been progressively brought into the domain of subjectivity. 
In this final section, it is the ambition to push the analysis one step further and isolate 
the dynamics by which a repair (as sinthomatic suppletion) has existential effects, that 
is, effects on the production of subjectivity.  
As Maurizio Lazzarato has recently shown, the use of the term ‘existential’ in 
Guattari’s later work is a way of figuring something beyond discourse, which 
nevertheless is somehow partly produced through discourse.436 In this way it coincides 
with a sinthomatic process that makes use of the Symbolic (recalling the schema of 
subscription-unsubscription-resinscription discussed in the last chapter) without being 
entirely reducible to it. This existential dynamic is pragmatic insofar as it involves 
activity and process. In Guattari’s existential pragmatics, this activity is the activity of 
enunciation in the widest sense, which has effects far beyond those associated with 
‘performativity’ as it has been theorised in the work of Judith Butler, to take the most 																																																								
436 Lazzarato makes this point by showing the line of influence between Bakhtin and Guattari, ultimately 
demonstrating how the latter surpasses the former with his concept of the ‘existential’: ‘while Bakhtin 
disillusions us with regard to the performative thanks to a conception of enunciation that eludes every 
kind of structural or combinatory formalization of language, Guattari radicalizes the break with linguistics 
and pragmatics by examining what Bakhtin failed to examine in sufficient depth, namely, the relationship 
between the linguistic and extralinguistic. Very late in his work, Guattari called this extra linguistic 
dimension existential.’ Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, p. 203. While this may be so, it could be said that 
in using the term ‘existential’ Guattari is also returning to his earlier interest in Sartre. For more on 
Guattari’s interest in Sartre see Watson, Guattari’s Diagrammatic Thought, particularly the section of 
chapter 1 entitled ‘Sartre meets Freud in the psych ward’. 
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prominent example. 437  As Lazzarato puts it, quoting Guattari, ‘unlike discursive 
pragmatics, existential pragmatics has to do with the production of the self, with the 
“ontological singularities of the self-appropriation of the self, the singularities of self-
consciousness”’.438  
The idea of a ‘self-appropriation of the self’ represents a curious conceptual 
figure that is at first difficult to grasp. Guattari’s existential pragmatics involves a 
process of auto-affection that is not dissimilar to the operation of conatus in Spinoza’s 
Ethics. If for Spinoza it is fundamentally activity that enables an object to endure over 
time, and this endurance or striving itself constitutes the object’s essence, for Guattari it 
is the activity of enunciation that continually returns back to the subject, giving 
consistency to an existential singularity in the process. This singularity is ‘incorporeal’ 
insofar as it cannot be reduced to the biological or cognitive existence of the subject. As 
Guattari puts it in a late seminar, existence ‘produces itself within its own movement’.439 
Again, this is radically opposed to ontological formulations that take existence as 
something fixed from the outset that progressively unfolds and manifests itself in the 
world. Here existence is constituted by the very act of unfolding, just as essence is 
constituted by the very act of striving for Spinoza.  
Keeping in mind the discussion of Guattari’s ‘mixed semiotics’ in the last 
chapter, it should be recalled that ‘the activity of enunciation’ does not simply refer to 
the activity of speech and signification. As Lazzarato puts it, ‘the relation to the self 
represents an incorporeal existential focal point […] whose consistency, durability, and 
development depends, secondarily, on the multiplicity of actualized elements that it 
traverses and reconfigures (the discursive, the cognitive, but also institutions, the social, 
the economic sphere, etc.).’ 440  Enunciation takes place across a range of strata, 
encompassing everything from utterances, gestures, glances, transactions, or indeed 
anything that constitutes an action in the world. Guattari’s existential pragmatics 
involves all of these signifying and a-signifying forms, but crucially it also goes beyond 
them, accounting for the very act of traversal itself. Here a formulation could be put 																																																								
437  The first of Butler’s works to draw on the theory of performativity was Judith Butler: Gender Trouble, 
Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge, 1990). It has since been developed in 
Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (London: Routledge, 1993), and Judith 
Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004).  
438  Félix Guattari, ‘Singularité et complexité’. <http://www.revue-chimeres.fr/drupal_chimeres/files/ 
850122.pdf > [accessed 01/06/2015], transcript of a seminar given on the 22nd May 1985, quoted in 
Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, p. 205. Much of Guattari’s work that Lazzarto draws upon in the chapter 
of Signs and Machines dedicated to existential pragmatics has not yet been translated into English, and 
for this reason I remain indebted to his particular reading of this primary material.    
439  Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, p. 207. 
440  Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, p. 206. [my italics] 
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forward in order to bring about a synthesis of the terms in this chapter: that enunciation 
entails a process of traversal, and that taken together they are what make repairs 
possible.  
The first two terms in this sentence sit side by side in Guattari’s work, and for 
this reason require less explanation than the third. Both traversal and enunciation 
designate activities, and moreover they designate activates that are existentially 
productive. Without the activities these terms imply, one finds oneself doomed to 
passively occupy the infrastructures that condition subjectivity, condemned to shuffle 
pre-existing semiotic counters from one place to another according to pre-established 
patterns. Each in their own way, traversal and enunciation describe the creation of new 
patterns and new semiotic counters. They designate ways of occupying linguistic and 
non-linguistic territories that somehow reconfigures them. It is in this sense that it is 
possible to use these terms in the same breath as repair, for there is a related process of 
reconfiguration that gives consistency to heterogeneous elements through action. To 
quote Lazzarato one last time,  
 
Speech thus has a dual function: to signify, communicate, and declare ‘politically,’ but 
also and especially ‘to produce assemblages of enunciation able to capture, 
territorialise, and deploy the singularities of a focal point of existential subjectivation 
and give consistency and durability to them.’441  
 
Beyond speech, signification or communication, this act of giving existential 
consistency and durability to subjects and objects can be called an act of repair. 
Furthermore, it is my assertion that this second, existential aspect to enunciation is 
precisely what Lacan was trying to account for in his theorisation of the sinthome. In 
Lacan’s final theoretical elaborations, the work of Joyce is exemplary precisely because 
it traverses an incredible range of semiotic forms, passing beyond them in order to 
produce wide-reaching existential effects on its author and its readers.  
 
I Repair, You Repair, We Repair  
 
In this chapter I have attempted to creatively reaccentuate Lacan’s concept of the 
sinthome and bring it into dialogue with the operations of a work of art. The marriage 
between the two has chiefly been brokered by the concept of repair. Reconciling this 																																																								
441  Guattari quoted in Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, p. 204. Reference missing in the original.  
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concept as it appears in Attia’s work has had a number of secondary effects on the 
notion of the sinthome. Firstly, it has enabled the latter to be discussed in the content of 
semiotic material ‘beyond’ signification — an encounter in many ways prepared in the 
last chapter by means of a discussion of Hjelmslev. Secondly, it has demonstrated the 
fundamentally inter-subjective dimensions of the sinthome, beyond the closed 
relationship between an author and his or her creative production. In this respect I 
would argue that Attia’s work provides an example of an installation effectuating a kind 
of repair into which subjects other than the author might enter. These subjects come to 
walk the bridge between the world and the work, and this has the capacity to bring 
about a subtle change in subjectivity in accordance with their connatus. An artwork 
sometimes, very rarely, has the ability to effect change in a viewer in the way it has 
been discussed in this chapter. In a final twist, this means that it is not simply the 
artwork that serves as the repair for its creator, in the mode of Lacan’s Joyce. What 
Attia’s installation effectively brings about is a repair of a larger magnitude whereby the 
creator, the artwork and the audience too might momentarily constitute a packet of 
relations that mutually repair one another.  
The way in which the argument has been constructed in this chapter could be 
seen as part and parcel of this process. Like Lacan’s concept of the sinthome, over the 
course of the discussion the concept of repair has been progressively freed from its 
moorings and allowed to drift into unfamiliar territory. Aesthetic in origin, the 
discussion has brought the concept to bear on the production of subjectivity, and 
therefore into the terrain of ethics. Insofar as the concept of repair combines the two, it 
is a thoroughly ethico-aesthetic concept, able to support a more general ethico-aesthetic 
paradigm ‘after’ transgression.  
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Chapter 6 
Experiments with Truth 
 
 
Lying has proven to be a surprisingly popular activity among artists in recent years. 
Over the last few decades projects have included advertisements for non-existent 
events, invented historical personae, forms of tactical media, imitation newspapers and 
websites, and a variety of pseudonyms adopted for various purposes.442 While this glut 
of deceptive artworks is relatively recent, it could be seen to build on a longer history 
that stretches back as far as early forms of camouflage and trompe-l’oeil. Arguably 
what distinguishes recent artistic experiments in this domain from their antecedents is a 
focus on process, with an eye to managing not only the deception itself, but also the 
moment when it unravels.   
The artist Walid Raad writes that ‘facts have to be treated as processes’, 
highlighting the way they are produced, put to work, made affective, or otherwise 
challenged and disputed.443 The same could be said for lies. In both cases there is a 
process that unfolds over time — lies hatch, grow, survive unnoticed or shed their skin 
of truth. To account for the processual nature of artistic experiments with deception, the 
art historian Carrie Lambert-Beatty has coined the term ‘parafiction’, using it to 
describe artworks that actively deceive viewers, often before self-consciously 
shepherding them back to the ‘truth’.444 The question at the heart of this chapter is ‘what 
remains of the artistic lie once this ‘truth’ has been restored?’ Once its object is revealed 																																																								
442  To cite a handful of these works, in 2013 the artist Ryan Gander commissioned the advertising agency 
Kirke and Hodgson to produce a PR campaign for a fictional government initiative to promote 
imagination (Imagineering (2013)). For the 9th Istanbul Biennial in 2005, the artist Michael Blum chose to 
pay tribute to a little known historical figure called Safiye Behar by mounting a display of letters, books, 
documents and photographs in her former apartment in the Beyoglu district of the city. In the weeks and 
months that followed the exhibition it emerged that no such character existed. In 2008 The Yes Men 
created a ‘special edition’ of The New York Times bearing the headline ‘IRAQ WAR ENDS’. They have 
also made websites that deliberately imitate those of the World Economic Forum, Apple, Halliburton and 
others. See The Yes Men, ‘Museum of Fake Websites’ <http://yeslab.org/museum> [accessed 
01/06/2015] for a full archive. Countless artists have used pseudonyms for various reasons. In 2009 the 
Czech artist David Černý invented 27 artists who were supposed to have collaborated on the Entropa 
sculpture unveiled at the headquarters of the council of the European Union. In 1997 Cornelia Sollfrank 
submitted no fewer than 200 entries to the Hamburg Art Museum's first .Net art open competition 
‘Extension’ under the guise of different female pseudonyms. Despite this number comprising over two 
thirds of the total entries received, all three of the winners were male, a fact that Sollfrank’s work, entitled 
Female Extension (1997), both anticipated and critiqued. 
443 Walid Raad/ The Atlas Group, ‘Untitled Artist’s Statement’, in Documentary Now! Contemporary 
Strategies in Photography, Film and the Visual Arts, ed. by Frits Gierstberg et al (Rotterdam: NAi, 2005), 
pp. 121-2 (p. 121).   
444 Carrie Lambert-Beatty, ‘Make-Believe: Parafiction and Plausibility’, October, 129 (2009), 51-84. 
Lambert-Beatty’s article provides a good descriptive account of the kinds of artworks discussed in this 
chapter. 
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to be false, a lie does not simply evaporate; it leaves behind it a residue long after its 
truth-claims have been dropped. For better or worse, art works that experiment with 
deception have the capacity to generate real effects. This chapter will focus on two 
broad classes of effects: those that are somehow critical, that turn one’s attention back 
on the truth-framing devices that allowed for deception in the first place, and those that 
are creative, that inscribe the image of a possible world onto the mind of the viewer or 
participant.  
Although the critical effects of deception should not be undervalued, it is the 
effects that could be considered creative that have a greater ethical part to play in the 
production of subjectivity. In this sense, it could be said that deception has a 
sinthomatic function that doesn’t simply embellish the Imaginary, or reconfigure the 
Symbolic, but is involved in the construction of a new subjective arrangement that helps 
produce the Real. It will be argued that deception has the capacity to create new 
universes of reference, providing vectors of subjectivation in the process.  
Considering these effects on a broader scale will entail a look at the relationship 
between acts of deception and the wider socio-symbolic context in which they take 
place. Building on the premise of a ‘decline of the Symbolic’ outlined in previous 
chapters, do artworks that reveal the plasticity of truth further accelerate this decline? 
Do experiments with truth ultimately risk undermining one’s capacity to distinguish 
between the Symbolic poles of truth and falsehood, or do they provide a set of crucial 
reading strategies for understanding how these poles are constructed in the first place?445 
This chapter will attempt to address all of these questions, in the process linking the 
subject of deception back to the abiding concern with the relationship between ethics 
and aesthetics.  
In the process, and without necessarily scaling back any of the claims made 
above, it is important to consider to what extent deception can be creative but 
nevertheless quite regressive. Here it is instructive to consider a statement attributed to a 
senior advisor to the Bush administration, Karl Rove, made in 2002, just prior to the 
																																																								
445 This last question is addressed by D. Graham Burnett, who writes that ‘if, increasingly, actual politics 
operated operatically (privileging everywhere image, performance, and spectacle), then wielding a little 
schizophrenic irony – indeed, mastering the veritable arts of collective deception – might well be the 
twenty-first century equivalent of registering to vote’. D. Graham Burnett, ‘In Lies Begin 
Responsibilities’ in More Real: Art in the Age of Truthiness ed. by Elizabeth Armstrong (Santa Fe: SITE, 
2012) pp. 190-209 (p. 195). Despite the hyperbolic tone of this quote, ‘registering to vote’ does not 
exactly represent the pinnacle of political agency, and by positioning ‘the arts of collective deception’ as 
its equivalent Burnett is perhaps not making a tall enough order.  
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invasion of Iraq: ‘We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.’446 
In the context of the lies that were propagated in the run up to the war, is this not also an 
expression of the power of deception to produce new universes of reference? It is 
possible to find numerous other examples that illustrate this point, such as the formal 
similarity between The Museum of Jurassic Technology, a playfully deceptive museum 
of fictional natural history in Los Angeles, and the right wing ‘creationist’ museums 
that actively promote a view of the world created in six days.447 The difference between 
these two cases obviously turns on the hinge of faith, but the comparison nevertheless 
highlights the need to avoid blanket endorsements of deceptive practices and make 
careful distinctions based on a complex range of factors.  
Here the ambition is not to subject such experiments to a moral calculation in 
order to determine whether they are the product of good intentions — an important 
yardstick in the philosophy of deception, as I aim to demonstrate. Rather, this chapter 
will consider the ethical import of such practices as they are played out in the sphere of 
art. Just as the concept of ‘repair’ in the last chapter was filtered through the sinthomatic 
ethics elaborated in chapter 4, towards the end of this chapter I will attempt to nuance 
the discussion of deception on the same basis, considering its potential to contribute to 
an ethico-aesthetic paradigm ‘after’ transgression.  
 
From Intention to Effect  
 
When it comes to pinpointing a precise definition of lying, the issue of intention quickly 
comes to the fore. It was St. Augustine who first outlined a systematic theory of lying 
that rested on the intentions of the liar. In his De Mendacio, he writes that ‘not every 
one who says a false thing lies, if he believes or opines that to be true which he says’, 
																																																								
446  Ron Suskind, ‘Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush’, New York Times Magazine, 
October 17 2004 <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/17BUSH.html?_r=0> [accessed 
01/06/2015]. The quote was later attributed to Karl Rove, in Mark Danner, ‘Words in a Time of War: On 
Rhetoric, Truth and Power’, in What Orwell Didn't Know: Propaganda and the New Face of American 
Politics, ed. by András Szántó (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), pp. 16-36 (p. 17). 
447 For a guide to the Museum of Jurassic Technology see Lawrence Weschler, Mr. Wilson's Cabinet of 
Wonder: Pronged Ants, Horned Humans, Mice on Toast, and Other Marvels of Jurassic Technology 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1996). One of the biggest creationist museums is located in Kentucky, and 
features among other things an interactive display presenting a monkey ‘from a biblical standpoint’, a 
widescreen visual presentation of the six days of creation, and a dinosaur den which promises to show 
why ‘Biblical history is the key to understanding dinosaurs.’ Creation Museum, ‘Exhibits’ 
<http://creationmuseeum.org/whats-here/exhibits/> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
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thereby arguing that it is not so much the relation between the utterance and reality that 
characterises a lie, but rather the intention to deceive.448  
 To illustrate this point it is enough to cite an anecdote found in Freud’s Jokes 
and their Relation to the Unconscious, which involves a dialogue between two Polish 
Jews who meet on a train. ‘“Where are you going?” one asks. “I’m going to Cracow,” 
the other replies. To which the first answers, “You say you are going to Cracow, 
because you want me to think you are going to Lemberg. But I know you are going to 
Cracow. So why are you lying to me?”’449 In this example, the second character takes 
the first to be lying to him, even though he supposes that what he says corresponds 
exactly to the truth. Here it is possible to make a distinction between truth/ falsity 
(which concerns the epistemological accuracy of a statement) and truthfulness/ 
deception (which is based on intention).450 The first character’s utterance is perfectly 
true, but if, as the second character believes, it were founded on an intention to deceive, 
according to the Augustinian model it would be classed as a lie.  
 If this provisional definition of the lie is accepted, one is obliged to consider the 
inter-subjective dimension of lying. To borrow a term from Mikhail Bakhtin, it could be 
said that lying is a fundamentally dialogic practice rooted in the concrete situation in 
which a particular utterance is produced and how this situation involves others. Bakhtin 
counters a view of language as something abstract and self-contained by focusing on the 
social life of language. In doing so he also helps bring the temporal aspect of dialogue 
into clearer focus:  
 
Forming itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is at the same time 
 determined by that which has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact 
 anticipated by the answering word. Such is the situation in any dialogue.451  
 
This is also true of dialogue that contains deceptive utterances. A Bakhtinian view of 
language allows one to step beyond the narrow definition of the lie based solely on 
epistemological accuracy and see it as a temporally extended discursive object. 
Furthermore, if one accepts Bakhtin’s view of language as a chaotic sphere of 																																																								
448 St. Augustine, ‘On Lying’, in Seventeen Short Treatises of St. Augustine (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 
1847), pp. 382-425 (p. 383).  
449 Freud, ‘Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious’, p. 115.  
450 The distinction between objective truth and truthfulness is made in Immanuel Kant, ‘On a supposed 
right to lie from philanthropy’, in Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
pp. 611-615 (p. 611). 
451  Mikhail M. Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel’, in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. 
Bakhtin, ed. by Michael Holquist (Austin TX: University of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 259-422 (p.280). 
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utterances freighted with points of view and value judgments about the world, then any 
simple process of epistemological adequation is immediately rendered specific to the 
language in which the process takes place.452  
 Taking on board Bakhtin’s insights therefore allows two things to be done: 1) to 
dethrone the category of truth as epistemological accuracy, which is seen as the product 
of an ‘ennobled discourse’ that claims to capture its object in an unmediated fashion, 
and 2) to see truthfulness and deception as thoroughly dialogic concepts conditioned by 
anticipated or actual responses. As the example from Freud’s joke book shows, 
truthfulness and deception are founded on a social relation and a series of assumptions 
and predictions pertaining to the behavior of others.  
 Nevertheless, with the category of truthfulness the emphasis is still narrowly 
placed on the intentions of the liar. A focus on intentions inevitably leads to their 
schematisation according to a pre-established moral code, giving rise to such categories 
as ‘white lies’, ‘noble lies’ or ‘malicious lies’, which can be distinguished from one 
another only when their intended outcome is taken into account. Augustine himself 
makes a distinction between eight classes, arranged in ascending order of how 
forgivable they are in the eyes of God, for it is only God who has the ability to traverse 
the boundary between the soul and the world in order to see the truth.453 This belief can 
be seen in the early modern practice of adding an unvoiced disclaimer to a deliberately 
voiced lie  — a practice nonetheless risky in that it presupposes a God that can’t tell the 
difference between speaking and thinking. 
 The moral ordering of lies based on intention could be used to think about 
artworks such as Dow Does the Right Thing (2004) by The Yes Men. In what is 
probably the most famous intervention by the group, and a defining example of what 
has been called ‘tactical media’, one of the group’s members, Andy Bichlbaum, posed 
as a representative of Dow Chemical for an interview on BBC World T.V.454 The 
interview took place on the twentieth anniversary of the 1984 Union Carbide chemical 
spill at Bhopal, in India, which killed around twenty thousand people and damaged the 																																																								
452  As Bakhtin writes, ‘No living word relates to its object in a singular way: between the word and its 
object, between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an elastic environment of other, alien 
words about the same object, the same theme, and this is an environment that it is often difficult to 
penetrate.’ Ibid., 276. 
453  These classes range from ‘lies told in teaching religion’ as the least forgivable to ‘lies which hurt 
nobody and protect a person from physical defilement’ as the most. Augustine, ‘On Lying’.  
454  The term ‘tactical media’ was coined at the ‘Next Five Minutes’ (N5N) conference in Amsterdam in 
1993, and subsequently defined by the organisers as referring to ‘a critical usage and theorization of 
media practices that draw on all forms of old and new, both lucid and sophisticated media, for achieving a 
variety of specific noncommercial goals and pushing all kinds of potentially subversive political issues’.  
Critical Art Ensemble, Digital Resistance: Explorations in Tactical Media (New York: Autonomedia, 
2001), p. 5.  
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health of countless others. As the parent company of Union Carbide since 2001, Dow 
have continually refused to take responsibility for the environmental after-effects of the 
spill and have offered no compensation to those still suffering from related illnesses.455 
It was therefore a surprise to many viewers when on live T.V. a representative of Dow 
pledged $12 billion to make reparations to the victims and clean up the spill site. It took 
the BBC just two hours to reveal the spokesperson as an imposter, by which time shares 
in Dow had already dipped on stock markets around the world.456  
 According to a theory of lying based on intentions this artwork could perhaps be 
considered to embody an altruistic lie. But what does characterising it as such really 
achieve? Fundamentally, any schematisation of lies founded on intention simply applies 
pre-existing moral categories of good and evil to a person or group’s presumed motives. 
Not only is such an approach out of step with the general focus of this thesis, which has 
sought to advance a vision of ethics as something creative, rather than normative; it also 
goes against each of the thinkers that have inspired this perspective on the subject. 
Bakhtin, like Lacan and Guattari, was notoriously suspicious of such a mechanical 
approach to ethics.457  
 Specific cases of deception rarely yield reliable knowledge of the intentions of 
the deceiver. With The Yes Men one may be on relatively firm ground in assuming that 
their intentions were to help victims of the spill, but in the great majority of cases 
artists’ intentions are a lot more opaque. Furthermore, by devoting attention to a moral 
calculation based on intention the thoroughly ethical stakes involved in artworks that 
experiment with deception are overlooked. The Yes Men justified their intervention 
with a phrase associated with the anti-globalization movement at the time: ‘We were 
trying to show that another world is possible.’458 An approach geared towards unpacking 
the ethical stakes of the work would focus less on the intention ‘We were trying…’ and 
more on the production of alternative universes of reference: ‘another world is 
possible’. Such an analysis would look at the range of novel effects on the production of 
subjectivity that an artwork such as the Dow Does the Right Thing sets in motion.  
																																																								
455 According to the Bhopal Medical Appeal, some victims received between $300 and $500 from Union 
Carbide in 1989, worth about five years of medical care. The Bhopal Medical Appeal, ‘Union Carbide’s 
Disaster’ <http://www.bhopal.org/what-happened/> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
456 The Yes Men claim on their website that Dow made a loss of 2 billion dollars on the German stock 
exchange. The Yes Men, ‘Dow Does Right Thing’ <http://theyesmen.org/hijinks/bbcbhopal> [accessed 
01/06/2015]. 
457  On this see Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Towards a Philosophy of the Act (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1993). 
458 The Yes Men ‘Dow Does Right Thing’. 
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 To the two broad approaches to the subject of lying already discussed (truth as 
epistemological accuracy, and truthfulness as the product of an imputed intention to be 
truthful) a third could be added: that of a truth effect. In the field of psychology the term 
‘illusory truth effect’ was first used by Hasher, Goldstein, and Toppino to describe the 
increased likelihood of false facts being intuited as true after they had been repeated 
several times.459 Here the term could be used in a different sense, inspired by the work 
of Barbara Cassin.460 In Sophistical Practice Cassin focuses on the lines of mutual 
influence between philosophy and sophistry, claiming that the latter’s privileging of 
rhetorical forms over an above any ontological claims amounts to a privileging of effect 
over intention: 
 
 Philosophy never relinquishes its claim to unmask sophistics by banking on the concept 
 of intention; sophistics never ceases to distinguish itself from philosophy by 
 emphasising the accounting of effects. The consideration of effects can match that of 
 intention because the effect is no longer at the mercy of a dichotomy: faced with the 
 polarised duplicity of intention, there is or there is not an effect, de facto, precisely.461  
 
Any understanding of intentions is reliant on how they are communicated, and for this 
reason they are at the mercy of a dichotomy between genuine and disingenuous speech. 
Effects, on the other hand, are signs of themselves, and cannot be falsified. Faced with 
the inscrutable nature of intentions this chapter wagers that a focus on the effects of 
artistic practices of deception will be more fruitful. This is not to argue that a definition 
of lying should be re-founded on the basis of the effect it has, but rather that it is more 
productive to consider the aspects of the lie which become public, participatory, and 
dialogic. The effects of deceptive utterances are rarely as clear-cut as the example 
drawn from Freud. Their edges bleed into the fabric of social life, addressing multiple 
audiences at the same time, bringing about all manner of secondary and tertiary effects 
— some intended, others not. In the reverse direction, a widespread ‘culture of lying’ 
might also render the task of isolating an individual lie as difficult as abstracting a 
subject from the discursive community to which he or she belongs.  
																																																								
459  Lynn Hasher, David Goldstein, and Thomas Toppino, ‘Frequency and the Conference of Referential 
Validity’, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 16:1 (1977), 107-112. 
460 Barbara Cassin, Sophistical Practice: Towards a Consistent Relativism (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2014). 
461 Ibid., p. 40. 
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 A passage from Jean-Michel Rabaté’s The Ethics of the Lie illustrates this point. 
In the context of a chapter on the ‘state lies’ propagated in Bush era America, Rabaté 
writes that: 
 
 the political lie on a grand scale, the true state lie, a lie so widespread that personal 
 culpability and the sputtering of the state machine are indistinguishable, end almost 
 always by creating its own reality. There is no longer a historical error, when history 
 itself is an error. The isolated lie no longer exists when the politics of an entire country 
 derives from the official lie.462  
 
This quote both highlights the relative impossibility of separating a subject from the 
socio-cultural milieu in which they exist, and points towards a tradition of equating 
lying with history in general, a tradition most readily associated with Nietzsche. 
 Nietzsche grants the concept of lying a range that covers entire systems of 
morality and religion. In The Anti-Christ Christianity is referred to as a ‘holy lie’463, 
fabricated by priests and philosophers, and in Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense, 
Nietzsche pre-empts the structuralist doctrine of the arbitrariness of the sign by 
characterizing truth as ‘A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, 
[…] a sum of human relations which have been subjected to poetic and rhetorical 
intensification, translation, and decoration’.464 In this context, the interdiction against 
lying is simply the reverse side of an ‘obligation to use the customary metaphors, or, to 
put it in moral terms, the obligation to lie in accordance with firmly established 
convention, to lie en masse and in a style that is binding for all.’465 For Nietzsche, any 
social relation founded on language would therefore have to be considered a lie, a 
position that comes to be expressed more systematically in the '60s and '70s with 
semiotics, so that in 1968 Umberto Eco can argue that ‘the definition of a “theory of the 
lie” should be taken as a pretty comprehensive program for a general semiotics.’466  
 The ‘dit-mension’ of language that semiotics circumscribes can be equated with 
a theory of the lie insofar as individual words fail to fully convey the noumenal object 
																																																								
462 Jean Michel Rabaté, The Ethics of the Lie (New York: Other Press, 2008), p. 82.  
463 Friedrich Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight, p. 41, and in several other places in the book. 
464 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense’, in The Birth of Tragedy and Other 
Essays, ed. by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 
141-153 (p. 146).  
465 Ibid., p. 146. 
466 Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 7.  
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to which they are assigned.467 Here language is viewed as a social tissue of lies that 
claims to describe an objective truth outside of itself. This view is valuable insofar as it 
de-individualises the lie and further weakens the definitional criteria of intention. 
Nevertheless if such a position is considered in light of the semiotic theories of 
Hjelmslev elaborated in chapter 4, which allows for the traversal of different semiotic 
strata rather than their neat separation, it immediately begins to seem reductive. As I 
hope to show towards the end of this chapter, if one takes a sinthomatic approach 
whereby the Symbolic can have a part to play in the production of the Real, then the 
cleavage between the Real and the deceptive (as the Symbolic per se) no longer appears 
so absolute.  Before doing so it is important to show that within the dit-mension of the 
Symbolic there exist different practices, different effects, and different uses associated 
with deception. Even though these distinctions could themselves be seen as arbitrary in 
relation to the objects they describe, they nevertheless have social, historical and 
cultural effects. A look at a specific artwork that deals with deception will be useful in 
this respect.   
 
Lying to Liars 
 
In her work The Trainee (2008) the artist Pilvi Takala spent an entire month working as 
a student trainee in the marketing department of Deloitte, all the while filming her 
actions on hidden cameras. The first ‘lie’ that Takala tells is to change her first name 
from Pilvi to Johanna, presumably to prevent her new colleagues from finding out that 
she is an artist and not an aspiring marketing executive. For the entire month she then 
proceeds to play a modern day Bartleby by doing as little as possible in and around the 
building. Colleagues look on as she spends a day at the library of the Tax and Legal 
department of the firm, neither consulting documents nor working on a computer but 
staring dreamily into space. On another day in the consulting department Takala sits 
redundantly in the middle of a busy open-plan office, justifying herself to bemused 
colleagues by saying that she is ‘doing brain work’ and mumbling vague thoughts about 
her ‘thesis’. The situation reaches a comic climax when on February the 28th Takala 
spends an entire day shuttling between floors in the building’s lift. A secret camera 
documents the forced smiles of colleagues hiding their disbelief when Takala explains 																																																								
467  The word ‘dit-mention’ is a pun borrowed from Lacan, which equivocates around the meanings 
‘spoken dimension’, ‘spoken mansion’ (a play on Heidegger’s famous assertion that ‘language is the 
house of being’) and crucially, ‘spoken lie’, with the implication that this extends to an entire dimension. 
Lacan, Seminar XX, p. 21 (December 19 1972). 
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that she finds the lift conducive to thinking — ‘like being on a train.’ This concern 
grows over the course of the month as a series of glances, e-mails and conversations are 
exchanged about Takala’s disruptive presence. When the project was exhibited in the 
Kiasma Museum of Contemporary Art in Helsinki in 2008, it included a power-point 
presentation showing some of these e-mails (figure 22).  
Figure 22: Pilvi Takala, The Trainee (2008), film still. © Galerie Diana Stigter and Carlos/ Ishikawa 
 
The ‘senseless amount of time’ employees at Deloitte apparently spent speculating on 
Takala’s presence is testament to the disruptive effect her performance had. Elsewhere 
the artist has described the intervention as a 'threat to order' — 'sitting in front of an 
empty desk with your hands on your lap, thinking, threatens the peace of the community 
and breaks the colleagues' [sic] concentration.’468   
 If The Trainee can be considered to have a disruptive effect, this effect is 
discharged by means of a set of deceptive strategies. Takala’s presence in Deloitte is 
initially accepted on the basis of a verbal lie pertaining to her reasons for being there, 
backed up by company management, who secured her a job for which she was not 
sufficiently qualified, and supplemented by a number of other choices involving 
everything from her mode of addressing other employees to office attire. But Takala’s 
work hints at another raft of lies, and she herself has described the way employees at 																																																								
468 Pilvi Takala, ‘The Trainee’ <http://www.pilvitakala.com/thetrainee01.html> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
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Deloitte and elsewhere hide laziness and time wasting under a mask of false-
productivity.469 A furrowed brow and a concentrated stare are sometimes all that is 
needed to hide hours spent browsing the Internet or scrolling through social media. If 
anything, open plan office environments encourage such duplicitous behavior, and the 
e-mail chain shared among concerned employees in The Trainee is testament to the way 
in which they encourage a regime of collective self-policing.470 The lie at the heart of 
Takala’s piece is therefore directed critically at another set of lies, and perhaps 
ultimately at the managerial practices and spatial systems that make such lies necessary.  
This coupling of one lie with another is also fundamentally what is at stake in a 
literary device Bakhtin labels ‘gay deception’, described as ‘a lie justified because it is 
precisely directed at liars’.471 The ‘lie’ to which Bakhtin opposes ‘gay deception’ is ‘the 
lie of pathos’, which characterises what he calls novels of ‘the first stylistic line’. A few 
points require explanation here. First of all, as Morson and Emerson point out, the 
Russian pafos, although from the same Greek root as the English word, does not carry 
the same connotations of sadness, and could even be translated as ‘enthusiasm’, 
‘inspiration’ and ‘animation’.472 This meaning becomes clearer when Bakhtin speaks of 
the various discourses of pathos in the novel, which as well as ‘sentimentalising pathos’ 
also include ‘high-heroising pathos’ — a construction that would normally seem 
oxymoronic in English. Secondly, when Bakhtin speaks of ‘novels of the first stylistic 
line’ he is drawing on an aspect of his own typology of prosaic forms to talk about 
novels that try to wash their hands of the patchwork of different discourses and tongues 
‘still warm’ from their usage in everyday speech. In a word, novels of the first line are 
polemically directed against heteroglossia. They make use of a ‘respectable’ or 
‘ennobled’ discourse that tries ultimately in vein to rid itself of contextual 																																																								
469 Ibid. 
470  For a discussion of Takala’s piece that focuses more on the relationship between contemporary 
performance practice and such post-taylorist management regimes see Sami Siegelbaum, ‘Business 
Casual: Flexibility in Contemporary Performance Art’, Art Journal, 72: 3 (2013), 48-63. 
471 Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel’, p. 401. Although the concept of ‘gay deception’ is embedded in 
Bakhtin’s discussion of the novel, it is my contention that it can be separated from this discussion on 
account of its close links to what Morson and Emerson have called ‘global concepts’ in Bakhtin’s work, 
specifically the concept of dialogue. Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of 
a Prosaics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). Debora Hayes provides further justification for 
putting Bakhtin’s work to use in the study of visual art, justifying it on the basis of his concept of ‘re-
accentuation’. Debora Hayes, Bakhtin and the Visual Arts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), p. 15. Bakhtin expresses the concept as follows: ‘Every age re-accentuates in its own way the 
works of its most immediate past, [thus] their semantic content literally continues to grow, to further 
create out of itself’, Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel’, p. 421. Although Bakhtin’s work advocates a 
close ‘reading’ of the context in which words and concepts are used, I would follow Hayes in arguing that 
his work also contains the imperative to put concepts to creative use and to “re-accentuate” them in novel 
ways.  
472 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 355.  
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contamination. As such, novels of the first stylistic line have pretensions to neutrality 
and universality.473 
It is now possible to see how Bakhtin opposes ‘gay deception’ to the lie of 
pathos, which is ‘accumulated in the language of all recognized and structured 
professions, social groups and classes […] the language of priests and monks, kings and 
seigneurs, knights and wealthy urban types, scholars and jurists […] the languages of all 
who hold power and who are well set up in life.’474 For Bakhtin, it is not that these 
particular professions and social groups are prone to lying more than anyone else, but 
that they have forgotten the arbitrariness of their discourse. They have forgotten that 
language itself lies, and in doing so, they participate in a literary discourse which 
attempts ‘to faithfully reflect reality, to manage reality, and to transpose it’.475 In other 
words, for Bakhtin these professions often appear in the novel as overly confident of 
their ability to minimise the distorting effects of language and describe reality as it is.  
It could be argued that such is the underlying dynamic of The Trainee. In a spirit 
of gay deception Takala effectively tests the limits of the office culture within Deloitte, 
where a particular way of speaking and acting assumes a dominant position. The 
ennobled discourse of the business world is often hostile to other discourses that would 
force it recognise the contingency of its own position. In her act of withdrawal from the 
company discourse Takala holds heteroglossia in potential, not committing to any one 
discourse, and therefore not identifying with the group or profession to which she 
supposedly belongs. This has the effect of directing attention towards the authorised 
language and an office culture of self-important assiduity. Moreover this critical 
attention is accompanied by a parodic, if not openly mocking stance.  
In his discussion of literary characters such as the clown, the fool and the merry 
rogue, Bakhtin claims that they allow languages to be perceived ‘physically as 
																																																								
473 Bakhtin also elaborates a rival to the tradition of the first stylistic line, the second stylistic line, which 
he casts in a more positive light. The second stylistic line ‘incorporates heteroglossia into a novel’s 
composition, exploiting it to orchestrate its own meaning and frequently resisting altogether any 
unmediated and pure authorial discourse.’ Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel’, p. 375. Novels of this class 
embody the clamour of interactions between different languages, dialects and worldviews, ultimately 
exposing the relative contingency of each. While the novels of the first stylistic line have heteroglossia as 
their disavowed background, it is only novels of the second stylistic line that fully draw on heteroglossia 
as a resource full of potential. 
474 Ibid., p. 401. 
475 Ibid., p. 412. In relation to this point Barbara Cassin makes a useful distinction between the 
descriptive or demonstrative mode ‘speaking of’, which she claims is the major register of philosophy, 
and the persuasive, effectual mode of ‘speaking to’, which is of the domain of rhetoric. Cassin, 
Sophistical Practice, p. 194. When the lie of pathos forgets that it cannot fully ‘speak of’ a particular 
object, ‘gay deception’ is never far away to remind it that it is also ‘speaking to’. 
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objects’.476 Similarly, in isolating the office culture as an object of attention, The 
Trainee brings the contours of the discourse and the managerial structures that make it 
possible into clearer focus. Although this effect is initially achieved by means of 
deception, Takala’s lie is purposely not so good that it goes unnoticed. Rather it is the 
points of difference that allow the office discourse in Deloitte to emerge as an object — 
sitting at a desk without a computer, riding the lift without a set destination, thinking 
without writing materials. It is these moments of slippage that culminate over the course 
of the month and ultimately cause the lie to unravel, a process that generates critical 
effects.  
 It could be said that these effects are generated at two points in the life of the 
artwork, each corresponding to a different audience group. Those who experience the 
work in a gallery constitute an audience to whom the deceptive structure of the work is 
never directed. From the outset they are in on the joke. The employees who directly 
experienced the intervention at Deloitte constitute a second group, as much an audience 
as a group of participants. Some three months after the internship had formally ended 
this group were told that they had been part of an artwork and the deceptive content was 
fully dismantled.477 This is perhaps the moment when the critical affect of the work was 
fully discharged to this audience. As Takala herself writes:  
 
 After I left, the conversation about acceptable working methods continued at the 
 workplace. Whether accepting my behavior or not, I forced my co-workers to 
																																																								
476 Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel,’ p. 404. In Bakhtin’s work the figure of the merry rogue re-
accentuates the discourse of pathos, whether it is heroic or sentimental, in order to '"distance it from the 
mouth" […] by means of a smile or a deception, mock its falsity and thus turn what was a lie into gay 
deception.' Ibid., p. 402. In charting the history of the merry rogue from dawn of the novel’s history, 
Bakhtin argues that in modern times it is ‘cut loose’ and ceases to be a ‘symbolically static image’, thus 
opening the door to viewing the character as a wider cultural trope. Ibid., p. 405. Modern and 
contemporary art is no stranger to the figure of the trickster, with artists such as Marcel Duchamp, 
Maurizio Catalan and more recently Ryan Gander playing the role with differing degrees of verve and 
subtlety. Jean Fisher lucidly explores the post-colonial dimensions of the trickster as a trans-cultural 
trope, claiming that it has been ‘remobilised in literature and art as a symbolic vector of anti-colonial 
resistance and cultural resurgence from the 1970s on.’ Jean Fisher, ‘Tricksters, Troubadours — and 
Bartleby: On Art from a State of Emergency’, InPrint, 2:1 (2013), 13-28 (p. 21). Fisher’s placing of the 
trickster in a post-colonial frame is not without precedent, and could be connected to other tropic figures 
such as ‘the mimic man’ in the work of Homi Bhabha, who exploits the identificatory slippage produced 
by mimicry in order to produce a certain ironic dislocation. Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture 
(London: Routledge, 2004). 
477  Three months after the internship ended employees who were directly filmed were asked their 
permission for the footage to be used. Employees who did not feature directly were informed a month 
after this. E-mail conversation with the artist.  
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 reconsider their expectations of shared rules and I think the same happens to people 
 who see the documentation as my art piece.478 
 
It is perhaps slightly surprising to learn then, that Takala’s intervention at Deloitte was 
carried out in the full knowledge of the CEO and manager of the marketing department, 
who gave his permission to carry out the action and in fact directly contributed to the 
work by supplying company e-mails. 479  A question that is often overlooked in 
discussions of this piece concerns what the manager thought the benefits of inviting 
Takala into his office would be. Is he simply a benevolent lover of contemporary 
performance art, or did he see the advantages of an artwork that denaturalised a stuffy 
office culture in the anticipation of new, more efficient forms of collective behavior? 
Perhaps at this level practices of ‘gay deception’ are not incompatible with an office 
culture that embraces bonding exercises, weekend retreats, and ‘dress down’ Fridays. 
This idea is perhaps the ultimate critical effect of Takala’s intervention, highlighting the 
perversity of a system that welcomes critique with open arms. If Bakhtin’s concept of 
gay deception offers a model of lying that reprocesses discourses and exposes a kind of 
truth through deception, this is not simply the truth of contingency and heteroglossia, 
but also of the effects of interactions between different languages and discourses and the 
power play that allows one to absorb another.  
 
Intimate Percussion 
 
In 2005 a strange rumour spread through the Spanish city of León. Groups of young 
people were increasingly turning their back on conventional music in preference for the 
sound of their own heartbeat, which was said to have addictive properties. Personal 
music devices were being modified to amplify the heartbeat of the user, and prolonged 
exposure had the capacity to induce a trance-like state. Signs of this nascent trend 
seemed to be materialising all over the city: graffiti and posters appeared in public 
places carrying slogans such as ‘intimate percussion’, special events were held at a local 
venue, and the story seemed to be gaining traction in the local media as well, with an 
interview broadcast on radio León and scattered articles in the local press. When the 
record label ‘Musique Camus’ gathered together several bands in order to record an 																																																								
478 Jacquelyn Gleisner, ‘New Kids on the Block: “Brain Work” with Pilvi Takala,’ 
<http://blog.art21.org/2012/12/10/new-kids-on-the-block-brain-work-with-pilvi-
takala/#.VINFPVesVuA> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
479 E-mail conversation with the artist.
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album of music entirely inspired by the heartbeat — later reviewed by the music critic 
Carlos del Riego — it seemed that the private practice had suddenly developed into a 
full blown subculture, further bolstered by the website heartbeaters.net, which 
functioned as an online portal for the growing community.  
Although outwardly extreme, the rumour was lent some credibility by a number 
of existing media narratives. Studies into the effects of repetitive audio on the listener’s 
heartbeat were quoted and circulated as factoids that fed into the rumour. The practice 
of ‘heartbeating’ also resonated with a number of technologically alarmist voices that 
had previously lamented the decline of face-to-face interaction. Furthermore, this 
decline was linked to familiar narratives of a generational disconnect between a self-
obsessed youth culture and an older generation that looked on in dismay. To the latter it 
might have been understandable for music itself to give rise to a new subculture, but the 
onanistic nature of a youth culture that preferred to get high on their own heartbeats 
seemed to symptomise a greater range of underlying social ills.  
For many, the revelation that the rumour was in fact a work of art by Dora 
Garcia, who made the announcement on the occasion of her exhibition opening at the 
Museo de Arte Contemporáneo de Castilla y León (MUSAC), did not come as much of 
a surprise.480 This is because many of the participants were enlisted as collaborators 
some three months before Garcia revealed the work’s fictional content. A second group 
of disbelievers may have had doubts after seeing Garcia’s name on the heartbeaters.net 
website. There, a previous work by the artist on the same theme — Heartbeat (1999), 
first exhibited at the Centro Andaluz de Arte Contemporáneo in Andalucía — was 
posited as an originary fiction, which precipitated the real life spread of the practice to 
urban centres across Spain and beyond.481 For a surprising number of others, the fiction 
had become a reality, and many of those who contributed material to the website 
heartbeaters.net did so of their own volition, presumably in the belief that just such a 
subcultural form was in fact emerging.  
The project’s success lay not only in its ability to play on existing social 
anxieties, but also make use of particular circuits of distribution. Garcia was quick to 
involve professionals in the fields of music, radio, and TV, who made use of both 
official channels of communication in the broadcast and print media, and propagated the 
fiction by means of word-of-mouth or ‘word-of-web’. Like all rumours, the source of 
the heartbeater stories in León were obscure, and at the beginning lacking in empirical 																																																								
480 The announcement was made on September 10 2005. 
481 The original manifestation of the work comprised of a hyperlinked text narrative, posters, videos, and 
pseudo-scientific reports.  
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validation. In this way the rumour existed as an artifact of unofficial speech that once 
released into the wild began to mutate and have real effects. Here the proximity of 
Heartbeaters to commercially driven campaigns of a similar character is significant — 
both seek to insert stories into pre-exiting social networks as if they had occurred 
spontaneously, ultimately with the aim of greater market/audience penetration. Obvious 
brand authorship notwithstanding, what distinguishes Heartbeaters from such PR 
practices is that the anonymous, distributed deception was ultimately reigned in and 
assigned to a specific author with a specific motive. Like Takala’s revelatory message 
to the employees at Deloitte, the lie was in effect terminated; only in Garcia’s case at 
this very moment it assumed the status of a fiction.  
Here it is interesting to consider the difference between lies and fiction. While 
the former claims to describe reality, the latter suspends all claims to this effect, either 
implicitly or explicitly.482 The suspension of these claims frees the work of fiction from 
any social obligation to be truthful. Just as lies need to take the listener into account, the 
fictional status of an object is worked out in a dialog between an author, an artwork and 
its audience according to a shifting set of conventions that change over time.483 
Heartbeaters played with such conventions, suspending them at a temporal juncture that 
caused the project to exist at one stage as a lie and at another a fiction. As a term that 
covers both practices at the same time, here the word ‘fabulation’ could be used to 
describe the project as a whole.484 The theoretical significance of this term will be 
elaborated in the final section.   
In order to consider the effects Heartbeaters generated it will be useful to look 
at the sequential nature of the piece in greater detail. For many participant-viewers the 
temporal makeup of Heartbeaters involved three stages. 
In the first stage elements of the story were allotted a space within a material 
network of signs and relayed via circuits of distribution. Here the object of fabulation 
had the capacity to be registered as factual, and bleed into other epistemological 
inscriptions and change their experiential qualities, for example bolstering moral panic. 
																																																								
482 This follows from John Searle’s definition of fiction as something ‘made possible by the existence of 
a set of conventions which suspend the normal operation of the rules relaying illocutionary acts and the 
world’. John R. Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 67.  
483 It is worth noting that such conventions do periodically change, as in the case of Thomas More’s 
Utopia, which when first published in 1516 was taken so seriously by some members of the Church that 
the possibility of sending missionaries to convert the population of the imaginary island was apparently 
discussed. Isaac D’Israeli, Curiosities of Literature, 2 vols (London: Murray, 1971- 73), II (1973), p. 23. 
484 The OED defines the verb fabulate as ‘to relate as a fable or myth’ and ‘to invent, concoct, fabricate.’ 
The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn, 20 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), V (1989), p. 640.   
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During this stage the antecedent myth of a previous artwork aimed to reinforce the 
veracity of the piece.  
During the second stage some aspect of the lie was revealed to be factually 
inaccurate or false. This was set in motion by an element of the artwork itself, and here 
it could be argued that Garcia’s termination of the fictional content can be considered 
part of the overall choreography. The initial deception subsequently started to unravel, 
and the experiential quality of the object of deception changed. 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Dora Garcia, Heartbeaters (2005), Museo de Arte Contemporáneo de Castilla y León, Spain 
(10 September 2005 - 6 December 2005). © The artist 
 
The final stage would seem to have involved two different processes, which are not 
mutually exclusive. One allowed the viewer to critically revisit the site of the original 
deception, in the process reflecting on the range of truth-framing devices that made it 
possible for the work to be perceived as truth in the first place. The final manifestation 
of Garcia’s project consisted of various didactic elements chronicling events in the life 
of the artwork (figure 23), thereby facilitating a critical return to these very devices. In 
this way Heartbeaters created a discourse on deception, as well as deception itself. This 
aspect closes the work back on itself, but it also encourages a critical literacy that may 
be transferred to other objects, giving the unsuspecting participant a crash course in the 
arts of rhetoric. Nevertheless, and this is the other process involved at this stage, some 
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residue of the original lie may still remain. Even though the lie has been unraveled, it 
may have slightly changed the objects of knowledge it came into contact with during 
the first stage.  
 During the final stage the lie can irreversibly attach itself to a range of 
heterogeneous elements in the mind of the viewer (for example having the capacity to 
forge a subliminal link between the practice of wearing headphones and the presence of 
a heartbeater), and circulated in the exchanges between people, objects and discourses, 
altering these ever so slightly in the process.  
 
Talking Back 
 
The idea that Garcia’s work not only has the capacity to sharpen a viewer’s critical 
faculties, but also, somehow, leave a ‘residue’ of its false content even after truth-claims 
have been dropped, points towards a possible effect on the production of subjectivity.  
In an essay about Jean Genet, Guattari describes a similar process, whereby 
Genet brings a ‘dreamer function’ to bear on the plight of the Black Panthers and the 
Palestinians in his last novel Prisoner of Love.485 Guattari argues that Genet’s ‘dreamer 
function’ does not work towards the ‘derealization of these movements’, but ‘is perhaps 
even a means of conferring on them a more intense subjective consistency.’486 Genet 
passes from being a practitioner of ‘derealizing fabulation’ to the constructer of 
‘fabulous images’ that produce the real’.487 Although Guattari does not deal directly 
with deception as it has been discussed thus far, his argument is significant because it 
leads in a different direction from the claims made for the ‘truth’ of fictive or deceptive 
art. I have argued that Bakhtin’s figure of the merry rogue can be aligned to such 
claims, whereby the truth effect of gay deception consists in exposing the ultimate 
contingency and contextual colouration of discourse, removing its mask and dialogising 
its content. In other words, by means of untruth, gay deception exposes the ultimate 
truth of heteroglossia. Such a conceptual figure could be said to highlight the corrosive 
potential of artworks that deal with untruth. By contrast, here Guattari positions art as 
capable of augmenting reality and granting it a greater ‘subjective consistency’. This is 
linked to the formation of a collective subjectivity in the groups Genet worked with.  
Guattari is not the first writer to use the term ‘fabulation’ in a philosophical 
context. The term hails from Henri Bergson, who in The Two Sources of Morality and 																																																								
485 Jean Genet, Prisoner of Love (New York: New York Review of Books, 2003). 
486 Guattari, Schizoanalytic Cartographies, p. 221. 
487  Ibid. 
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Religion accords fiction the power to ‘prevent or modify action’.488 This power is for 
Bergson a function of what he calls ‘closed societies’.489 Myths, gods and ‘semi-
personal powers’ play an essentially regulatory function, helping to bind societies 
together in rigid or static ways. When the concept is discussed by Guattari, both in his 
solo writing and with Deleuze, the term is largely emptied of these negative 
connotations. In What is Philosophy? the authors give the term a decidedly creative 
meaning, associating it with artists and novelists who go beyond the ‘perceptual states 
and affective transitions of the lived.’490 If for Bergson fabulation is a function that has 
real effects on society, then for Deleuze these effects are no longer linked to static 
regimes of behaviour, rituals, or structural constants. Rather, the fabulatory function has 
the capacity to ‘invent a people to come’, providing an image of a collectivity in such a 
way that is processual, collaborative and open.491 Both in his essay on Genet and his 
collaborative writing with Deleuze, Guattari explicitly links fabulation to his abiding 
concern with the production of subjectivity. For Guattari the fabulous image effectively 
‘produces the real’492 — at a certain point exceeding the dominant co-ordinates of 
language to become ‘self-sufficient, self-referent, self-processual’, and in doing so it 
becomes an image that can speak back to an audience.493 In What is Philosophy? 
Guattari and Deleuze associate such a detachment with the construction of monuments 
or giants.494 Only once these larger than life forms have been created and isolated can 
the fabulatory image take on a life of its own.  
Early on in Guattari’s essay on Genet he zones in on a key visual metaphor from 
Prisoner of Love. The metaphor involves the vapour from a boiler, which ‘steams up a 
window, then gradually disappears, leaving the window clear, the landscape suddenly 
visible and the room extended perhaps to infinity’.495 This image would seem to hint at 
the power of something less monumental having a fabulatory function: the ephemeral 																																																								
488 Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (London: Macmillan, 1935), p. 89. 
489 The French ‘fabulation’ is rendered as 'myth-making' by Bergson’s English translators. 
490  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? (London: Verso, 1994), p. 171. The concept 
of ‘fabulation’ also appears in a number of Deleuze’s solo writings, but is never developed at any length. 
See Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 
3-4 and Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time- Image (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 
pp. 150-4, where it is translated as ‘story-telling’, as it also is in Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism (New York: 
Zone, 1991), p. 108. For a detailed discussion of the concept in the context of literature see Ronald 
Bogue, Deleuzian Fabulation and the Scars of History (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010). 
Perhaps because of its late publication in English, Bogue’s account of fabulation does not reference 
Guattari’s use of the term in Schizoanalytic Cartographies. 
491 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 150. 
492 Guattari, Schizoanalytic Cartographies, p. 221.  
493 Ibid., p. 229. 
494  Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 168, 172. 
495 Genet, Prisoner of Love, p. 367.  
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drift of vapour, or the unofficial spread of a rumour. The sequential nature of the image 
resonates with the progressive unfolding of Garcia’s artwork. If it is possible to align 
Heartbeaters with this image, the question that follows is ‘what remains when the steam 
(or deceptive content) of the work has evaporated?’ Just as the fabulatory image has the 
capacity to augment the power of a group, or even ‘invent a people’ for Deleuze, 
perhaps the ultimate constructive effect of Garcia’s work is its role in forging the image 
of a collectivity.496  However fragile and temporary, the original fiction set in motion a 
process that produced links between people bound together by the a-signifying rhythms 
of a heartbeat. As I have said, the ‘revelation’ that disbanded this collectivity is 
effectively what terminates its deceptive content. However it also had the effect of 
isolating the work as an object of aesthetic experience, allowing it to speak back to an 
audience in a different voice.  
This notion of aesthetic isolation recalls Bakhtin’s early aesthetic theory 
discussed in chapter 4. As previously discussed, it is by way of a reading of Bakhtin that 
Guattari expands the psychoanalytical concept of the part-object so that it becomes a 
‘part-enunciator’. Although this concept is never connected explicitly to the notion of 
fabulation, it would appear that similar processes are at stake. In both cases an object is 
charged with a power that then feeds back into the production of subjectivity. In 
Bakhtin’s account the necessary pre-condition for this is the object’s detachment from 
the given co-ordinates of reality. To repeat a quotation from chapter 4, ‘Isolation is […] 
the negative condition of the personal, subjective (not psychologically subjective) 
character of form; it allows the author creator to become a constitutive moment in 
form’.497 In Guattari’s hands this process works in both directions, so that the form also 
becomes a constitutive moment in the subject who creatively apprehends it. This 
moment of isolation in Bakhtin’s aesthetic theory sheds light on Guattari’s claim that 
the fabulatory image needs to gain a certain ‘consistency’ in order to play a part in the 
production of subjectivity.  
Here a problem arises concerning artworks that deceive. If Heartbeaters did in 
fact succeed in soliciting belief, it did so insofar as it mimicked existing narratives and 
occupied existing circuits of distribution. Practices of mimicry are often what allow lies 
to go unnoticed because they enable the object of deception to blend into a background 
of expected behaviors, appearances and events. But if mimicry is too successful then the 
object of deception has less chance of detaching itself from the cognitive circuits of 																																																								
496 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, p. 150. 
497 Mikhail Bakhtin, 'The Problem of Content, Material and Form', p. 308. 
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meaning and ‘talking back’ to an audience from another place. Put otherwise, here 
successful mimicry leads to a lower consistency of the fabulatory image in question, 
and higher consistency leads to less successful mimicry. This is not to say that the name 
‘art’ need appear in neon letters above such works in order for consistency to be gained 
(and deception unraveled) but it does mean that a certain mode of aesthetic (rather than 
cognitive) perception needs to be mobilised for an object to act as a ‘fabulous image’. 
Labeling something art can sometimes serve as a short cut to such a mode of perception.   
The problem of consistency’s inversely proportional relationship to mimesis can 
perhaps be overcome by artworks such as Heartbeaters that effectively stage an act of 
deception. This performative dimension of the project is arguably what allows an 
audience the space to reflect on both its critical function in respect to the structures it 
mimics, and for it to gain consistency as an aesthetic object. In passing from deception 
to fiction, Heartbeaters arrives at a position whereby it has a greater power. Deception 
serves as a prefatory stage in the deployment of the fabulatory image and fiction is 
charged with a power from deception, so that the admixture between the two has a 
greater capacity, for better or worse, to have real effects. 
 
Lying and tying 
 
Beyond the subject of Genet’s work, and beyond the realm of contemporary art 
production, what are the different modalities by which deception and fiction can bring 
forth the Real? Do all fictions that have a ‘constructive’ effect produce ‘fabulous 
images’ in the sense Guattari uses the term? And what are the broader socio-political 
stakes in their doing so? To answer these questions it will be useful to return to the 
terms of chapter 4 and consider deception and fiction in their Symbolic, Imaginary and 
Real aspects.  
In the introduction a senior advisor to the Bush administration, Karl Rove, was 
quoted as saying of the United States ‘We're an empire now, and when we act, we 
create our own reality.’498 Rove is quoted as making a distinction between the ‘reality-
based community’ with people who  ‘believe that solutions emerge from […] judicious 
study of discernible reality’ and another community of ‘history actors’ who create 
reality.499 The fact that such a reality was created on the basis of lies in the run up to the 
																																																								
498 Suskind, ‘Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush’.  
499  Ibid.  
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war in Iraq serves as a cautionary tale that warns against uncritically endorsing the 
power of deception and fiction to shape reality.  
A year after Rove testified to the creative power of untruth Naomi Klein labeled 
2003 as the year of the fake: ‘fake rationales for war, a fake President dressed as a fake 
soldier declaring a fake end to combat and then holding up a fake turkey.’500 The 
incident to which Klein is referring is Bush’s notorious 2003 ‘mission accomplished’ 
speech made on the deck of the aircraft Carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, where he 
emerged from a jet plane in full military regalia to prematurely proclaim victory in Iraq. 
By the time Bush had made this speech, the false pretext for the original invasion had 
almost become a reality. The Iraq war has transformed the country into a magnet for 
terrorists from across the region and helped Ba’athist and religious fundamentalists to 
forge an unstable alliance against allied forces. The irony is that such factors were part 
of the raft of lies that allowed for the invasion of Iraq in the first place — before they 
were true — yet it was only the war itself that brought them into existence. This 
example illustrates the power of lies to actively shape reality. It could also be allied to 
the fabulatory function in the work of Bergson, insofar as it involves the creation of a 
myth (the ‘axis of evil’) that works in the services of a ‘closed society’ (where ‘closed’ 
should not so much be understood as an adjective describing America as a whole, but a 
horizon of possibility, a process of closing society).  
Such lies become reality by means of a series of carefully calibrated semiotic 
devices that operate performatively on the Symbolic. For Austin, performativity 
involves a highly codified speech act, which depends on the rules of a given social 
scenario in order to accomplish an action through language. The extent to which a 
perfomative is ‘happy’ (successful) or ‘unhappy’ (unsuccessful) for Austin depends on 
the context and the authority of the actor in question.501 Performativity has become a 
significant leitmotif in much post-structuralist theory, and thinkers such as Derrida and 
Butler have both questioned the absolute distinction between successful and non-
successful speech acts, and expanded the category to account for a range of socio-
semiotic effects.502 In the various speeches, interviews and appearances Bush made 
during his two terms in office, all manner of semiotic codes were performatively 																																																								
500 Naomi Klien, ‘The Year of The Fake: Don’t Think and Drive’, The Nation, 26 January 2004 
<http://www.thenation.com/article/year-fake> [accessed 01/06/2015]. 
501  J. L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 
28. 
502  Butler’s texts that deal with the issue of performativity are referenced in the last chapter (footnote 
437). For Derrida’s contribution to the conversation on performatives see Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature, 
Event, Context’, in Limited, Inc (Evanston IL: Northwestern university Press, 1988), pp. 1-23. 
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manipulated as a means to lend credence to the official lie being propagated. For this 
reason it is possible to claim that the ‘reality’ the Bush government created through 
lying was first of all a Symbolic reality. Bush and his government together constructed a 
matrix of semiotic untruths, first nestled within a larger socio-symbolic network of 
‘social lies’, but then disseminated via massive circuits of media distribution, quickly 
saturating Symbolic universes of reference and distorting everyday ‘socially agreed’ 
reality. The lies of the Bush administration were primarily Symbolic not only because 
they involved manipulations of semiotic material, but because their performativity, like 
all performativity, depended on a set of pre-existing conventions in order to be 
effective. Herein lies one of the problems of endorsing the performative power of 
deception to construct reality: as well as creating new universes of reference, 
performative speech acts also bolster the Symbolic structures they rely on. With every 
declaration of marriage conferred on a couple by a priest, to cite Austin’s example, the 
power of the priest and the institution from which they derive their authority are 
strengthened.503 Likewise, creative deception that operates purely at the level of the 
Symbolic can only ever operate as a prophylactic against the emergence of new, 
potentially disruptive information, because according to this model the only sensory 
data that is accepted as true is that which can be accommodated to existing belief 
systems and structures of knowledge. In this way they create by means of calcification, 
layer upon layer until the joints of possibility seize up. In the terms of chapter 4, this 
amounts to a form of adaptation.  
  To the category of Symbolic lies and fictions it is possible to add those that are 
primarily Imaginary. Imaginary lies can be discerned in an extreme form in the 
pathological category of mythomania.504 Rabaté describes the mythomaniac as ‘an 
interested victim of the omnipotence of his desires’, someone who ‘cannot sustain 
himself in reality and prefers an ideal fiction to a communal reality marked by lack, 
inadequacy, frustration’. 505 Although Rabaté uses the term fiction, mythomania is 
usually considered to be a form of pathological lying. It invariably involves the piling of 
lie upon lie over a considerable period of time as a means to stave off the effects of the 
Real. This is not to say that mythomaniacs are unaware of a ‘reality’ beyond their lies, 																																																								
503 Austin, How To Do Things, p. 5. 
504  The psychologist Ernest Dupré (1862-1921) is credited with inventing the category of ‘mythomania’, 
a ‘confabulationary delusional state which derives from a “disequilibrium in the imaginative faculty”’. 
Ernest Dupré and Jean Logre, ‘Confabulatory delusional states’, in The Clinical Roots of the 
Schizophrenia Concept: Translations of Seminal European Contributions on Schizophrenia, ed. by John 
Cutting and Michael Shepherd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 157-167 (p. 162). 
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for often the subtlety of their methods requires them to have a firm foothold in the 
Symbolic and an accurate sense of what is believable. In this sense the mythomaniac is 
often highly adept at manipulating truth-framing devices, but unlike the kinds of lies 
and fictions that have primarily Symbolic effects, mythomania involves the construction 
of the self and reality according to an Imaginary fantasy of totality. The lies that the 
mythomaniac uses are creative insofar as they progressively fill out the gaps in an 
underlying fantasy that remains curiously static. Ernest Dupré, the French psychologist 
who coined the term mythomania writes of the process as follows:  
 
 As each invented idea is produced, it is then registered as if it were an incontrovertible 
 fact, inscribed, as it were, on a 'mythomanic dossier'. After a while, secondary 
 interpretations and the guiding influence of emotional preoccupations then consolidate a 
 complex system which constitutes the more or less permanent phase of a confabulatory 
 delusional state.506 
 
The elaboration of a mythomaniacal delusion could therefore be considered ‘processual’ 
— to recall a key adjective deployed by Guattari to describe fabulation — but the way 
mythomaniacal lies progressively build do not create new vectors of subjectivation. The 
underlying ideal that yokes them together remains fixed, with each new lie only serving 
to increase the power of an underlying fantasy. When the Real finally does come to pop 
the mendacious bubble it can have a devastating effect, as illustrated by Rabaté with the 
case of Jean-Claude Romand, a French family man who at the risk of having his lies 
unmasked, killed his parents, wife and two children before attempting to commit 
suicide. Romand had spun a web of deception stretching back 18 years, involving made 
up qualifications, friends and a job at the World Health Organization. When his 
narcissistic fantasy finally looked like it would be found out, Romand made a passage à 
l’acte as means to ensure the survival not of himself, but of the Imaginary fantasy he 
had built brick by brick.507 As Romand himself admitted: ‘When I don’t know how to 
surmount an obstacle, I destroy it.’ 508  Such an extreme example highlights the 
essentially narcissistic character of deception and fiction if they remain in the 
Imaginary, which although still ‘constructive’, also, invariably end with the destructive 
emergence of the Real.  																																																								
506  Dupré and Logre, ‘Confabulatory’, p. 165. 
507 A number of films deal with the case: Time Out (2001) by Lauren Cantet, The Adversary (2002) by 
Nicole Garcia and La Vida de Nadie (2003) by Eduard Cortes, as well as a book: Emmanuel Carrere, The 
Adversary: A True Story of Monstrous Deception (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2002).  
508 Jean-Claude Romand quoted in Rabaté, Ethics of the Lie, p. 125. 
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The third category of constructive deception or fiction involves the Real, but it 
cannot be inscribed within this domain entirely. This is because from a Lacanian 
perspective the Real is considered ontologically anterior to codifications of truth and 
falsehood. It is however possible to speak of a ‘sinthomatic’ form of deception or 
fiction that binds the three orders together in a novel way. To recapitulate some of the 
points made in chapter 4, the concept of the sinthome constitutes a way of allowing a 
psychic construction to hang together in a way that avoids static laws of psychic 
coherence (such as those embodied in the Oedipus complex) in favour of a process of 
existential unfolding. Here one is reminded of Lacan’s description of James Joyce as a 
‘pure artificer […] a man of know-how’509 who managed to make for himself a new, 
particularized master signifier. If performativity has as its ultimate outcome a bolstering 
of the Symbolic ring of the Borromean knot, and mythomania an expansion of the 
Imaginary, then a sinthomatic effect of untruth has the capacity to incorporate elements 
of all three registers as a means to create genuinely novel subjective effects.  
From a sinthomatic perspective, deception and fiction could be seen as processes 
of untying and retying respectively. For its part, deception has the capacity to 
undermine the legality of signification, to distort and disrupt established norms and 
conventions, and shrug off the obligation to manipulate language in the socially 
sanctioned manner. In this way deception pulls at the Symbolic chord that both helps 
produce subjects, and knots them together through language. Yet in so doing it pulls in 
the same direction as capitalism, further exacerbating the decline of the Symbolic. In 
both cases the Symbolic’s general condition of malleability is revealed.  
And yet from this condition of malleability new ‘fabulous’ images can emerge. 
If deception unties, then fiction reties, and as with any common knot, the retying makes 
use of the untying. The corrosive effects of deception and the constructive effects of 
fiction join each other in a double movement of untying and retying, a movement that 
echoes the relation between breakage and repair. At the same time deception 
undermines the Symbolic, something comes to be re-inscribed at the point of collapse. 
This point of collapse itself becomes a new particularised point of identification, 
crystallising attention on the ‘fabulous image’ that comes to be in its place. It draws 
heterogeneous semiotic materials into its orbit, and slowly these give it a consistency 
that grows and changes with each new addition. Once a certain threshold of consistency 
is achieved the fiction has the power to ‘speak back’ as a partial enunciator, and by 
‘making use of it’ an open, processual, and collective dimension emerges. It is only at 																																																								
509  Lacan, Seminar XXIII, p. 141 (9 March 1976). 
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this stage that the fiction achieves the status of an ethico-aesthetic object: ethical insofar 
as it feeds back into the production of subjectivity, and aesthetic insofar as this can only 
occur on the basis of an aesthetic approach to the object in question. Artworks that 
experiment with truth in this way can contribute to the emergence of a wider ethico-
aesthetic paradigm ‘after transgression’.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Like the topological figures that loop their way through Lacan’s final seminars, in this 
thesis ethics and aesthetics have been treated as concepts that undergo semi-continuous 
transformation. Neither can be taken as concepts that ‘belong’ to a presupposed subject, 
because they help reformulate the terrain on which this subject is itself constructed. 
Complex and variable in their historical interrelations, ethics and aesthetics nevertheless 
converge on processes and practices of subjectivation. 
Since its inception over a century ago, psychoanalysis has remained focused on 
questions of subjectivity. It has been one of the ambitions of this thesis to demonstrate 
that psychoanalysis, and its radicalisation in the form of schizoanalysis, offers a rich set 
of resources for thinking through how the subject changes in reciprocal dialogue with 
the social, and moreover, that art has a part to play in this process. The second half of 
this conclusion will be devoted to looking at the particular relationship between art and 
psychoanalysis in more detail. Before this can be done, it is worth recapitulating on 
some of the main propositions that have been put forward thus far.  
Firstly, despite their variability, I have tried to show that the relationship 
between ethics and aesthetics historically stabilises into conceptually coherent 
paradigms. The first half of this thesis was devoted to demonstrating that one such 
paradigm can be articulated around the concept of ‘transgression’. A longer study would 
no doubt be able to isolate other ethico-aesthetic paradigms, perhaps tracing the roots of 
transgression back to a time when the ethical function of art centred on its presumed 
edifying effects.510  
Within the paradigm of transgression it was my ambition to show that there are 
numerous typological variations. Chapters 1-3 were an attempt to isolate some of the 
different ‘logics’ of transgression in the work of a number of European and American 
post-war artists. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 sought to elaborate a number of concepts that 
embodied ethico-aesthetic relationships beyond transgression. In this latter half it was 																																																								
510  In the UK, perhaps the preeminent figure associated with such an edifying paradigm was John Ruskin. 
In his wildly successful Modern Painters Ruskin claimed that the artist had ‘the responsibility of a 
preacher’ in the delivery of moral truths. See John Ruskin, Modern Painters, 6 vols (London: George 
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	 204	
not my intention to show that these concepts already constitute a distinct ethico-
aesthetic paradigm, but rather to deploy vectors along which a new paradigm might 
develop, inspired by a series of more recent works of art. It would be disingenuous to 
claim that these vectors emerge from artworks like water from a spring, bubbling up 
through the cultural bedrock in pure form. While in each chapter it has been my 
ambition to allow artworks to lead me toward new concepts, conclusions, and ideas, 
these ideas have obviously not passed into the argument in an unmediated fashion. At 
every step of the way the significance of particular artworks has been articulated in 
dialogue with particular theoretical standpoints. The work of Lacan, Guattari and to a 
lesser extent Bakhtin have all helped to bring the various relationships between ethics 
and aesthetics that artworks embody into sharper focus. Perhaps with the exception of 
Guattari, some of the resources these thinkers offer have been underused in the 
theorisation of contemporary art. Secondary texts on Lacan abound, but few of them 
discuss his late work in conjunction with contemporary art. One of the original 
contributions of this thesis is to demonstrate that the work of these thinkers provides a 
rich reservoir of concepts that have utility in exposing aspects of artworks that would 
otherwise remain concealed. While it is important to remember that many of these 
concepts are rooted in particular contexts and debates, as much as possible it has been 
the ambition to follow Bakhtin’s example and creatively ‘reaccentuate’ concepts and 
motifs rather than fix them into particular disciplinary arrangements. 
This process of reaccentuation does not entail amplifying theory so that it speaks 
at a volume above that of artworks. Theory, in this sense, has not been used in a meta-
textual way, able to explain the hidden message of artworks while placing itself beyond 
question. It is my claim that Lacan’s work in particular should be treated as a 
historically situated praxis that changes in dialogue with wider social transformations. 
In this way, artworks are given an equal voice to the theoretical resources under 
discussion, and the conversation between the two makes it possible to better discern the 
changes to the social that have been grouped under the concept of the decline of the 
Symbolic. Insofar as the relationship between art and theory is, in this thesis, primarily 
a relationship between art and psychoanalytic theory, the relationship between the two 
bears a little more consideration. Before arriving at my own conclusions as to how this 
relationship might be mediated, it is worth briefly going over some of the problems that 
have historically beset psychoanalytically inflected studies on art. 
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Sublimation and its Discontents  
 
As Parveen Adams points out, the attitude of psychoanalysis towards art is often 
characterised by a certain false modesty, ‘expressed in the formula “art has much to 
teach psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis has very little to say to art”’. 511  This has 
traditionally resulted in a rather one-sided relationship. If psychoanalytical writings deal 
with specific artworks at all, they often do so in such a way that illustrates a particular 
psychoanalytical concept or theory. In his discussion of works such as Holbein’s 
Ambassadors and Piola’s Anamorphosis of Rubens discussed in chapter 1, it could be 
said that Lacan himself is guilty of using art in such an instrumental fashion. In Seminar 
VII precious little attention is paid to the specificity of these artworks beyond their 
significance as examples of anamorphosis. As well as attempting to steer clear of such 
tendencies by attending to specific works of art and the conditions under which they 
were produced, this thesis has also avoided the concept most often used to mediate the 
relationship between art and psychoanalysis: sublimation.  
One of the reasons for avoiding the concept of sublimation is that it places 
considerable emphasis on the role of the artist in creative production. In so far as it 
considers artworks as diversions of the individual’s libidinal energy away from sexual 
aims, sublimation treats the artist as an analysand, and their libidinal investments come 
under close scrutiny. This sometimes results in a psychobiographic approach, in which 
an artist’s personal history is transformed into a master key that unlocks the doors of 
understanding to particular artworks.  
Another drawback of using the concept of sublimation to mediate between art 
and psychoanalysis is that it hinges upon the dubious notion of a ‘higher cultural aim’ 
for libido. Freed from its erotic origins, libido becomes desexualised in Freud’s theory, 
finding its place among the venerated objects of ‘civilised’ culture. It is therefore 
fundamentally ill-suited to accounting for transgressive artworks that frequently take 
their aim at such culture.512 It is true that the concept of sublimation undergoes 
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something of an overhaul in Lacan’s seminar on ethics, where it becomes associated 
with transgression through its indexical link to the Real.513 By the time of Seminar XXIII 
this link takes on a different character, and the sinthome becomes a name for an artistic 
process that directly participates in the Real, rather than lingering in its proximity. 
Without a feat of theoretical gymnastics then, it would be difficult to use both the 
concept of sublimation and the sinthome to bridge the gap between art and 
psychoanalysis, insofar as the two appear to be mutually exclusive in Lacan’s work.  
 
From Diagnosis… 
 
If not through recourse to the concept of sublimation, then what precisely has brokered 
the union between art and psychoanalysis in this thesis? In the first place, 
psychoanalysis has levied a certain diagnostic power. This power has not so much been 
directed towards artists, but rather towards artworks and social forms. More precisely, 
artworks have been treated as symptoms of particular social forms. In this way it was 
possible to diagnose the decline of the Symbolic as an underlying factor in the shift 
away from an ethico-aesthetic paradigm of transgression. This proposition — that 
changes to capitalism have had far-reaching effects on the Symbolic structures that 
anchor meaning and prohibition — sits at the centre of the argument, and is formulated 
on the basis that artworks constitute symptoms of social change.  
While a symptom necessarily points towards an underling cause, it does not 
necessarily do so in a direct or unmediated fashion. A symptomatic relationship is not a 
wholly deterministic relationship. In Lacan’s early work one finds a repudiation of the 
notion of a symptom as a direct route back to a cause, which is what distinguishes it 
from a medical symptom.514 The symptom cannot be found at the end of a piece of 
string that one follows back through the maze of history to an original source. In 
Lacan’s work there is no universally valid meaning of any given symptom. The 
relationship between a symptom and its cause is one that is refracted through the 
networks of the Symbolic, at every step picking up semiotic baggage that changes its 
character. This is what Lacan calls the ‘formal envelope’ of the symptom, but it could 
be said that it is an envelope that paradoxically changes the character of the message it 
contains. It is not simply that causes generate symptoms and symptoms realise causes, 																																																																																																																																																																		
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(London: Verso, 2005), p. 212-13. 
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but rather that symptoms have a part to play in the co-construction of the cause itself. 
One way of bridging the gap between art and psychoanalysis can, therefore, be 
found in their respective symptomologies. In a short interview entitled 'Mysticism and 
Masochism', Deleuze speaks of symptomology as a method that has as much to do with 
art as it does medicine: ‘symptomology appeals to a kind of neutral point, a limit that is 
premedical or sub-medical […]: it's all about drawing a "portrait". The work of art 
exhibits symptoms, as do the body or the soul’.515 Treating artworks as symptoms of 
underlying social forms places their author in the position of analyst, rather than 
analysand. No longer the focus of speculation on their presumed psychic dysfunctions 
or personal history, the artist becomes the creator of ‘portraits’ — a process that 
involves grouping and regrouping signs in new ways. Just as James Parkinson was able 
to re-order signs in such a way to isolate Parkinson’s disease at the beginning of the 19th 
century, so too can artists and writers like Sacher-Masoch bring together signs that 
reveal socio-cultural formations in completely new ways.516 
In chapter 1 of this thesis the work of the Viennese Actionists was seen to 
operate in a similar diagnostic mode. While their names did not come to label the socio-
cultural forms they isolated in the same way as Masoch, their work nevertheless created 
a symptomology of an Austrian social sphere that had not been fully de-nazified. 
Thinking alongside such artworks entails adding another layer to the artists’ 
symptomologies, so that the mode with which the Actionists diagnosed underlying 
social ills in Austria itself becomes symptomatic. The way in which they created a 
portrait of Austrian social life by bringing together particular symptoms was 
underpinned by specific ‘logics’ of transgression. Treating these logics themselves as 
symptoms, and following them forward in time, makes it possible to discern the ways in 
which the Symbolic changes. In different ways, the first three chapters of this thesis 
could all be said to operate in a predominantly diagnostic mode. Artworks have been 
selected and grouped together in specific ways that point towards a set of underlying 
causes.  
  
																																																								
515  Gilles Deleuze, ‘Mysticism and Masochism’, in Desert Islands and Other Texts, ed. by David 
Lapoujade (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), pp. 131-134 (p. 132). Elsewhere Deleuze credits Nietzsche 
with inventing a symptomological method. See Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. xi. The contours of 
this method are sketched in Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Philosopher as Cultural Physician’, in Philosophy 
and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's, ed. by Daniel Breazeale (London: 
Humanities International Press, 1979), pp. 69-76.  
516  For an extended treatment of Masochism see Gilles Deleuze, ‘Coldness and Cruelty’, in Masochism 
(New York: Zone Books, 1991), pp. 9-138. 
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…To Production 
 
If the engagement between art and psychoanalysis in this thesis is mediated through the 
common method of symptomology, something changes when the concept of the 
symptom is progressively reworked and becomes the sinthome. The focus is no longer 
simply diagnostic, but also productive. When viewed in a sinthomatic way, artworks not 
only have the capacity to reveal something about the changing patterns of social life, but 
to actively intervene in this life, producing vectors of change. This makes the bridge 
between art and psychoanalysis into something more pragmatic, where the goal is not 
only to use psychoanalysis to ‘read’ works of art and reveal their underlying causal 
dynamics, but to bring psychoanalysis and art together into variable composites that can 
construct new objects, ideas, and practices. In this way the bond between 
psychoanalysis and art is forged in the crucible of a pragmatism that aims to supply new 
resources for processes of subjectivation. This, I would argue, is a thoroughly ethico-
aesthetic enterprise.  
The shift from a symptomology to a sinthomology, from diagnostics to 
production, is a shift that finds its progressive expression in a movement from the 
beginning to the end of this thesis. If the arguments in chapters 1-3 operated in a 
predominantly diagnostic mode, then this was gradually supplemented with a set of 
concepts that operate in a more productive way. This shift to production is however 
flanked by two dangers. These have already been touched on in chapters 4-6, but here it 
is worth briefly drawing the loose ends of these arguments together and outlining them 
in a more schematic form.  
On the one hand production can result in the ossification of the existing 
structures that condition subjectivity. As was shown in chapters 5 and 6, production can 
easily lead to stultifying renovations and stronger egos as it can experimental repairs 
and ‘fabulous’ images. These productive forces are marked by a sclerotic reaction to the 
decline of the Symbolic — reactions that knot the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary 
in ways that duplicate one or other of the elements already present.  
The discussion of ordinary psychosis in chapter 4 signaled a second danger that 
potentially accompanies production: the loss of subjectivity. A note of caution 
accompanies both Lacan and Guattari’s calls for practices of subjective 
experimentation. In different ways, they show us that production can unleash flows of 
desire, or regimes of jouissance, that overwhelm the subject to such an extent that it 
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becomes difficult to speak of a subject at all. As demonstrated in part 1, this was the 
fate that befell Antigone: eager to escape Creon’s over-codified social sphere, she 
plunges headlong towards subjective annihilation. In a similar vein Guattari, together 
with Deleuze, warns of the dangers of falling into a subjective ‘black hole’, which they 
relate to a ‘precocious’ deterritorialisation that occurs too quickly, too violently.517   
Treading a path between these two dangers requires some diagnostic focus to be 
retained, if only to show where the dangers lie. It also requires attention to be paid to the 
specific ways in which the production of subjectivity is supported. The concept of the 
sinthome is just such a principle of support that treads a fine line between the subjective 
black hole of psychosis on the one hand, and sclerotic production on the other. The 
imperative, then, is not only to symptomise, nor simply to unleash desire in 
uncontrollable ways, but to scaffold, modulate, and use artworks as supports for 
subjective mutations. This is one of the crucial propositions that can be drawn from part 
2. The supports artworks can provide in processes of subjectivation have the capacity to 
facilitate unique orientations for a subject that is ‘re-inscribed’ in the Other, rather than 
irrevocably withdrawn. In respect to the main argument of this thesis, my suggestion is 
that this position has the capacity to bind ethics and aesthetics in a new paradigmatic 
relationship beyond transgression.  
Despite the theoretical through-lines, micro-arguments, and numerous asides, 
the main focus of this thesis is indeed the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in 
contemporary art. The very fact that it has been possible to point towards more than one 
paradigm for the relationship at stake shows that ethics and aesthetics do not relate to 
one another in a fixed way. It has not been my ambition to exhaustively catalogue all 
the possible permutations between the two. Rather, I have tried to show that ethics and 
aesthetics periodically stabilise into specific ‘ethico-aesthetic paradigms’ within 
contemporary art, and that these paradigms form and deform in response to wider socio-
cultural changes.  
Before drawing the conclusion to a close, it is worth recapitulating the three 
overarching ambitions outlined in the introduction: 1) to account for the patterns of 
historical emergence of the ethico-aesthetic paradigm of transgression; 2) to account for 
the historical decline of this paradigm; and 3) to trace the contours of an ethico-aesthetic 
paradigm ‘after’ transgression. The first of these ambitions was realised through a close 
look at a number of artworks and the socio-cultural conditions from which they 
emerged. An argument was built over the course of these three chapters that 																																																								
517  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 334.   
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transgressive artworks require a ‘strong’ Symbolic order to react against. The second 
ambition was realised over the same three chapters by means of the proposition that the 
Symbolic was in decline in the contexts discussed, leading to the decline of 
transgression itself. The third and final ambition was geared less towards convincingly 
diagnosing an existing state of affairs than actively producing a range of possibilities. 
This approach, characterised more by production than diagnosis, emphasises the modal 
component of the question ‘how might one live?’, opening up a space of possibilities, 
rather than enumerating a set of obligations. 
In the introduction it was also argued that a movement away from the ethico-
aesthetic paradigm of transgression represents a transition from a reactive to a 
progressively active mode. In fact, all of the artworks discussed in this thesis have a 
certain active role in co-constructing their cause, insofar as they are symptomatic in the 
way outlined above. Nevertheless, the extent to which this co-construction takes place is 
not distributed evenly. The shift from transgressive to sinthomatic artworks is consistent 
with an increase in the magnitude by which something has the capacity to self-cause. In 
the Spinoist tradition, knowledge of causes becomes a central tenet of ethics. From a 
psychoanalytic perspective, an understanding of the way a subject is acted upon 
supplies them with an opportunity to change the nature of this causal relationship. The 
transitions from a symptomology to a sinthomology — from a diagnostics to a 
production — all push in this same direction, augmenting the capacity for a subject to 
become their own cause. My suggestion is that in transgression’s relationship to the 
Name-of-the-Father (or the superego, or the state) there persists a relationship of 
external causality. Transgressive artworks remain trapped by the targets of their 
critique. The challenge to transform external causality into self-causality (where this 
‘self’ can belong as much to a group as to an individual) is congruent with a shift 
towards the post-transgressive ethico-aesthetic paradigm this thesis has attempted to 
theorise and advance.  
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